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Chapter One 
Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
 Earnings quality is of considerable interest to the participants in the financial reporting 
process including present and potential investors, creditors and lenders, preparers of financial 
reports, auditors and assurance providers, regulators and standard setters, analysts and financial 
press commentators. As a reflection of this bourgeoning interest, both analytical and empirical 
research on the proxies, determinants, and consequences of earnings quality have grown 
tremendously over the past two decades.1 The major drivers for the dramatic surge in earnings 
quality literature are likely to be the confluence of several factors that have both encouraged and 
facilitated this line of research. These factors include regulators’ harsh allegations of widespread 
earnings management among public companies, the introduction of the abnormal accrual models, 
the development and implementation of a set of internationally accepted accounting standards 
and the introduction of numerous new electronic data sets (DeFond, 2010). The importance of 
earnings quality research can also be justified by the ubiquitous nature of earnings and earnings-
based metrics. Earnings have multitude of uses in various contexts. Earnings enter different 
valuation models and investment decision models as key inputs. Lower quality earnings can thus 
lead to poor decisions resulting in capital misallocations or wastage of scarce resources in the 
worst cases of fraud. Earnings also appear in different contractual arrangements such as in debt 
contracts or compensation contracts. Therefore, low quality of earnings can cause inordinate 
payouts to employees or can mask decaying credit quality from lenders. Against this backdrop, 
this thesis undertakes three empirical investigations to provide evidence on the stock market 
implications of earnings quality in the Japanese context. Japanese stock market has been selected 
as the subject of study because Japan has the second largest stock market in the world 
representing about 10% of the world’s stock market capitalization (behind only the United States’ 
36% of global market capitalization). The capitalist economy has sophisticated equity markets 
and well-developed information dissemination systems, as well as widely-varying agency 
settings operating within common legal parameters (Landis et al., 2010). Yet, a careful search of 
                                                 
1 Dechow et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive review of an emerging stream of literature covering the proxies, 
determinants and consequences of earnings quality. 
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the “top-ranked” accounting journals exposes the paucity of academic papers on the stock market 
implications of earnings quality conducted in the Japanese equity market.  
 A great deal of academic research on the market consequences of earnings quality has 
investigated the impact of earnings quality on various indicators of stock market outcomes such 
as the cost of capital, abnormal returns, idiosyncratic return volatility, market liquidity, 
information asymmetry, properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts and others.  This thesis 
examines the impact of earnings quality on three stock market outcomes for a broad cross-
section of Japanese manufacturing firms for the period 2002-2012. The market outcomes 
considered for this thesis are the cost of equity capital, firm-specific return volatility, and 
information asymmetry. These outcome indicators have significant implications for the capital 
market participants for efficient allocation of resources in an economy. The cost of equity capital 
is considered as a summary indicator of investors’ capital allocation decisions (Francis et al., 
2004). The existence of a large volume of research dealing with the determinants of the cost of 
capital demonstrates the importance of this issue. Hence, the factors affecting the cost of capital 
are of utmost interest to accounting and finance researchers, corporate managers and policy 
makers. For example, understanding the determinants of the cost of capital is important to 
corporate managers because the cost of capital plays a significant role in corporate capital 
budgeting decisions that require selecting and investing in positive net present value (NPV) 
projects leading to shareholders’ wealth maximization. Likewise, for investors, the cost of capital 
is necessary for equity valuation. Academic researchers require a reliable empirical proxy for the 
cost of equity capital when examining the effect of the variable of interest on firms’ cost of 
equity capital (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). On the macro level, lower cost of capital prompts 
greater investment, having a favorable impact on the economy as a whole. The firm-specific 
return volatility has important implications for (i) individual investors for making optimum 
portfolio diversification strategy; (ii) arbitrageurs who look for substitutes for mispriced stocks 
with lower idiosyncratic volatility; and (iii) executive compensation policies tied with stock 
options (Rajgopal and Venkatchalam, 2011). Moreover, a growing body of research suggests that 
idiosyncratic return volatility can explain some of the cross-sectional variation in stock returns in 
the sense that higher idiosyncratic risk stocks appear to have higher stock returns (Goyan and 
Santa-Clara, 2003; Fu, 2005). This line of research implies that firm-specific return volatility can 
affect the cost of capital. Information asymmetry is an important concept in accounting literature 
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because one of the fundamental roles of accounting disclosure is to reduce information 
asymmetry in the capital market. A large number of existing theoretical models addressed the 
impact of information asymmetry on the expected return demanded by the uninformed investors 
in response to their anticipated loss in a trade with better informed investors (Kyle, 1985; 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easely and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2011; Lambert and 
Verrecchia, 2010). Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Easley et al. (2002), Armstrong et al. (2011) 
and Akins et al. (2012) empirically test the prediction of these theoretical studies, and find 
evidence of a significant relation between information asymmetry and the cost of capital. 
Furthermore, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) suggest an indirect path where earnings quality can 
affect the cost of capital mediated by information asymmetry. Information asymmetry among 
investors can also result in adverse private and social consequences including low investor 
participation, high transaction costs, thin markets and decreased gains from trade (Lev, 1989). 
Moreover, Francis et al. (2006) suggest that stock market perspective of earnings quality focuses 
on the capital allocation view of earnings quality. Therefore, demonstrating a link between 
earnings quality and market outcomes implies a fundamental economic role of accounting 
information and earnings-related information in particular in capital allocation decisions.  
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the stock market outcomes of earnings 
quality in the Japanese equity market. To this end, this study selects three indicators of stock 
market outcomes and conducts three empirical investigations that relate earnings quality 
measures with those outcomes in order to explore whether earnings quality has any impact on 
those outcomes. The outcome indicators are the cost of equity capital, firm-specific return 
volatility, and information asymmetry among investors. These outcome indicators are selected 
for investigation because of their alleged role in the development of a transactionally and 
informaitonally efficient stock marke that can foster economic growth and enhance economic 
welfare through ensuring better allocation of scarce resources among competing units in the 
economy. In a broader sense, this thesis will complement our understanding of the role of 
earnings quality not only for the efficient allocation of resources but also for the well-functioning 
of capital markets in an economy. 
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 Prior research on the consequences of earnings quality has identified two sources (innate 
versus discretionary) that can affect the quality of earnings of a given firm, and investigated their 
impact on various stock market outcomes such as cost of capital (Francis et al., 2005) and 
information asymmetry (Bhattacharya et al., 2013).  Therefore, a secondary objective of this 
thesis is to distinguish earnings quality measure into two components (innate and discretionary) 
using the approach suggested by Francis et al. (2005), and investigate their differential effect on 
the selected outcome variables.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 This thesis fits into a line of research which broadly examines the consequences of 
earnings quality. With above research objectives, the specific research questions addressed in 
this thesis include: 
1. Does earnings quality affect the cost of equity capital? 
2. Does earnings quality have any impact on firm-specific return volatility? 
3. Does earnings quality influence information asymmetry among investors? 
4. Does innate and discretionary components of earnings quality have differential effect on the 
cost of equity capital, firm-specific return volatility and information asymmetry among 
investors? 
 
1.4 Motivation for the Research 
 The growing demand for research on earnings quality has drawn considerable attention of 
academic researchers in last two decades all over the world. While the study on the determinants 
and consequences of earnings quality has recently been the subject of enormous academic 
research in the United States, the number of research papers published in top-tier accounting 
journals on the issue of earnings quality and its impact on the capital markets in the Japanese 
context is very scant. The international cross-country studies on earnings quality expose the low 
quality of earnings in Japan compared to other developed countries (Leuz et al., 2003; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2003).  On the determinants side, many studies have examined how different 
unique institutional characteristics such as keiretsu affiliation and cross-corporate shareholdings, 
various ownership categories, information intermediaries or accounting standard and disclosure 
affect the quality of earnings of Japanese firms. On the other hand, few studies have examined 
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the consequences of earnings quality. The lack of sufficient evidence on the stock market 
outcomes of earnings quality provides the impetus for conducting this research. So, this thesis 
will contribute to fill this gap in the earnings quality literature by providing evidence on the stock 
market consequences of earnings quality in the Japanese context.  
 Earnings quality is one of the most important characteristics of financial reporting 
systems. The concept of earnings quality is especially important in the context of capital markets. 
High-quality information is said to improve capital market efficiency. Therefore, investors, 
creditors and other users have a compelling interest in high-quality financial accounting 
information. Standard setters also try to develop high-quality accounting standards that will 
improve earnings quality, and regulators introduce frequent changes in financial reporting 
systems, corporate governance and enforcement intending to achieve a similar objective. 
Between 1999 and 2002, there were a number of significant changes to corporate financial 
reporting in Japan known as “Big-Bang Accounting Reforms.” These changes essentially 
involved setting up western-style institutions such as Accounting Standards Board of Japan 
(ASBJ) that follows closely the model of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) of the 
United States, and convergence of local accounting standards with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs). As part of the convergence process, JASB issued new accounting 
standards that are in line with IFRSs. Prior to the issuance of new accounting standards, Japanese 
accounting standards were similar to German code law. Moreover, Japanese financial system 
was bank-dominated where banks and other financial institutions used to satisfy a significant 
portion of total funding requirements of the companies. In the bank-based financial system, the 
role of publicly available accounting information was limited because these banks had direct 
access to private information of their client firms. The adoption of big-bang accounting reforms 
reflects the transformation of the Japanese financial system from a bank-centered system to a 
market-centered system where the quality of financial reporting in general and the quality of 
reported earnings, in particular, emerge as a significant issue to the constituents of the financial 
reporting process. The gradual transition of Japanese financial system from traditional bank-
based system to a capital market-based system provides an excellent setting to study the stock 
market outcomes of the quality of financial reporting in Japan. 
 
 
6 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 The thesis consists of seven chapters. The introductory chapter gives an overview of the 
whole research including the background, research objectives, research questions and the motivation 
for the research.  Chapter two provides a description of the significance of earnings for various 
decision-making purposes and the importance of earnings quality research. A discussion of the 
drivers of financial reporting and accounting information, the theoretical explanations for the 
prominence of earnings and related empirical evidences, the valuation versus contracting role of 
earnings and the reasons for renewed interest in earnings quality research by the users of 
financial information are main contents of this chapter. Chapter three delineates researchers’ 
attempts to give precise definition of earnings quality, lists widely used proxies of earnings 
quality, explains the reasons for choosing accruals-based earnings quality proxies for this 
research and discusses about the components of earnings quality. Chapter four, five and six 
present the results from three empirical investigations. Chapter four deals with the cost of equity 
capital effect of earnings quality. Chapter five examines the relation between earnings quality 
and firm-specific return volatility. Chapter six examines the impact of earnings quality on 
information asymmetry among investors. A review of related theoretical and empirical literature 
along with development of testable hypotheses, research design issues including variable 
measurement and model specifications to test the hypotheses, sample selection procedure, and 
discussion of the empirical results are presented in each of chapter four, five and six. Chapter 
seven contains the conclusion of the study. First findings of the study are summarized and 
synthesized. The contributions and limitations of the study and scope for future research are then 
presented to conclude the study. 
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Chapter Two 
 Significance of Earnings and Earnings Quality Research 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 The central theme of this thesis is to conduct an empirical study on the stock market 
outcomes of earnings quality in the Japanese setting. Before providing empirical evidence, it is 
important to know why earnings are of significant interest to wide range of users, and why 
research on earnings quality is especially important in the context of stock markets. The 
objective of this chapter is to give an overview of the drivers of financial accounting information, 
to provide theoretical explanations and empirical evidence in favor of the prominence of 
earnings information to financial reporting community, to explain the role of earnings and its 
implication in the capital market setting, and to highlight the importance of earnings quality 
research for efficient resource allocation in the economy. 
 
2.2 Demand for Financial Reporting and Accounting Information 
 It is generally acknowledged that demand for financial reporting arises from the presence 
of information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors in the 
capital markets (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Information problem stemming from information 
asymmetry and incentive problems stemming from agency conflicts impede the efficient 
allocation of resources in the capital markets. Information asymmetry occurs because managers 
typically have better firm-specific information than investors about the value of investment 
opportunities of their business, but do not always disclose all value relevant information and tend 
to withhold unfavorable information that may be damaging to their personal interests. Managers 
often exploit this information advantage for extracting private gains at the expense of the general 
investors’ welfare. Therefore, investors face an information problem when they make an 
investment in risky securities. 2  On the other hand, agency conflicts arise because of the 
separation of ownership from management in the public firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
public firms are owned by the shareholders but managed and controlled by a group of specialized 
                                                 
2In a seminal paper, Akerlof (1970) explains this information or “lemons” problem using an example from a used 
car market in which half of the cars are good and half of them are bad (lemons). Since it is impossible for a buyer to 
distinguish a good car from a lemon, all cars must sell at the same price. Consequently, this prevents the seller of a 
good car from receiving a fair price of the car. At the extreme, good cars may be driven out of the market by lemons, 
because no seller has incentive to sell at the price set by the market. 
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professionals (commonly known as management) who are appointed by the owners and are 
entrusted to act on behalf of them. This separation between ownership and control creates a 
conflict of interest between firm’s management and shareholders in that the interest of the 
management may not be consistent with the interest of the shareholders. The management makes 
most of the decisions on behalf of the shareholders but the decisions taken by the management 
do not necessarily coincide with the wishes of the shareholders. Thus, once investors have 
invested their funds in the firm, the self-interested managers may have incentives to make 
decisions that expropriate the investors’ funds. For example, the managers may receive excessive 
compensation or make investment decisions that are detrimental to the investors but beneficial to 
the managers themselves. Therefore, mitigating information problem and agency problem is 
essential for facilitating capital formation process in the economy and ensuring efficient 
allocation of capital among most productive firms. 
 Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest a number of solutions both to the information problem 
and the agency problem. For example, optimal contracts between shareholders and managers 
may align the interests of the two parties, independent auditors can verify the accuracy of the 
reported numbers revealed to the capital markets, information intermediaries can produce more 
value relevant information for the investors, or financial intermediaries can assume active 
monitoring role in disciplining management. Regardless of the importance of the above-
mentioned mechanisms, financial statements and accounting earnings, in particular, are viewed 
as the most important single source of information that can mitigate information problems and 
agency problems (Healy, 1996). 
 
2.3 Importance of Earnings to Financial Reporting Community 
 Accounting earnings have transfixed both investors and managers over a long period.  
Earnings are ubiquitously used in reporting a company's operating performance and in conveying 
its value to the public. The announcement of annual and quarterly earnings is greeted with 
significant stock price movements suggesting that accounting earnings contain and reveal 
valuable information to the investors. Therefore, it seems to be natural that consumers of 
financial information will base their decisions on reported earnings figure, and managers of firms 
will eye on manipulating earnings to change the decisions of users in their favor.  
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2.3.1 Theoretical Explanations 
 Ronen and Yaari (2008) discuss three scholarly explanations that help understand the 
prominence of earnings to a large constituency of accounting information. The three 
explanations are: (i) the costly-contracting approach, (ii) the decision-usefulness approach, and 
(iii) the legal-political approach. 
 
2.3.1.1 The Costly-contracting Approach  
 The costly-contracting approach defines the firm as a nexus of contracts made between 
the firm represented by management and outsiders, such as lenders, and between the firm 
represented by the board and insiders, such as management. Earnings are used in these contracts 
because they are explicitly and mutually observable. According to this approach, earnings are 
valuable in drafting a contract that is not complete and one of the parties to the contract behaves 
opportunistically. Practically it is impossible to design a truly complete contract since some 
future contingencies are unforeseen by boundedly rational parties to the contract.  Hence, the 
contracts can be made partially complete by incorporating a flexible array of renegotiable 
options that reflect changing circumstances. Accounting numbers will lose importance if the 
contracts can be made optimally adjustable to the changing circumstances. So the fact that 
contracts are not complete is not in itself sufficient to render accounting numbers valuable 
because contracting parties could constantly revise the contract. Even when contracts are 
optimally adjustable to the changing economic circumstances, the adjustment may be costly, or 
the contracting parties may not be willing to do so because of opportunistic behavior. In addition 
to the incompleteness of the contract, if the parties to the contract behave opportunistically, then 
one of them might refuse to adjust the contract. Thus, the combination of incompleteness and 
opportunism renders contracts imperfectly adjustable to changing economic circumstances and 
lends importance to accounting numbers (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
 
2.3.1.2 The Decision-usefulness Approach  
 A firm is a social unit of individuals who join, cooperate and participate in the activities 
of the firm to achieve a collective goal. These participating individuals are called decision 
makers. Decision makers are rational human beings who are driven by self-interest maximization 
behavior. Consequently, they will work for the well-functioning of the organization as long as 
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they find their individual interest being achieved. The decision-usefulness approach, which is 
derived from game theory, focuses on a single decision maker. One important assumption of 
decision-usefulness approach is that each decision maker is rational in that he chooses those 
actions that maximize his expected utility. An action (decision) is optimal if it maximizes his 
expected utility, when he has to select a decision from a range of feasible actions (decisions), 
knowing that the combination of his action (decision) and the actions (decisions) of other 
pertinent decision makers will determine his share of the social outcome. Thus, a decision 
maker’s share in the social outcome depends in part on the actions (decisions) taken by other 
decision makers. The emphasis on optimal decisions implies that any accounting number is 
valuable if it conveys useful information to all decision makers for their respective decision 
making. Under this approach, decision makers are not fully informed, and earnings are important 
to them because they believe that earnings provide relevant information that is useful for making 
decisions. Conversely, an accounting signal that does not reveal any incremental information is 
not useful for decision making (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
 
2.3.1.3 The Legal-political Approach 
 The legal-political approach also views the firm as a nexus of contracts, but contracts 
with all stakeholders are not equally important. The contract between management and 
shareholders is given priority over contracts with other stakeholders. This approach recognizes 
the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Management takes actions to 
manage the firm’s resources and assets to generate a stream of cash flows or earnings, but they 
do not possess the right to these cash flows or earnings. The right to cash flows or earnings 
belongs to shareholders who hold the common stock but as a residual claimant, they are not 
guaranteed any cash. Both parties pursue their respective self-interest, and there is no a priori 
guarantee that their interests will be aligned. Under this approach, not only the existence of a 
conflict of interests but also the lack of power of shareholders over decisions that affect their 
share of the firm lends importance to accounting information. Hence, two features of manager-
shareholders situation prevent the shareholders from maximizing their welfare. One is poor 
governance, and the other is information. That is, shareholders need information to monitor 
management and the board with the limited tools in their possession. Earnings are summary 
numbers that convey valuable information about the operation of the firms. Shareholders can 
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learn valuable information from these summary numbers without knowing detail operations of 
the firm, a process that might be too costly and cumbersome and might run the risk of exposing 
proprietary information to the competitors (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
 To summarize, the aforementioned theoretical perspectives explain why earnings are the 
most useful information for all the constituencies associated with accounting and financial 
reporting. The costly-contracting approach holds that earnings are essential for designing 
efficient contracts when the contracts are far from complete regarding specifying future 
contingencies. The decision-usefulness approach states that earnings provide valuable 
information to decision makers for respective decision making. The legal-political approach 
assumes that shareholders have neither knowledge nor power to monitor and control managers 
effectively. So earnings are valuable measure that summarizes a firm’s activities and allow 
shareholders to make effective use of their limited tools. 
 
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence 
 Earnings are at the core of the financial reporting process and receive utmost prominence 
by a wide range of users since earnings numbers are used as a summary measure of firm 
performance in various contexts such as in firm valuation, in executive compensation contracts 
or in debt covenants. It is well-known that accounting earnings are cash flows generated from the 
operations of the firm, adjusted by accruals. Academic finance literature prioritizes cash flows 
over accounting earnings as a measure of firm performance. Cash flows are assumed to be 
relatively objective measure of firm performance because cash flows are free from subjective 
judgment that managers can apply over accruals. In contrast, the proponents of earnings as a 
better measure of firm performance argue that cash flows are subject to periodic fluctuations, and 
accruals are introduced to smooth these fluctuations. Accruals shift or adjust recognition of cash 
flows over time to make financial statements more revealing about the real economic 
performance of the firm (Dechow, 1994; Dechow et al., 1998). Thus, the accrual adjustment 
process enables earnings to be a better indicator of performance than cash flows. Another reason 
for the importance of accounting earnings is that earnings reflect cash flows forecasts and are 
highly correlated with firm value (Dechow, 1994). This ability of earnings to reflect future cash 
flows makes earnings a better proxy for future cash flows than current cash flows. Therefore, 
Dechow et al. (1998) state that earnings are repeatedly used as performance measures in 
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contractual arrangements and as input to the equity valuation models. Empirical research has 
examined whether earnings or cash flows better measure firm’s performance. An assumption 
underlying this stream research is that stock prices accurately reflect the economic income of a 
firm. Early research focused on the information content of the accruals and cash flows. In a 
phenomenal work, Ball and Brown (1968) find that earnings are highly associated with stock 
returns than are operating cash flows. Since accruals are the difference between earnings and 
cash flows, this result suggests that accruals improve the ability of accounting earnings to reflect 
firm performance. In a similar vein, Wilson (1986, 1987), Rayburn (1986), Bowen et al. (1986), 
Bernard and Stober (1989) and Livnat and Zarowin (1990) report that the accruals and cash 
flows components of earnings have information content. 
 These studies do not directly examine the superiority of earnings over cash flows as a 
summary measure of firm performance. Dechow (1994) compares the strength of association 
between stock returns and earnings versus stock returns and cash flows over different 
measurement intervals to formally establish that earnings are superior to cash flows as a 
summary measure of firm performance. Results show that earnings have a stronger association 
with stock returns than net cash flows or cash flows from operations over short measurement 
intervals (i.e. quarterly). The explanatory power of realized cash flows relative to earnings will 
increase as the measurement interval is increased from a quarterly interval to an annual interval 
and a four year period, respectively. However, earnings are more strongly associated with stock 
returns than either cash flows measure over each measurement interval. Based on this evidence, 
Dechow (1994) concludes that earnings are better measure of firm’s financial performance. 
Similarly, Lev and Zaworin (1999) find that stock prices react more strongly to reported net 
income as compared to operating cash flows, which means that investors appreciate earnings as a 
performance indicator more than cash flows. Penman and Sougiannis (1998) find that forecast 
errors are smaller in valuation models when earnings are used instead of cash flows. Dechow and 
Schrand (2004) note that accruals, if used appropriately, improve the decision usefulness of 
earnings by lessening value-irrelevant fluctuations in underlying cash flows. Dechow and 
Skinner (2000) contend that accruals tend to reduce the temporal variation of cash flows, and 
thus produce a more useful earnings number than cash flows of the current period. 
 Earnings have significant relevance to the internal decision-makers and the producers of 
financial reports also. In a comprehensive survey of the CFOs conducted by Graham et al. (2005), 
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an overwhelming majority (51%) of the CFOs state that earnings, not cash flows, are the most 
important financial metric considered by the external constituents. This finding suggests that 
accounting earnings are more important to the managers for financial reporting purposes than 
cash flows because earnings may have superior informational content about firm value than do 
cash flows.3 The interviews of the CFOs have highlighted several reasons for their exclusive 
focus on earnings such as investors’ need for a simple and easily understandable financial metric 
that summarizes firm performance, extensive media coverage and dissemination of earnings 
news by the financial press, or sophisticated users’ (financial analysts, institutional investors) 
reliance on earnings for assessing firm performance and predicting future value. CFOs also 
believe that meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is crucial because hitting earnings 
benchmarks provides credible signal to the market, helps to maximize their firm’s stock prices, 
influences their own welfare through career concerns and external reputation, and contributes to 
avoid severe stock market reaction associated with failing to meet or exceed earnings 
expectations (Graham et al., 2005).  
 
2.4 The Role of Earnings: Valuation or Stewardship 
 As the most widely used accounting information, earnings perform dual roles: 
informativeness role and stewardship role (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). The informativeness role of 
earnings arises from the fact that investors demand relevant and reliable information about future 
expected cash flows and the risk associated with those cash flows. One way to evaluate the 
informativeness role of earnings is to examine the relationship between reported earnings and 
stock prices. For example, Francis et al. (2003) find that earnings are more closely associated 
with stock prices, and earnings have more information content than cash flows, sales, and other 
financial statements’ elements. However, the recent evidence on the preference of street earnings 
over GAAP earnings and the decreasing association between earnings and stock prices raises 
question about the informativeness of earnings. On the other hand, the stewardship role of 
earnings lies in the agency relationship where managers act as agents (steward) of the principals 
(shareholders). The agency relationship predicts that managers, being self-interest maximizing 
                                                 
3 The importance of earnings to CFOs is affected by certain firm characteristics. For example, earnings are relatively 
less important to the CFOs of unprofitable, younger and financially distressed firms, firms for which translation of 
economic events into earnings is slow, or firms operating in high-tech industries (Graham et al., 2005). 
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individuals, may act in a manner that is inconsistent with the expectation of the shareholders. 
This possibility will motivate the shareholders to demand information to monitor the 
performance of the manager and to provide managers with incentives that align managers’ 
interests with their own. As Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p. 113) state, “One function of 
financial reporting is to constrain management to act in the shareholders’ interest.” Earnings are 
used by the shareholders to monitor managers and to design incentive contracts that are expected 
to ensure goal congruence between owners and managers. However, the increase in equity-based 
compensation and decrease in the relative weight of earnings in managers’ incentive package 
cast doubt on the efficacy of the stewardship role of earnings. 
 There is a long-standing theoretical debate in accounting research about whether earnings 
are more useful for valuation purpose (Barth et al., 2001) or for stewardship and contracting 
purposes (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). These different perspectives on the role of earnings have 
practical implications for what is meant by earnings quality or what constitutes high-quality 
earnings. For example, earnings consisting of more persistent and less transitory or reversible 
components are considered “high-quality earnings” for valuation purpose but not for contracting 
purpose (Christensen et al., 2005). The survey by Dichev et al. (2013) of CFOs from public 
companies provides evidence on the relative prominence of the valuation role of earnings versus 
contracting role of earnings from the perspective of the producers of earnings quality. The 
responses of the CFOs, when asked about how earnings are used by the interested parties, 
indicate that the valuation role of earnings dominates with nearly 95% of the CFOs state that 
earnings are very important to the investors for valuation of stocks. However, the survey also 
finds that earnings are important for four other uses, which can be placed in the 
stewardship/contracting/control role of earnings. Specifically, the survey finds support for the 
importance of earnings (i) for use in debt contracts (82.1%); (ii) for internal use by the firm’s 
own executives (80.5%); (iii) for use in executive compensation contracts (78.7%); and (iv) for 
use by outsiders in evaluating company’s managers (62.7%).  
 This thesis assumes stock market perspective as opposed to contracting perspective and 
examines how earnings quality influences stock market outcomes. In the stock market setting, 
ex-ante resource allocation decision is seen as fundamental to ex-post evaluation of contractual 
outcomes or assessment of stewardship. Francis et al. (2006) suggest that stock market use of 
earnings information for capital allocation decisions is fundamental since it provides a basis for 
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other uses, such as stewardship and thus, prioritizes the informativeness/valuation role of 
earnings in the capital market setting. They also argue that whether and to what extent earnings 
quality affects resource allocation decisions help understand why and how earnings information 
is helpful for investors and others including those charged with stewardship responsibilities. 
Since I investigate the stock market consequences of earnings quality in this thesis, I focus on the 
valuation role of earnings and capital allocation view of earnings quality as opposed to 
contracting view.  
 
2.5 Why Research on Earnings Quality Is of Interest 
 Financial reporting is introduced as a useful device for mitigating information problem 
and incentive problem in the capital market. It is instrumental in reducing information 
asymmetry between management and external stakeholders by providing timely and reliable 
information. It is also commonly used in the contracting process of the firm with third parties, 
including executives, lenders, and suppliers. Hence, the quality of earnings is an essential aspect 
when concerned parties make decisions that are entirely or at least in part, based on earnings 
number (Dechow et al., 2010). 
 There has been a tremendous growth in earnings quality research over the last two 
decades. DeFond (2010) identifies several factors that have spurred and facilitated this line of 
research such as regulators’ harsh criticism of widespread earnings management, many instances 
of high-profile accounting scandals leading to the collapse of corporate giants, introduction of 
the abnormal accruals models and other proxies of earnings quality, the development and 
implementation of a set of “high-quality” international accounting standards, and easy 
accessibility to required data provided by new electronic databases. 
 The concept of “earnings quality” is at the heart of the accounting and financial reporting. 
An important objective of financial statements is to reflect the underlying reality of the firm and 
to provide information that effectively aids users in making decisions. Among all financial 
statement items, earnings are the single most commonly used financial information for 
multifarious purposes. Thus, lower quality earnings information will not serve its intended 
purposes and will lead to wrong decisions. Consequently, the ability to objectively determine the 
earnings quality of firms, to identify the factors influencing the quality of reported earnings, and 
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to assess the impact of earnings quality on stock market indicator has become a vital part of 
financial accounting research.  
 Schipper and Vincent (2003) discuss the importance of earnings quality from decision 
usefulness perspective adopted by the FASB and by academic scholars. They state that the issue 
of earnings quality is of significant interest to those who use financial information provided by 
financial reports for investment decision making or for contracting purposes. They also believe 
that standard setters have considerable interest in the quality of reported earnings because 
earnings quality or more generally financial reporting quality is viewed as an indirect indicator of 
the quality of financial reporting standards. 
 Earnings quality is extremely important for the investors who are contemplating to make 
a fresh investment of their valuable resources in the stock market or to dispose of their existing 
investment. Investors are only willing to invest their accumulated fund in any firm if the 
expected return on the investment matches the risk involved in that security. To evaluate the 
profitability and riskiness of potential investment opportunities, investors need information about 
the expected future earnings or cash flows and the associated risks. Managers of firms supply 
financial information including current and past earnings to the present and potential investors in 
the capital markets with a view to attracting capital investments for their firms. With these 
invested funds, managers then finance the risky projects that the firms undertake in order to 
maximize shareholder value. Hence, earnings information steers resource allocation decisions, 
and high-quality earnings are desired from an investment perspective because it facilitates 
efficient allocation of resources in the economy. Schipper and Vincent (2003) summarize the 
adverse consequences of low-quality earnings on capital allocation in the following words: 
“Low-quality earnings are inefficient because they reduce economic growth by causing capital to 
be misallocated. In the limit, earnings of such low quality as to be fraudulent are objectionable 
because they divert resources from substantive projects with actual expected payoffs to 
chimerical projects with imaginary expected payoffs.” 
 As earnings and earnings-based metrics enter into contractual agreements such as in 
compensation agreements and in debt agreements as dominating or restrictive criteria, 
contracting decisions based on low-quality or poor earnings may induce unintended wealth 
transfers. For example, when earnings are used as a performance measure in the compensation 
contracts in which incentives are directly linked with performance, artificially inflated earnings 
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will result in overcompensation to managers. Similarly, overstated earnings might hide 
deteriorating creditworthiness, leading lenders mistakenly to continue lending or to defer 
foreclosure (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). An opposite view is also prevalent in the literature. 
For example, Christensen et al. (2002) show that earnings management can improve contracting 
efficiency. Christensen et al. (2005) analyze the contracting implication of different properties of 
accounting earnings and its components (persistence and autocorrelation structure), and show 
that the stochastic characteristics of the various components of accounting earnings have 
different effects on the value of accounting earnings as a performance measure in incentive 
contracting relative to the use of accounting earnings for valuation purpose. For example, while 
improving “earnings quality” by increasing persistent component, reducing reversible component, 
eliminating transitory component or reducing accrual estimation errors may be helpful for equity 
valuation, it may not be equally helpful for incentive contracting. This line of research suggests 
that earnings quality has differential implications for incentive contracts, and to the contracting 
parties who attempt to design an optimal and efficient contract. 
 There are practical difficulties in identifying and measuring overall indicators of financial 
reporting quality. As practitioners and users view earnings as a prominent outcome of the 
financial reporting process, many researchers focus on earnings quality to summarize financial 
reporting quality since earnings are easier to observe and measure. However, the exclusive focus 
on earnings quality as a summary indicator of financial reporting quality has some limitations. 
For example, earnings number masks the differences in the properties of various line items, 
which are aggregated into a single bottom line number.  The capital market implications of these 
line items are expected to vary depending on particular decision context.  In addition, earnings 
do not capture balance sheet information, which may have different properties and decision 
usefulness (Francis et al., 2006). Despite these limitations, the focus on the quality of earnings 
number seems to be appropriate because earnings number is believed to be the most important 
outcome indicator of financial reporting process by the researchers. In the same token, 
accounting standard setters tend to focus on the outputs of the financial reporting process, 
including the quality of reported earnings, when they seek feedback from financial reporting 
community in order to appraise the effectiveness of the standards they promulgate (Schipper and 
Vincent, 2003).  
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 Many research questions in accounting and finance explicitly or implicitly are associated 
with the idea of earnings quality. For example, the seminal work by Ball and Brown (1968) 
evaluates the relevance of accounting income number. Sloan (1996) evaluates differential 
persistence of various earnings components. Barth et al. (2008) examine the role of accounting 
standards in influencing the usability of financial reporting. Francis et al. (2004, 2005) examine 
the impact of earnings quality on the firms’ access to capital. This line of research on earnings 
quality is especially important because higher quality earnings should be more useful to a wide 
range of users, and assist them in their resource allocation decisions or contracting purposes. 
Therefore, it is of significant interest to the firms, investors, creditors, standard setters, and 
regulators to seek for continuous improvement in earnings quality. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter gives an overview of the significance of earnings in various decision 
contexts and highlights the importance of earnings quality research. At first, it is identified that 
the presence of information asymmetry and the separation between ownership and control gives 
rise to information problem and incentive problem, which impede the efficient allocation of 
resources in the capital markets. Among various mechanisms used to mitigate information 
problem and agency problem, financial accounting information and accounting earnings, in 
particular, are mostly valued by the investor. Then, three scholarly explanations are discussed to 
highlight the prominence of earnings to financial reporting community. According to the costly-
contracting approach, earnings are important for designing efficient contracts if the contracts are 
incomplete, and the parties to the contract behave opportunistically. The decision-usefulness 
approach holds that earnings number reveals valuable information to decision makers for making 
investment, credit and other decisions. The legal-political approach suggests that earnings 
number is a valuable measure that summarizes a firm’s activities and allows shareholders to 
make effective use of their limited tools. These theoretical explanations are supported by 
empirical evidence showing that earnings are more informative about firm performance than 
cash flows (Dechow, 1994), earnings are better predictor of future cash flows than current cash 
flows (Barth et al., 2001), earnings are repeatedly used in valuation models as performance 
measures (Dechow et al., 1998) and earnings are significantly associated with stock returns (Ball 
and Brown, 1968; Dechow, 1994). Survey results also indicate that managers view earnings as 
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the key metric evaluated by investors and analysts (Graham et al., 2005). The chapter then 
discusses the valuation and stewardship role of earnings. The valuation role of earnings 
emphasizes that investors require relevant and reliable information about future expected cash 
flows and the risk associated with those cash flows for security valuation purpose while the 
stewardship role of earnings recognizes that shareholders demand information to monitor the 
performance of the manager. While there is a debate about the role of earnings, a survey of CFOs 
indicates that valuation role of earnings dominates stewardship role (Graham et al., 2005). Last 
of all, the chapter discusses why earnings quality research is of significant interest from both 
investment and contracting perspective. 
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Chapter Three 
 Earnings Quality and Its Components 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 This chapter deals with different perspectives on the definition of earnings quality, lists a 
large number of empirical metrics available in the literature to proxy for earnings quality, 
explains the rationale for selecting accruals-based earnings quality measures for the purpose of 
this study, and discusses components of earnings quality. 
 
3.2 Definition of Earnings Quality 
 Surprisingly, the concept of earnings quality remains largely elusive, and a fast growing 
literature on earnings quality has failed to reach a consensus on the definition of earnings quality. 
As a result, there is no agreed upon definition of earnings quality in the literature although 
researchers have taken several attempts to provide a theoretical underpinning and to define and 
measure earnings quality more precisely. For example, Schipper and Vincent (2003) relate 
earnings quality with the theory of economic income. Dechow and Schrand (2004) assume that 
high-quality earnings reflect current performance and indicate future performance of a firm. 
Francis et al. (2006) define earnings quality as how precise reported earnings are with respect to 
a valuation-relevant construct. Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that higher quality earnings provide 
more information about a firm’s fundamental earnings process. Standard setting bodies such as 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) jointly develop a common conceptual framework that highlights the need for high-
quality financial reporting. Although the joint conceptual framework does not define quality 
precisely, it mentions that accounting information should possess some qualitative characteristics 
such as faithful representation, comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and understandability in 
order to achieve a higher quality (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011). 
 Many researchers have used the notion of decision-usefulness as an indicator of high-
quality earnings. Schipper and Vincent (2003) consider earnings quality from a decision-
usefulness perspective, following the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) 
conceptual framework. The conceptual framework provides general guidelines for high-quality 
financial reporting. The main purpose of financial statements is to provide information that is 
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useful for making decisions, following the intuition that financial reporting should effectively 
help users take informed decisions. As a result, earnings information which actually aids in 
decision making is considered to be of high quality. Their focus on decision-usefulness 
perspective is motivated by the following two reasons. Firstly, the FASB has shifted its focus 
from stewardship function of accounting to decision-usefulness perspective of accounting 
numbers in the conceptual framework. According to Concept Statement No. 1 (para. 34 and 
following), the primary purpose of financial reporting is to disseminate useful information for 
business decision making, and Concept Statement No. 2 (paras. 30 and 32) accentuates decision-
usefulness as overruling criteria for judging accounting choices. Secondly, decision-usefulness is 
empirically tractable and commonly used in accounting research. However, since there are 
myriad of users and uses (i.e., decision-makers and decisions) of earnings information, earnings 
quality from decision-usefulness perspective is heavily context-dependent. As a result, the 
assessment of decision-usefulness of earnings requires choosing a decision context and making 
specific assumptions about the decision makers and their uses of earnings number in that context. 
The conclusions then are conditional on the context chosen (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). The 
concept of earnings quality from decision-usefulness perspective carries different meaning to 
different financial statement users. Regulators view earnings to be of high quality when earnings 
are measured in conformance with the spirit and rules identified in generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). To the creditors, high-quality earnings are those that can be easily and 
rapidly converted into cash flows. To the compensation committees, high-quality earnings reflect 
managers’ real performance and are little influenced by the factors beyond management control 
(Dechow and Schrand, 2004). 
 Shipper and Vincent (2003) complement this context-specific decision-usefulness 
perspective on earnings quality with the context-neutral perspective of economic income. They 
relate “earnings quality” to the economic-based definition of earnings developed by Hicks 
(1939). 4  They define earnings quality as “the extent to which reported earnings faithfully 
represent Hicksian income, where representational faithfulness means "correspondence or 
                                                 
4 Hicksian income refers to the amount that can be consumed (that is, distributed to the shareholders as dividends) 
during a period, while leaving the firm equally well-off at the beginning and the end of the period. Hicksian income 
corresponds to the change in net economic assets resulting from transactions other than those with owners (Schipper 
and Vincent, 2003). This measure of income is tantamount to the newly introduced concept of “comprehensive 
income”.  
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agreement between a measure or description and the phenomenon that it purports to represent" 
(FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, para. 63)”. This definition embraces the idea that reported 
earnings will be of higher quality if reported earnings closely resemble economic earnings of 
which Hicksian income is an example. Focusing on Hicksian income is appropriate as Shipper 
and Vincent (2003) argue that “It abstracts from user-decision contexts; from accounting 
recognition rules, which preclude the recording of many economic assets and liabilities; from 
difficulties in reliably measuring assets and liabilities at their economic values; from the effects 
of management's judgments and estimates; and from the influence of auditors. The construct thus 
allows us to consider what reported earnings would look like in the absence of financial 
reporting rules and their implementation.” However, there are some practical difficulties of 
Hicksian income construct limiting its applicability. The exact measurement of Hicksian income 
and thus, the quantification of discrepancy between accounting income and Hicksian income are 
not possible because Hicksian income is empirically non-operational. Moreover, accounting 
recognition and measurement rules coupled with preparers’ implementation choices will not 
render reported earnings to measure Hicksian income. There are some approximate measures of 
Hicksian income available in the economic literature. The quality of accounting earnings can be 
judged by considering how closely reported earnings match with those approximations of 
Hicksian income (Schipper and Vincent, 2003).  
 Dechow and Schrand (2004) suggest that a high-quality earnings number should have 
three attributes: first, the reported earnings number should reflect current performance; second, it 
should be a good indicator of future operating performance; and, third, accurately annuitize the 
intrinsic value of the company. Thus, they analyze earnings quality from financial analysis 
perspective, and incorporate equity valuation perspective in the concept of earnings quality, 
highlighting analysts as very important users. This definition of high-quality earnings is closely 
related to Levitt (1998)’s concept of meaningful disclosure. Levitt (1998) says that managers 
should tell the investors the story of ‘where the company has been, where it is and where it will 
be going’ by providing high-quality disclosure. A high-quality earnings number does the same 
story-telling as mentioned by Levitt (1998) by giving users the flexibility with which they can 
evaluate the past and current operating performance, predict future operating performance and 
assess the intrinsic value of the firms. 
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 Francis et al. (2006) focus on capital market setting, as opposed to a contracting or 
stewardship setting, to lay out a research perspective on earnings quality because they view 
capital market uses of accounting information as fundamental in the sense of providing a basis 
for other uses. They associate earnings quality with a statistical notion, precision (that is, low 
variance), in the sense that higher quality earnings are more precise with respect to an underlying 
valuation-relevant construct that earnings are intended to describe. Despite their chosen focus on 
precision, they acknowledge that other attributes of earnings also contribute to the quality of 
earnings such as timeliness and unbiasedness. Francis et al.’s (2006) perspective of earnings 
quality complements that taken by Dechow and Schrand (2004) in that precise earnings would 
correspond to permanent earnings, and that taken by Schipper and Vincent (2003) in that precise 
earnings would represent a change in net wealth.  
 Dechow et al. (2010) define earnings quality as “Higher quality earnings provide more 
information about the features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific 
decision made by a specific decision-maker.” They also indicate three features of this definition 
of earnings quality. First, earning quality is decision-specific, i.e., it can be defined in the context 
of a specific decision model used by a specific decision maker. Second, higher quality earnings 
are informative about the firm’s unobservable financial performance. Third, earnings quality 
depends on both the firm’s fundamental earnings process and the accounting system that 
measure earnings. Thus, this definition of earnings quality embraces the idea that higher quality 
earnings should be informative of the features of a firm’s financial performances that are relevant 
to any decision taken by the users of financial statements. 
 In addition to aforesaid attempts to define earnings quality, academics and practitioners 
have thought of earnings quality in a number of different ways. For example, high-quality 
earnings are described as those that are persistent and sustainable predictor of future earnings 
(Penman and Zhang, 2002; Melumad and Nissim, 2009), are smooth (Francis et al., 2004), are 
closer to cash flows or contain small amount of accruals (Visvanathan, 2006), result from 
applying conservative rules (Watts, 2003a, 2003b), are value relevant (Francis and Schipper, 
1999), recognize losses more timely than gains (Basu, 1997; Beaver and Ryan, 2005), exhibit 
less earnings management (Barth et al., 2008), do not have special or non-recurring items 
(Dechow and Schrand, 2004; McVay, 2006), contain less accrual estimation errors and backed 
by past, present and future cash flows (Dechow and Dichev, 2002), have small changes in total 
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accruals orthogonal to firm fundamentals (DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; 
Kothari et al., 2005).  
 Dichev et al. (2013) conducted a large survey and a dozen of in-depth interviews with top 
financial executives of public companies to elicit their views on the concept of earnings quality 
and other related aspects. From CFOs’ responses, the sustainability notion of earnings quality 
emerges as a dominant theme, that is, they believe that higher quality earnings are sustainable 
and repeatable. CFOs specify some qualitative factors that affect earnings sustainability 
including consistent reporting choices over time, earnings backed by actual cash flows, and 
absence of one-off items and long-term accounting estimates. This view of earnings quality is 
consistent with the valuation function of earnings, where investors view the firm as a long-term 
stream of earnings and cash flows. Consistent with this view, current earnings are considered to 
be high quality if they serve as a good guide to the long-run profits of the firm. Interestingly 
earnings sustainability is also a desirable characteristic in credit decisions and managerial 
evaluation. Thus, contrary to the Dechow et al. (2010)’s idea that the concept and measures of 
earnings quality are strongly conditional on the specific decision setting, CFOs view earnings 
quality as a distinct and context-free characteristic (Dichev et al., 2013). 
 It can thus be summarized from above discussion that earnings quality is essentially a 
context-specific construct (with few exceptions as mentioned above), partly because the users, to 
whom the definition is targeted, differ from situation to situation (Dechow et al., 2010; Schipper 
and Vincent, 2003). Thus, investors, creditors, standard setters, and managers with compensation 
contracts tied to earnings may have divergent perceptions of earnings quality conditional on their 
decision context. 
 
3.3 Earnings Quality Proxies 
 Earnings quality is a multidimensional concept and thus there is no single agreed-upon 
measure of earnings quality that is suitable for all decision models. The empirical literature has 
developed a large number of metrics to proxy for earnings quality. Because each of them 
captures only certain aspects of the financial reporting process, there is no single best measure of 
earnings quality and the metrics should not be seen as substitutes (Dechow et al., 2010). Many 
studies have split commonly used proxies of earnings quality into different groups. Dechow et al. 
(2010) classify earnings quality proxies available in the literature into three broad categories: 
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first category, proxies based on the properties of earnings, includes earnings persistence, total 
accruals and abnormal accruals, earnings smoothness, asymmetric timeliness and timely loss 
recognition, and target beating; second category, investor responsiveness to earnings, includes an 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) or the R2 from the earnings-returns model, and relation of 
ERC to another construct such as auditor quality; third category, external indicators of errors or 
earnings misstatements, includes firms subject to SEC enforcements, restatements, and internal 
control weaknesses. Francis et al. (2004) identify seven attributes of earnings (measures of 
earnings quality) that have been widely used in academic earnings quality research, and 
characterize these attributes as either “accounting-based” or “market-based” depending on the 
underlying assumptions about the intended function of earnings. The “accounting-based” 
earnings quality measures include accruals quality, earnings persistence, predictability, and 
smoothness. These measures assume that the function of accounting earnings is to allocate cash 
flows over the reporting periods using accruals, and thus, take earnings or its components such as 
cash flows or accruals as a reference construct. On the other hand, the “market-based” earnings 
quality measures include value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. These measures assume 
that the function of earnings is to capture economic income as manifested in stock returns, and 
therefore, use stock price or return as the reference construct. Schipper and Vincent (2003) group 
earnings quality constructs that have been used in accounting research into four classes: (1) 
earnings quality constructs derived from the time-series properties of earnings such as 
persistence, predictive ability, and variability; (2) earnings quality measures based on the 
selective qualitative concepts in the FASB’s conceptual framework such as relevance, reliability, 
and comparability; (3) earnings quality measures that rely on the relations among earnings, cash 
flows and accruals such as ratio of cash from operations to income, changes in total accrual, 
abnormal accruals and accruals-to-cash relations; (4) earnings quality derived from management 
implementation decisions such as required or subversive estimates and judgment taken as inverse 
measure of earnings quality. They also highlight that some earnings quality constructs depend on 
accounting measurement system as well as underlying events and transactions (e.g., earnings 
predictability is significantly hampered by some business models) while some earnings quality 
constructs are primarily reporting phenomenon (e.g., earnings smoothness or abnormal accruals 
depend primarily on accounting treatments). 
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3.4 Reasons for Choosing Accruals-based Earnings Quality Measures 
 Accruals play an important role in shifting or adjusting the recognition of cash flows over 
time so that the adjusted numbers better measure firm performance (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). 
Accruals enhance the usefulness of earnings to capture economic performance of the firms when 
it occurs by mitigating timing and mismatching problems associated with cash flows as a 
measure of firm performance. Thus, the quality of accruals is commonly used as an indicator of 
earnings quality.  It is generally recognized that higher quality accruals translate into higher 
quality earnings. However, estimation errors in accruals, reversible nature of accruals, and 
discretionary use of accruals deteriorate the quality of accruals and earnings. Considering the 
central role of accruals in earnings determination process and the overriding impact of accruals 
on various earnings attributes, as discussed below, I choose to use accruals-based measures of 
earnings quality. To be specific, I use Dechow and Dichev (2002)’s accrual quality model and 
Kasznik (1999) version of the modified Jones (1991) abnormal accruals model to derive 
measures of earnings quality. Dechow and Dichev (2002) focus on the matching function of 
accruals to cash flows and measure quality of accruals in terms of estimation errors in accruals. 
The general view is that the quality of accruals decreases as the variance of estimation errors 
increases. The abnormal accruals models divide total accruals into normal accruals associated 
with firm’s fundamental performance and abnormal accruals resulting from accounting 
distortions or earnings management. The general impression is that a high level of abnormal 
accruals indicates low quality of accruals and earnings. Furthermore, accruals-based measures of 
earnings quality directly capture the problems associated with accounting measurement rules and 
so are pertinent to accounting researchers (Dechow et al., 2010).   
 
3.4.1 Role of Accruals in the Determination of Earnings 
 The primary function of accruals is to mitigate problems with measuring firm 
performance. Realized cash flows are a ‘noisy’ measure of firm performance because of timing 
and matching problem. Therefore, accruals are used to alter the timing of cash flows recognition 
in earnings to mitigate the noise in cash flows (Dechow, 1994). The importance of accruals in the 
financial reporting process can also be viewed from the perspective of its ability to predict future 
earnings or cash flows. An important objective of financial reporting is to assist the users in 
predicting future earnings or cash flows, which are regarded as the primary valuation construct 
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used by the investors to assess firm’s value. Prior research examining the predictive ability of 
earnings with respect to future cash flows has found that earnings are better predictor of future 
operating cash flows than current operating cash flows (Dechow et al., 1998). Further, Barth et al. 
(2001) find that current earnings when disaggregated into the cash flows and the accrual 
components have significantly more predictive ability for future cash flows than current and 
several lags of aggregate earnings. Investors should, therefore, have a considerable interest in 
earnings and its components - accruals and cash flows. As the breakdown of earnings into 
accruals and cash flows improves the predictive ability of earnings, and given the fact that 
management discretionary judgment affects the accruals mostly rather than cash flows, the 
quality of accruals should be an important measure of earnings quality for the investors. Thus, 
the quality of accruals represents an important measure of earnings quality. 
 
3.4.2 Role of Accruals in Assessing Earnings Quality 
 Under the accrual accounting system, reported earnings consist of two elements - cash 
flows and accruals. Accruals are used to adjust cash flows to arrive at earnings number. At 
different phases of the financial reporting process, managers need to exercise judgment to 
determine the magnitude of accruals. For example, management is required to apply judgment to 
estimate future economic activity, to select appropriate accounting methods from a given set of 
available alternatives, to determine the level of working capital, to decide expensing versus 
capitalizing revenue expenditures or to structure certain transactions. In the above cases, 
managers’ meticulous use of accruals can improve the quality of earnings while the reckless use 
of accruals by the managers can deteriorate the quality of earnings. 
 
3.4.2.1 Accruals Improve Earnings Quality 
 Accruals play a pivotal role in the financial reporting process that generates accounting 
information conveyed to the investors for making investment, credit or other decisions. The 
primary output of financial reporting is the financial statements. The single most important item 
among all financial statements is net income or earnings. Earnings are the summary measure of 
firm performance produced under the accrual basis accounting. Managers can use accruals to 
make earnings report more informative for users. Management can convey its private signal 
about the firm’s financial performance through its usage of accruals in the earnings generation 
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process or through the selection and application of certain accounting methods or choices 
deemed to provide credible signals of a firm’s financial performance (Subramanyam, 1996; 
Demski 1998; Fields et al., 2001; Arya et al., 2003; Guay, 2006). 
 
 3.4.2.2 Accruals Impair Earnings Quality 
 However, the academic literature and the financial press have been skeptic on whether 
the accruals increase earnings quality and thus, make financial reports more informative, or 
managers use accruals to manipulate earnings number, leading to erosion in earnings quality. 
Managers use accruals as potential instruments for earnings management, which can be defined 
as a purposeful intrusion of management in the financial reporting process to extract personal 
gain for the management itself (Schipper, 1989).  
 Managers need to apply considerable judgment in estimating accruals. This raises a 
possibility that managers can deliberately misuse their power of judgment with malicious intent. 
They can intentionally misapply accounting methods or restructure business transactions to 
either misguide some investors about the true economic performance of the firm or to affect the 
contractual outcomes that depend on the reported earnings number (Schipper, 1989; Healy and 
Whalen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Nelson et al., 2002). However, the questions remain 
as to what extent managers will assist investors to form rational expectations about firm’s 
operating performance through their choice of accruals or how far they will be involved in costly 
earnings management activities through accruals manipulation. Regardless of the intention of the 
management for the choice of accruals, the resulting accruals number will have a significant 
effect on the quality of accruals and earnings. Moreover, accruals can also introduce a transitory 
element in earnings that reduces the utility of earnings as a measure of firm’s current or future 
performance, and affects the quality of earnings. Thus, given that Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) confers management substantial flexibility to apply judgments in 
estimating accruals, it is imperative that the quality of accruals is an important factor in 
generating high-quality earnings. 
 
3.4.3 Accruals and Other Attributes of Earnings 
 Accruals have important implications for different properties of earnings. Sloan (1996) 
examines the role of cash flows component and accruals component in the time-series behavior 
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of earnings and shows that accruals are less persistent than cash flows, suggesting that the 
persistence of earnings decreases when accruals constitute a large part of earnings relative to 
cash flows. Xie (2001) extends Sloan (1996) by suggesting that the lack of persistence in 
earnings is mainly driven by the reversal of abnormal accruals. Thomas and Zhang (2002) find 
that the high accruals firms earn negative future abnormal returns because of one specific accrual, 
namely inventory. Dechow and Dichev (2002) show that the lack of persistence can also be 
caused by estimation errors in the accruals. Barth et al. (2001) find that accruals improve the 
predictability of earnings for future cash flows. Dechow and Schrand (2004) note that accruals 
are used to smooth cash flow volatility that does not reflect variation in the underlying firm 
performance. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that accruals are used to reflect timely 
recognition of economic losses. These findings suggest that accruals have a significant impact on 
other attributes of earnings.  
 
3.5 Components of Earnings Quality 
 The accruals-based earnings quality metrics represent total earnings quality that are 
jointly determined by intrinsic (innate) factors, such as firms' business models and economic 
environments, and by management's (discretionary) reporting and implementation decisions. In 
addition, any earnings quality proxy measures quality with an error. Therefore, any measure of 
earnings quality contains, at least, three subcomponents: innate earnings quality, discretionary 
earnings quality, and noise. The portion of earnings quality associated with firms’ innate 
characteristics stemming from business model and operating environmental uncertainty is 
designated as innate earnings quality, the portion of earnings quality determined by 
management’s discretionary choices and judgments due to managerial incentives or opportunism 
is designated as discretionary earnings quality, and finally, the portion associated neither with 
business fundamentals nor with managerial discretion represent measurement error or noise.  
 Dechow and Schrand (2004) suggest that some firms will have lower quality earnings 
even in the absence of earnings management due to the nature of their business. For example, 
firms with higher growth potential and firms doing business in turbulent environment have low-
quality earnings in general. Thus, both managerial opportunism and the economic environment 
of the firm can influence the quality of accounting earnings. Similarly, Dechow et al. (2010) 
contend that earnings quality is determined by both the firm’s fundamental performance and the 
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accounting measurement system. They note that accounting literature often fails to distinguish 
properly the effect of fundamental performance on earnings quality from the effect of the 
accounting measurement rules. In a recent paper, Francis et al. (2005) empirically distinguish 
innate and discretionary component of earnings quality. While the innate component stems from 
the business model and operating environment of the firms, the discretionary component arises 
from the factors associated with the financial reporting process, such as management 
implementation decisions, the financial reporting standards, auditing and corporate governance 
structures, and regulatory scrutiny. 
 Dichev et al. (2013) investigate CFOs’ perceptions about the underlying drivers of 
earnings quality. Especially they tend to focus on comparing the role of two categories of 
determinants: innate determinants, e.g., the firm’s industry and business model vs. discretionary 
determinants, e.g., corporate governance and managerial discretion. The result suggests that 
CFOs ranked firm’s business model as the most important driver of earnings quality (74% CFOs 
rate it as highly influential) followed by accounting standards (60.4%), the company’s industry 
(56.8%), macro-economic conditions (55%) and the firm’s internal controls (50%). The other 
three determinants that exert less influence on earnings quality are the board of directors (48%), 
reporting choices (43.2%) and the operating cycle (40.2%).5 The evidence implies that most of 
the dominant determinants of earnings quality are beyond the control of the firm or, at least, 
external to its accounting function. As a result, recent research has distinguished between innate 
and discretionary factors and investigated the differential effect of each factor on market 
outcomes (Francis et al., 2005). The survey result also finds that CFOs attach moderate to less 
importance on some highly discussed factors such as the role of the auditors, the SEC 
enforcement process, and the prospect of litigation.  
 Discretionary factors have received much attention in the literature while innate factors 
have recently been recognized by the researchers and practitioners as significant drivers of 
earnings quality. The distinction of innate vs. discretionary factors is important because innate 
factors like macro-economic forces are exogenous to the firms, and thus, management and 
stakeholders cannot influence them much except understand and acknowledge them. In contrast, 
                                                 
5 The percentage in the parentheses represents the percentage of total number of CFOs who respond to this question 
and select a choice of 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5 for the respective factor implying that earnings quality is highly 
influenced by that factor. 
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most of the discretionary factors like internal controls and various voluntary control mechanisms 
at the firm and industry level are within the control of management. In response to a more 
specific question on to what extent earnings quality is driven by the innate factors, CFOs 
estimate that innate factors (beyond managerial control) account for roughly 50% of earnings 
quality, where business models, industry, and macro-economic conditions play a prominent role. 
That means about 50% of earnings quality is driven by non-discretionary factors such as industry 
and macro-economic conditions (Dichev et al., 2013). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter summarizes different perspectives of earnings quality. Despite several 
attempts by the researchers to define earnings quality, the concept remains elusive and till now 
there is no agreed upon definition of earnings quality. The definition of earnings quality is 
largely decision specific and differs from situation to situation depending on the purpose for 
which earnings will be used. The chapter then identifies different proxies of earnings quality 
used in the extant literature followed by the reasons for selecting accruals-based earnings quality 
for this research. Finally, the chapter recognizes that earnings quality is affected not only by 
management’s discretionary reporting choices but also by firm’s business model and operating 
environments, which allow the researchers to separate earnings quality into innate and 
discretionary components. Moreover, a survey result indicates that at least 50% of earnings 
quality is determined by innate factors (Dichev et al., 2013). 
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Chapter Four 
Earnings Quality and Cost of Equity Capital 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The issue of whether poor earnings quality affects firms’ access to capital through 
influencing the cost of obtaining fund from the public has drawn considerable attention of the 
academic researchers, practitioners and regulators in the last two decades. The role of accounting 
information in determining the cost of equity capital has confronted all the constituencies of the 
financial reporting process after Levitt (1998) claims that one important benefit of high-quality 
accounting standards is improved liquidity and reduced cost of capital in the financial markets. 
On a similar note, Neel Foster (2003), a former member of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) asserts that more information reduces uncertainty, and investors are willing to pay 
more for enhanced certainty. From the perspective of financial reporting, the upshot of these 
arguments is that more and better disclosures translate into a lower cost of capital for the 
providers of high-quality information. Recognizing the significance of high-quality disclosures 
in the capital market, Dechow et al. (20010) appeal to academic researchers to undertake more 
research on the determinants and consequences of poor quality earnings. However, despite such 
growing interest, the theoretical and empirical evidence concerning the adverse cost of capital 
consequence of poor earnings quality fail to reach a consensus that leaves the issue still open for 
further empirical investigation. 
 The extent to which earnings quality is related to the cost of capital is one of the most 
interesting issues in accounting and finance research. Despite a large body of research proposing 
that earnings quality, measured using various attributes, affects the cost of debt and equity capital, 
there is no agreement on whether earnings quality is priced in the cost of capital, or the 
underlying mechanism that connects earnings quality to the cost of capital (Kim and Qi, 2010). 
Theories have identified multiple linkages through which earnings quality can affect the cost of 
equity capital. One such link is the direct link where poor information quality affects the cost of 
capital by increasing investors’ uncertainty about the precise assessment of future cash flows. 
Another is the indirect link where information quality is likely to affect the cost of capital via 
information asymmetry (Easley and O’Hara, 2004) or via market beta (Lambert et al., 2007). 
Implicit in the indirect link is the assumption that poor information quality results in information 
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asymmetry which in turn creates non-diversifiable liquidity risk or information risk that are 
manifested in the cost of capital measures. Developing a rational expectations asset pricing 
model, Easely and O’Hara (2004) contend that more private information increases the risk of 
uninformed investors to trade with privately informed investors since better-informed investors 
can adjust their portfolio weights to reflect private information. The model implies that a firm 
can affect its cost of capital by increasing the quality and quantity of information it provides to 
the investors. Taking a different approach, Hughes et al. (2007) conclude that while information 
asymmetry affects factor risk premium, it does not lead to cross-sectional differences in expected 
returns in their model. However, Hughes et al. (2007) note that while an asymmetric information 
factor does not arise endogenously in their model, their model is silent on whether a systematic 
information factor exists. Bhattacharya et al. (2013) provide empirical support in favor of an 
indirect link mediated by information asymmetry. They document that poor earnings quality is 
associated with increased information asymmetry as manifested in higher adverse selection 
component of bid-ask spread suggesting that poor quality earnings result in higher trading costs 
and lower liquidity in the financial market. The rationale behind poor quality earnings leading to 
higher information asymmetry is rooted in accrual-basis accounting in which accruals are used to 
estimate future cash flows and to allocate past cash flows. Therefore, any estimation errors in the 
accruals can increase the uncertainty of the investors about the distribution of the firm’s future 
cash flows. To remove this uncertainty, some investors will acquire costly private information 
inducing information asymmetry between those privately informed investors and less informed 
investors. Armstrong et al. (2011) examine when information asymmetry among investors 
affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. They find that information 
asymmetry is positively related to the firms’ cost of capital when markets are not perfectly 
competitive, and there is no relation between information asymmetry and the cost of capital 
when markets approximate perfect competition. The combined findings of these two papers 
imply that poor earnings quality can result in information asymmetry, and information 
asymmetry can affect the cost of capital in a market that is less than perfect. Lambert et al. 
(2007) also suggest an alternative indirect link where earnings quality can affect the cost of 
capital via its effect on systematic risk, often specified as unobservable forward-looking beta. 
Irrespective of the link, these theoretical studies generally posit an association between earnings 
quality and the cost of capital. While the existence of a relation between earnings quality and the 
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cost of capital is predicted by analytical models, those models are silent as to the magnitude of 
associations or to the likelihood that both direct and indirect links can exist. Bhattacharya et al. 
(2012) find statistically reliable evidence of both a direct link between earnings quality and the 
implied cost of equity and an indirect link mediated by information asymmetry or beta. Using 
path analysis, they show that the direct path is empirically more dominant than the indirect 
path(s). However, the relative importance of the direct versus the indirect paths depends on the 
level of competition in the market.6  Their finding is thus consistent with the arguments in 
Lambert et al. (2011) that when market friction is high, information asymmetry serves as a 
mediating variable. 
 A handful of studies has examined empirically the impact of earnings quality on the cost 
of capital. Francis et al. (2004, 2005) create an accruals quality factor based on Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) accruals quality model and show that the accruals factor is incrementally 
informative in firm-specific time-series regressions of stock returns on the accruals quality factor 
and the Fama and French (1993) factors. On the basis of this finding, they propose accruals 
quality as a priced risk factor. However, some recent research has rejected this view. For 
example, Core et al. (2008) question the validity of the asset pricing tests using a “risk factor” 
formed on the basis of proxies for accruals quality to declare a candidate factor as priced risk 
factor. Cohen (2008) argues that controlling for endogeneity is important because firms consider 
both the benefits of improved reporting quality and the costs associated with the disclosure of 
propriety information. After controlling for firm-specific attributes that are likely to affect both 
the costs and benefits of providing high-quality information, Cohen (2008) reports no significant 
association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. In a related study, Nichols 
(2006) argues that the accruals quality “risk factor” is not similar to a traditional risk factor and 
captures information already impounded in cash flows variability. Mashruwala and Mashruwala 
(2011) raise concern about the validity of accruals quality as a proxy for information risk based 
on their findings that the effect of accruals quality on expected return is restricted to the month of 
January only. These studies indicate that the accruals quality “risk factor” can explain a trivial 
portion of the cross-sectional variation in stock returns once the market, size and distressed risk 
factors are controlled for. Kim and Qi (2010) reconcile the conflicting evidence reported by 
                                                 
6 Bhattacharya et al. (2012) find that although the direct path always dominates, the importance of the indiect path 
increases when market is less than perfectly competitive. 
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Francis et al. (2005) and Core et al. (2008) by controlling low-priced stocks in the two-stage 
cross-sectional test. They also examine the underlying mechanism of the pricing effect of 
earnings quality and show that, consistent with the analytical model of Yee (2006), the effect of 
earnings quality on the cost of equity stems from fundamental risk. 
 In addition to showing that information risk as proxied by accruals quality affects the cost 
of capital, Francis et al. (2005) decompose earnings quality into innate and discretionary 
components and investigate whether the cost of capital effect is attributable to the innate portion 
of earnings quality or the discretionary portion of earnings quality, or both. Innate component of 
earnings quality is determined by firms’ business model and operating environment whereas 
discretionary component of earnings quality is affected by managerial discretionary behavior. 
This distinction is important to shed light on whether the innate component that reflects 
economic fundamentals has different cost of capital effect than the discretionary component that 
reflects managerial choices. While there is no theory distinguishing the sources of information 
risk, previous research on the use of discretionary accruals (Guey et al., 1996) suggests that 
innate and discretionary earnings quality will have different cost of capital effects. Consistent 
with the predictions that follow from earnings management literature, Francis et al. (2005) find 
that the cost of capital effect of innate earnings quality is substantially larger than that of 
discretionary earnings quality. 
 Given the inconclusive evidence on whether earnings quality is priced or not, an 
empirical question remains as to whether earnings quality reflects systematic non-diversifiable 
risk that affects the cost of capital or idiosyncratic risk that can be eliminated by holding a well-
diversified portfolio. To this tune, this chapter is primarily intended to provide empirical 
evidence on whether earnings quality affects the cost of equity capital in a large cross-section of 
Japanese manufacturing firms. The secondary purpose of this chapter is to identify the sources 
(intrinsic versus reporting) of earnings quality and examine the cost of capital effects of different 
sources to provide evidence on whether the components of earning quality (innate versus 
discretionary component) have different cost of equity capital effect. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 The extent to which earnings quality affects a firm’s cost of equity capital continues to be 
one of the most important but unresolved issues in the accounting and finance literature. In this 
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section, I review the related literature on the cost of equity capital effect of earnings quality. First, 
I outline the theory on the cost of equity consequence of improved earnings quality. Following 
that, I discuss the empirical findings on the cost of equity impact of earnings quality.  
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Research on the Cost of Equity Effect of Earnings Quality 
 Theoretical research allows for the possibility of both direct and indirect links through 
which earnings quality can affect the cost of capital (Bhattacharya et al., 2012). The models 
developed by Lambert et al. (2007, 2011) predict a direct link between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity, an indirect link through information asymmetry in the imperfectly competitive 
market, and an indirect link via systematic risk, consistent with a Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) setting. Several other studies (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 
2004) also suggest an indirect link where earnings quality affects the cost of equity through 
information asymmetry.  
 
4.2.1.1 Direct Link between Earnings Quality and Cost of Equity 
 Lambert et al. (2011) specify a direct link between information risk as proxied by 
earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. They show that in a perfectly competitive market, 
high-quality earnings can affect the cost of equity capital directly by reducing the uncertainty and 
increasing the average precision of investors’ assessments of firms’ future cash flows. According 
to their model, if some investors acquire more precise information, this additional information is 
partially reflected in the price, thereby reducing the uncertainty of other uninformed investors. 
On the other way, disseminating more public information to more investors in a bid to reduce 
information uncertainty can also affect the cost of equity because more information improves the 
average level of information precision. Based on this model, Bhattacharya et al. (2012) identify a 
direct link between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. 
 
4.2.1.2 Indirect Link between Earnings Quality and Cost of Equity Mediated by 
Information Asymmetry 
 An indirect link suggests that earnings quality can be associated with the cost of equity 
capital through information asymmetry. This indirect link is based on the idea that earnings 
quality influences information asymmetry which, in turn, affects the cost of equity capital. 
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Therefore, the indirect link mediated by information asymmetry is derived from two streams of 
research. The first stream predicts that low-quality disclosures can exacerbate information 
asymmetry in equity markets by increasing incentives for private information collection and 
inducing more informed trading (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). The second stream predicts 
that information asymmetry among market participants increases the adverse selection risk for 
liquidity providers. In order to compensate for the risk of trading with informed investors, 
liquidity providers widen the spread between the ask and bid prices, thereby lowering liquidity 
and increasing the cost of capital (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Another line of research (Wang, 
1993; Easley and O’Hara, 2004) under the second stream posits a link between information 
asymmetry and cost of equity and identifies information quality as a causal variable (Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004) affecting information asymmetry. The underlying assumption of this link is that 
information asymmetry creates non-diversifiable information risk which is priced in equilibrium, 
and poor information quality leads to an increase in information asymmetry. Wang (1993) 
showed that in a two-asset multi-period model, information asymmetry induces two opposing 
effects into asset prices. In one hand, uninformed investors demand a risk premium to cover the 
loss arising from the adverse selection risk. On the other hand, trading by informed investors 
helps stock prices to reveal more information that reduces the risk of the uninformed investors. 
As a result, the joint effect of these two opposing forces on the equilibrium rate of required 
return in this model is ambiguous. Easley and O’Hara (2004) take the issue further and 
investigate the role of the composition of information in determining a firm’s cost of capital. 
They specifically focus on the exact roles played by public and private information. They argue 
that differences in the composition of information between public and private information 
(information asymmetry) influence the cost of capital because investors require a higher return to 
hold stocks with more private, and correspondingly less public, information. This higher return is 
a reflection of the fact that the existence of private information induces a risk for the uninformed 
investors who are not able to adjust their portfolios to incorporate new information. Hence, 
private information creates a new form of systematic risk for which investors require 
compensation in equilibrium.  
 Another body of literature (Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2011) suggests that 
information asymmetry can affect the cost of equity capital in an imperfect market. Hughes et al. 
(2007) consider the effects of private signals in a competitive noisy rational expectations setting 
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and conclude that while greater information asymmetry leads to higher factor risk premiums and 
higher cost of capital, information asymmetry has no cross-sectional effect on the cost of capital. 
Using Diamond and Verrecchia’s (1991) characterization of imperfectly competitive capital 
markets, Lambert et al. (2011) predict the possibility of an indirect link between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity mediated by information asymmetry. However, their main result is not 
based on information asymmetry; rather it is based on information imprecision. They dispute 
Easley and O’Hara’s (2004) attribution of the expected returns effect of information quality to 
information uncertainty. They argue that the expected returns effect stems from the average level 
of information imprecision, regardless of how information is distributed across investors – that is, 
the expected returns effect is due to information uncertainty per se, not to the presence of 
differences in information uncertainty across investors. A change in information asymmetry can 
affect the cost of capital, but only because the average precision of information is also changing 
simultaneously. In other words, the dissemination of more information to more investors reduces 
the cost of capital, but only because it increases the average precision of investors, not because it 
reduces information asymmetry (Francis et al., 2006). 
 
4.2.1.3 Indirect Link between Earnings Quality and Cost of Equity Mediated by Systematic 
Risk 
 Lambert et al. (2007) develop a CAPM-based model in which information quality 
impacts the cost of equity through its influence on systematic risk.7 They show that earnings 
quality affects investors’ assessment of the covariance of a firm’s cash flows with those of the 
market, and this effect is non-diversifiable. Lambert et al. (2007) point out that there is no 
separate role for earnings quality as a risk factor in a CAPM consistent world. The effect of 
earnings quality on the cost of equity is found because earnings quality is one determinant of the 
unobservable forward-looking beta. It is important to recognize here that the earnings quality 
effect can be fully captured by an appropriately specified, forward-looking beta. Thus, their 
model does not provide support for an additional risk factor capturing “information risk.” One 
justification for the inclusion of information variables in a cost of capital model would be to 
                                                 
7 The framework in Lambert et al. (2007) is similar in spirit to the estimation risk literature, which posits that 
information environment affects a firm’s beta to the extent the information uncertainty about the parameters of 
distribution is related to the market return. Thus, low information securities tend to have higher beta (Barry and 
Brown, 1985). 
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recognize that the empirical proxies for beta are measured using past data that may not capture 
full information effects (Lambert et al., 2007). The intuition of this model suggests that the most 
practical way to empirically explore the link between earnings quality and the cost of capital is 
via the beta factor. 
 Overall, extant research concludes that a firm’s earnings quality is associated with the 
cost of capital either directly or indirectly via information asymmetry or systematic risk. 
 
4.2.2 Empirical Findings on the Cost of Equity Effect of Earnings Quality 
 A growing number of empirical studies have tested the prediction of theoretical models 
regarding the cost of equity capital effects of earnings quality. However, empirical research on 
this issue produces mixed results and thus, is unable to provide unanimous support to the claim 
that the cost of equity capital is inversely related to the quality of earnings. In this section, I 
provide a summary of extant empirical findings on the relation between earnings quality and the 
cost of equity capital. 
 Botosan (1997) is the first empirical study that attempts to establish the association 
between the level of disclosure and the cost of equity for a sample of 122 manufacturing firms. 
Using a self-constructed disclosure index and implied cost of equity measure, Botosan (1997) 
documents that greater level of disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital for low analyst 
following firms but the relationship is not statistically significant for high analyst following firms. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) re-examined the association using three types of disclosures level 
and the expected cost of equity capital derived from inverting dividend discount model. They 
find inconsistent evidence that the cost of equity capital is decreasing in annual report disclosure 
level but is increasing in the level of more timely disclosures (quarterly disclosure). But, they do 
not find any association between the level of investor relations activities and the cost of equity 
capital. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) is a cross-country study showing an association between 
average cost of equity and earnings opacity. They combine three individual measures (earnings 
aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earning smoothing) to develop a composite measure of 
earnings opacity and show that countries with more opaque earnings have higher cost of equity. 
Francis et al. (2004) examine the expected returns effects of different accounting-based and 
market-based earnings attributes and find that firms with poor earnings quality (low values for 
each attribute) have higher cost of equity capital in general. They also find that accounting-based 
40 
 
earnings attributes such as accruals quality, persistence, and smoothness have higher effect on 
expected returns than market-based attributes. Francis et al. (2005) provide a detailed 
investigation of the expected returns effects of two proxies for earnings quality: the Dechow-
Dichev (2002) measure of accruals quality and absolute abnormal accruals (estimated using 
various implementations of the modified Jones (1991) model). For both proxies, they confirm the 
expected return effect as well as a cost of debt effect of earnings quality. Francis et al. (2005) 
also form an accruals quality factor mimicking portfolio and show that this accruals quality 
factor loading is significantly positve in the asset pricing regressions. The inclusion of accruals 
quality factor both in the standard CAPM model and in the Fama-French three-factor model 
increases the explanatory power of asset pricing model and reduces the magnitude of the size and 
market loadings significantly. On the basis of this finding, they propose that this accruals quality 
risk factor represents undiversifiable information risk incremental to traditional risk factors. 
Following the same procedure, Ecker et al. (2006) construct an accruals quality mimicking factor 
and show that the coefficient of the factor (e-loadings) is positively correlated with most other 
proxies of earnings quality. These e-loadings are predictably lower for matured firms with good 
information environment and higher for firms with obvious evidence of poor quality earnings 
such as restatement firms and bankrupt firms. These studies establish that accruals quality 
represents a risk factor that is priced by the market. 
 In contrast to the interpretation that the accruals quality is a priced risk factor, Core et al. 
(2008) show that the expected return effect of earnings quality is not significant. Using two-stage 
cross-sectional tests of determining whether a candidate risk factor is priced or not, they fail to 
find evidence that the accruals quality factor constitutes a priced risk factor.8 However, building 
on the same method that is used by Core et al. (2008), Kim and Qi (2010) find evidence of 
expected return effect of accruals quality after eliminating low priced stocks from the sample. 
Ogneva (2012) finds a significant negative relation between realized returns and accruals quality 
factor after controlling for cash flows shocks. These studies suggest that information risk 
interpretation of earnings quality depends on the research design that use realized returns as a 
proxy for expected return. 
                                                 
8 While Core et al. (2008) fail to find evidence that the accruals quality factor is a priced risk factor, they find that 
the accruals quality factor loadings are related to implied cost of capital. 
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 Francis et al. (2005) decompose accruals quality into innate and discretionary 
components and find that the innate component has a larger pricing effect. Several studies report 
effects similar to those in Francis et al. (2005) regarding a substantially larger cost of capital 
effect of the innate portion of earnings quality compared to the discretionary portion. For 
example, Grey et al. (2009) use realized cost of debt, industry-adjusted price-earnings ratios, and 
asset pricing regressions to test for the cost of capital effects of accruals quality in the Australian 
market. When they split accruals quality into an innate portion and a discretionary portion, they 
find strong evidence that innate accruals quality is priced, whereas the discretionary portion has 
small and insignificant pricing effects. Motivated by the theoretical studies that predict a direct 
link from earnings quality to cost of equity or an indirect link through information asymmetry, 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012) analyze the relative importance of the different paths that potentially 
link earnings quality and cost of equity.  They find that the direct link between earnings quality 
and the cost of equity dominates the indirect link (through information asymmetry) in all settings 
they investigate: innate versus discretionary earnings quality, CAPM versus 3-factor model, 
different degrees of market competitiveness. They further show that the degree of dominance 
varies predictably when the setting varies. 
 Two empirical costs of capital studies explicitly link earnings quality and fundamental 
risk. First, Chen et al. (2007) test the empirical prediction from Yee’s (2006) model and confirm 
that the expected returns effect of earnings quality as measured by accruals quality is an 
increasing function of underlying fundamental risk. Second, Nichols (2006) shows that the 
accruals quality factor mimicking portfolio has a substantial realized return effect and that the 
effect is associated with cash flow shocks, i.e., it is associated with fundamental risk.  
 Cohen (2008) and Liu and Wysocki (2007) provide evidence consistent with the 
prediction that information quality should not affect the cost of equity capital after controlling for 
firm-specific determinants of information quality. Cohen (2008) finds that earnings quality is 
significantly related to the cost of equity before taking into account the endogenous nature of 
disclosure quality that can be strategically chosen by management to reduce the cost of equity. 
When he uses an instrumental variable approach to account for the determinants of earnings 
quality, the pricing effect is found to be insignificant.  Liu and Wysocki (2007) find that after 
controlling for the innate determinants of earnings quality, the remaining pricing effect is not 
significant. 
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 In summary, using different proxies for the cost of equity and several measures of 
earnings quality, these studies find that there is a significant relation, both economically and 
statistically, between earnings quality and the cost of equity. However, there are few exceptions 
to this general finding suggesting that there is no relation between these two constructs. The 
weight of the existing empirical evidence also suggests that a non-trivial portion of the expected 
returns effect of earnings quality seems to be associated with the intrinsic determinants; the 
effects of discretionary determinants are less significant both statistically and economically. 
 
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
4.3.1. Cost of Equity Effect of Earnings Quality 
 The extent to which earnings quality is associated with the cost of equity capital is one of 
the most important issues in accounting. Despite a sizeable body of research suggesting that 
earnings quality, measured using various attributes, affects costs of equity capital, there is no 
consensus on whether earnings quality is priced in the cost of capital, or the underlying 
mechanism linking earnings quality to the cost of capital. The extant theoretical and analytical 
research (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2004; Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et 
al., 2007, 2012) posits that a firm’s earnings quality is associated with the cost of equity directly 
or indirectly via information asymmetry or via market risk. Francis et al. (2005) argue that 
accruals quality is a priced factor in the cost of equity capital while Core et al. (2008) counter 
this argument using two-stage cross-sectional tests. Kim and Qi (2010) reconcile the difference 
between Francis et al. (2005) and Core et al. (2008) by showing that accrual quality is a 
significant priced risk factor in the cross-sectional tests once low-priced returns, defined as 
returns with two adjacent prices less than $5 (sometimes referred to as “penny stocks”), are 
controlled in the cross-sectional regression. Cohen (2008) and Liu and Wysocki (2007) show that 
after controlling for firm-specific determinants of disclosure decisions, earnings quality is not 
significantly related to the cost of equity capital. Albeit disconcerting theoretical and empirical 
evidence, the weight of evidence drifts in favor of the pricing effect of earnings quality. 
Therefore, I formalize my first hypothesis, stated in alternative form: 
H1: Earnings quality is negatively associated with the cost of equity 
capital 
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 To test this hypothesis, I use the empirical measures of earnings quality outlined in 
section 4.4.1, and two proxies for the cost of equity; Industry-adjusted EP ratio and implied cost 
of equity capital estimated by reverse engineering the valuation models presented in Easton 
(2004).  
 
4.3.2 Cost of Equity Effect of Innate versus Discretionary Component of Earnings Quality 
 The theoretical models suggest a pricing role for earnings quality but do not distinguish 
between possible components of earnings quality. That is, these models do not posit differences 
between the pricing effects of poor earnings quality that is driven by innate features of the ﬁrm’s 
business model and operating environment, and poor earnings quality that is discretionary, i.e., 
due to accounting choices, implementation decisions, and managerial error. However, research 
on accounting choice and earnings management suggests a potential distinction between the 
pricing effects of the innate and discretionary components of earnings quality (Francis et al., 
2005).  
 Three competing views exist in the accounting literature that explain and predict 
management’s discretionary accounting choices (Holthausen, 1990; Badertscher et al., 2012). 
One view is that discretionary accounting choices are made to reveal managers’ private 
information about the future prospects of a firm. This view is referred to as the ‘‘informational 
perspective’’ of discretionary accounting choices. Under this view, managers utilize the 
flexibility in GAAP to enhance the relevance and reliability of the reported accounting 
information to improve its predictive usefulness and representational faithfulness. A second view 
on managers’ discretionary accounting choices holds that managers make discretionary 
accounting choices to disguise the true underlying economic performance of the firm and to 
enhance their personal welfare at the expense of the investors. This view is known as 
“opportunistic perspective.” A third view in the accounting choice literature on managers’ 
discretionary accounting choices is based on contracting perspective that can be divided into the 
ex-post opportunistic contracting hypothesis and ex-ante efficient contracting hypothesis. While 
the opportunistic contracting hypothesis includes the bonus plan hypothesis and the debt 
covenant hypothesis, the efficient contracting hypothesis implies that accounting choices are 
made to minimize contracting costs amongst the various contracting parties to the firm which, in 
turn, maximizes firm value (Badertscher et al., 2012). In a similar vein, Guay et al. (1996) 
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suggest that the discretionary component of earnings quality is a medley of three distinct 
subcomponents. While the performance subcomponent improves the quality of earnings by 
enhancing the ability of earnings to measure true economic performance in a reliable and timely 
way, managerial opportunism and pure noise, respectively, reduce the quality of earnings by 
distorting real economic performance. Francis et al. (2006) note that the magnitudes of the 
earnings quality effects of these subcomponents would be expected to differ, implying that the 
net earnings quality effect of management’s implementation decisions could be positive, 
negative or neutral. Nonetheless, based on the results and discussion of Guey et al. (1996), 
Francis et al. (2005) infer that research findings on the use of discretionary accruals suggest a 
possible difference in the cost of capital effects of innate versus discretionary earnings quality 
because of the fact that in a large sample covering long time periods, there will be some 
observations where managerial discretion is used to signal credible information about future 
performance, and there will be some observations where managerial discretion is used to reap 
opportunistic gains. This reasoning implies that discretionary earnings quality is expected to 
have cost of capital effects that reﬂect some mixture of performance improvement and 
opportunism plus noise. To the extent that discretionary earnings quality reﬂects a mixture of 
counter-intuitive effects such as earning quality increasing and earnings quality decreasing 
effects, Francis et al. (2005) expect that overall cost of capital effect of discretionary component 
of earnings quality will be smaller than the effect for innate component of earnings quality.  
 Francis et al. (2005) investigate whether the expected returns effect is attributable to the 
innate portion of earnings quality, the discretionary portion, or both. Consistent with their 
predictions, they find that the expected returns effects of innate earnings quality are substantially 
larger than the effects of discretionary earnings quality. Several studies report effects similar to 
those in Francis et al. (2005) regarding a substantially larger cost of capital effect of the innate 
portion of earnings quality compared to the discretionary portion. For example, Grey et al. 
(2009) use realized cost of debt, industry-adjusted price-earnings ratios, and asset pricing 
regressions to test for cost of capital effects of accruals quality in the Australian market. When 
they split accruals quality into an innate portion and a discretionary portion, they find strong 
evidence that innate accruals quality is priced, whereas the discretionary portion has small and 
insignificant pricing effects. Grey et al. (2009) attribute the finding that discretionary earnings 
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quality has an insignificant cost of capital effect to Australian institutional and regulatory factors 
that limits discretionary discretion.  
 Following Francis et al. (2005), I formulate my second hypothesis on the basis of the 
differential cost of equity effects between innate and discretionary components of earnings 
quality. I state H2 in its alternative form which implies that investors put more emphasis on a 
unit of innate earnings quality than a unit of discretionary earnings quality: 
H2: The innate component of earnings quality has larger impact on cost of 
equity capital than discretionary component of earnings quality  
 In order to test this hypothesis, I decompose earnings quality measure into innate and 
discretionary components following the approach applied by Francis et al. (2005) to be discussed 
in section 4.4.2. 
 
4.4 Earnings Quality and Its Components 
4.4.1 Measures of Earnings Quality 
 The objective of this chapter is to investigate the effect of total earnings quality and its 
components on firm’s cost of equity capital. Since the theoretical models predicting an 
association between earnings quality and the cost of equity consider the precision of earnings as 
a desirable quality of earnings, I think that accruals-based earnings quality measures that capture 
the precision of earnings with regard to a valuation relevant construct are suitable for my 
research question. Prior research by Francis et al. (2004) finds that accounting-based earnings 
attributes have larger effect on the cost of equity than market-based attributes, and among all the 
accounting-based attributes, accruals quality has the strongest effect. Aboody et al. (2005) and 
Francis et al. (2005) find a significant cost of equity effect of absolute abnormal accruals 
calculated from different versions of Jones (1991) model. All these results suggest that the most 
pertinent measures of earnings quality for my purpose should focus on accounting fundamentals. 
Consequently, I find two accruals-based measures of earnings quality such as Dechow-Dichev 
(2002) accruals quality measure as extended by McNichols (2002) and Kasznik (1999) version 
of Jones (1991) absolute abnormal accruals measure as suitable and appropriate for this study.  
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4.4.1.1 Accrual Quality (DDSTD) Measure Based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model 
 The accruals quality measure is based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) (hereafter DD) 
model. Intuitively, this measure views cash flows as fundamental to investors and focuses on the 
non-cash portion of accounting earnings known as accruals. This model is based on the fact that 
accruals adjust the recognition of cash flows over time to measure better firm performance. Since 
accruals are normally based on assumptions and estimates, the possibility of making wrong 
estimates is very likely and, if wrong, these erroneous estimates must be corrected in future 
accruals and earnings. DD argue that estimation errors and their subsequent corrections are noise 
that reduces the beneficial role of accruals. Therefore, the quality of accruals and earnings 
decreases when the magnitude of estimation errors increases. DD model measures accruals 
quality by the extent to which total current accruals map into operating cash flows. Under this 
approach, working capital accruals are regressed on cash flows from operations from the current 
period, last period and next period. The unexplained portion of the variation in working capital 
accruals is used as the basis for measuring the quality of earnings; that is, a greater unexplained 
portion implies lower quality. Specifically, the original version of DD model is as follows9: 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + υi,t                         Eq. (4.1) 
where TCA is the total current accruals computed as ∆CA – ∆CL – ∆Cash + ∆STDEBT, ∆CA is 
the change in current assets, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, ∆Cash is the change in cash, 
∆STDEBT is the change in short-term debt included in current liabilities. CFO is the cash flows 
from operations calculated as NI-TCA+DEP, where NI is the net income, TCA is the total 
current accruals and DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense. Subscripts i and t are the 
firm and time subscripts, respectively.  
 In a discussion paper, McNichols (2002) suggests that adding changes in sales revenues 
and property, plant, and equipment (PPE) significantly increases the model’s explanatory power 
and reduces measurement error. Using DD model augmented (as suggested by McNichols) with 
the fundamental variables from the Jones (1991) model, namely, property, plant, and equipment 
(PPE) and change in revenues leads to a better-specified model and sequence of residuals. 
Although McNichols (2002) advised to include fundamental variables from Jones model in DD 
model on the basis of incremental explanatory power of the independent variables, unlike Jones 
                                                 
9 All the variables used in the estimation equation are scaled by average total assets. Appendix A presents detailed 
definition of all the variables. 
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model, she did not include depreciation in her measure of accruals to allow for consistency with 
DD model. Explicitly, I will estimate the following regression to examine whether cash flows 
have explanatory power for accruals after controlling for the change in current period sales and 
the level of property, plant, and equipment: 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + φ4ΔREVi,t + φ5PPEi,t + νi,t Eq. (4.2) 
where ΔREV is the change in revenues and PPE is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment. Subscripts i and t are the firm and time subscripts, respectively.  
 
4.4.1.2 Absolute Abnormal Accruals (KZABS) Based on Kasznik (1999) Version of 
Modified Jones (1991) Model 
 Abnormal accrual is another widely used measure of earnings quality on the basis of the 
view that accruals that are not determined by accounting fundamentals represent an inverse 
measure of earnings quality. The abnormal accruals measure is typically estimated using some 
variants of the Jones (1991) approach. I estimate following version of the abnormal accruals 
model used by Kasznik (1999) (hereafter KZ): 
TAi,t = δ0 + δ1(ΔREVi,t - ΔARi,t) + δ2PPEi,t + δ3ΔCFOi,t + ηi,t    Eq. (4.3) 
where TA is the firm i’s total accruals, computed as TCA-DEP, TCA is the total current accruals, 
DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense, ΔREV is the change in revenues, ΔAR is the 
change in accounts receivable, PPE is the gross value of property, plant and equipment, and 
∆CFO is the change in cash flows from operation. Subscripts i and t are the firm and time 
subscripts, respectively. Equation (4.3) is a modified and extended version of Jones (1991) 
model, which describes total accruals as a function of the changes in revenue and the level of 
property, plant, and equipment. Following the suggestion of Dechow et al. (1995), Kasznik 
adjusts the sales revenue variable for the change in accounts receivable. Kasznik also includes 
the change in operating cash flows as an explanatory variable based on Dechow’s (1994) finding 
that cash flow from operation is significantly negatively correlated with total accruals. I prefer 
Kasznik version over modified Jones version because the former version considers significant 
correlation between cash flows from operation and total accruals in addition to two fundamental 
accounting variables used by the latter version and results in higher adjusted R2.  
 I estimate the parameters of the models in cross-section for each industry in year t to 
control for the effects of changing industry-wide economic conditions on total accruals and to 
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allow the coefficients to vary across years and industry (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Thus, the 
parameter estimates are industry and year specific rather than firm specific. The industry-year 
cross-sectional estimations yield firm- and year-specific residuals, which form the basis of 
earnings quality metric. 
 The first earnings quality measure, EQ1 (DDSTD) = σ(υi,t),  is the standard deviation of 
the residuals obtained from estimating equation 4.2, calculated over years t-4 through t and the 
second measure, EQ2 (KZABS) = | ηi,t |,  is the absolute value of the residuals obtained from 
estimating equation 4.3. I will interpret larger standard deviation of residuals indicating poorer 
earnings quality while lower absolute value represents a higher quality of earnings. The two 
types (standard deviation of residuals and absolute value of residuals) of earnings quality 
measures are conceptually different in one aspect that, if a firm has consistently large residuals 
resulting into small standard deviation, that firm is said to have relatively good earnings quality 
because there is little uncertainty about its accruals and the quality of earnings. 
 
4.4.2 Separating Earnings Quality into Innate and Discretionary Components  
 The underlying assumption of accruals-based earnings quality measure is that earnings 
quality is a function of managerial discretion. However, a major difficulty in understanding 
managerial discretion is the unobservability of managerial intent. Prior research has attempted to 
overcome this unobservability issue by examining the net effect of managers’ reporting decisions 
on the level and properties of earnings or accruals. In doing so, researchers have applied various 
research design that partition accruals into normal component representing business 
fundamentals and a discretionary component reflecting managerial discretion. To isolate 
discretionary accruals from total accruals researchers have estimated the statistical association 
between accruals and firm fundamentals by regressing accruals on a set of variables capturing 
firm fundamentals. The portion of accruals that cannot be explained by firm fundamentals is 
designated as discretionary accruals and this unexplained portion is used as a measure of the 
management reporting discretion or as a measure of earnings quality. But a potential problem 
with this type of research design is the incompleteness of variables meant to capture firm 
fundamentals implying that variation in accruals associated with the firms’ fundamentals is 
ascribed to managerial discretion (Dechow et al., 2010). These models assume that managerial 
intent is unrelated to firm fundamentals. Then, any correlation between the residual of the model 
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(a measure of managerial intent) and firm characteristics is taken as a model misspecification. As 
a result, recently researchers have placed emphasis to parse out factors related to firm’s operating 
performance or firm’s innate characteristics from the accrual model residuals. Francis et al. 
(2005) showed that the DD measure of accruals quality can be separated into its innate and 
discretionary components. They employ regression analysis where a measure of earnings quality 
is regressed on a set of innate factors and empirically define innate earnings quality as the fitted 
value and discretionary earnings quality as the residual. 
 Following Francis et al. (2004, 2005), I use two approaches to distinguish between innate 
and discretionary components of earnings quality. Both methods use summary indicators to 
capture the influence of operating environment and business model on earnings quality. These 
effects are referred to as innate factors, recognizing that the description is not exact because 
management can change the business model or the operating environment of a firm as part of 
strategic decisions. Innate factors are viewed as being slow to change relative to factors that 
influence discretionary earnings quality; that is, innate factors are predetermined at any given 
reporting date, but susceptible to modification over time. Innate factors are also not within the 
control of managerial leeway.  
 Under the first approach, I regress a measure of earnings quality on innate factors that 
prior researchers believe describe the firm’s business model and its operating environment. For 
example, Francis et al. (2005) implement this approach using DD model of earnings quality and 
innate factors. For this purpose, I use the five innate factors considered by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) as explaining accrual quality such as firm size, cash flow variability, sales variability, the 
length of operating cycle, and incidence of negative earnings realizations. Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) posit and find that accrual quality is inversely associated with firm size, and positively 
associated with cash flow variability, sales variability, operating cycle and incidence of losses. 
Building on DD, Francis et al. (2004) add measures of intangible intensity, intangible dummy 
and capital intensity as additional factors capturing business model. I also include these three 
factors. My first approach to identifying the components of earnings quality relies on annual 
estimations of the following equation: 
EQi,t = γ0 + γ1ASSETi,t + γ2VCFOi,t + γ3VSALESi,t + γ4OPCYCLEi,t + γ5NEGi,t + γ6INTANi,t  
 + γ7INTANDUMi,t + γ8CAPITALi,t + μi,t     Eq.  (4.4) 
50 
 
where, EQ is a measure of earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model and Kasznik version of Jones (1991) model. The predicted values from equation 
(4.4) yield an estimate of the innate portion of firm i’s earnings quality in year t, 
InnateEQi,t = γ̂0 + γ̂1 ASSETi,t + γ̂2 VCFOi,t + γ̂3 VSALESi,t + γ̂4 OPCYCLEi,t + γ̂5 NEGi,t 
   + γ̂6 INTANi,t + γ̂7 INTANDUMi,t + γ̂8 CAPITALi,t   Eq. (4.4a) 
The residual10 from equation (4.4) is the estimate of the discretionary component of firm i’s 
earnings quality, DiscEQi,t = μ̂i,t. This approach yields distinct estimates for each of the two 
components of earnings quality.  
 The second approach includes total earnings quality as the variable of interest and all the 
innate factors affecting earnings quality as control variables in the cost of equity tests. In these 
augmented regressions, the coefficient on total earnings quality captures the cost of equity effect 
that remains after taking into account the effect of innate factors. Following Francis et al. (2005), 
I will interpret this coefficient as a measure of the cost of equity effect of discretionary earnings 
quality. Francis et al. (2005) note that the precision of the estimates of these two components 
depends on the researcher’s ability to identify and measure the factors that describe the firm’s 
business models and its operating environment using accounting variables and other factors.
 The first and second approaches to separating total earnings quality into innate and 
discretionary components are not substitutes. Only the first approach provides a distinct estimate 
of innate and discretionary earnings quality allowing direct comparisons of the effects of innate 
versus discretionary earnings quality. On the other hand, the second approach implies the effect 
of discretionary earnings quality after controlling for the effect of innate factors. The two 
approaches are also different in their sensitivity to omitted innate factors. Under the first 
approach, omitted innate factors lead to model misspecification in the regression of total earnings 
quality on innate factors, and more noise in the error term. Other things being equal, this noise 
would bias the coefficient estimate on DiscEQ toward zero. Under the second approach, an 
incomplete set of innate factors would result in an upwardly biased coefficient estimate on 
TotalEQ, which essentially reflects the effect of discretionary earnings quality (Francis et al., 
2006). 
4.5 Model Specification 
                                                 
10 Francis et al. (2005) recognize that the residual term reflects both discretionary earnings quality and noise. 
Similarly, measures of discretionary accruals derived from different versions of the Jones model will include the 
effects of management intent and noise in accruals. 
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4.5.1 Empirical Model to Examine First Hypothesis 
 My first hypothesis in alternative form predicts that firms with poor earnings quality 
experience higher cost of equity capital To test this hypothesis, I use the empirical measures of 
earnings quality outlined in section 4.4.1, and two proxies for implied cost of equity; industry-
adjusted EP ratio and implied equity cost of capital estimated by reverse engineering the 
valuation models presented in Easton (2004). Previous studies have utilized different proxies for 
the equity cost of capital which is not directly observable. There are different methods available 
in the literature for estimating the cost of equity capital. One popular and commonly used 
method is Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993) although Fama and French 
(1997) recognize that three-factor model does not provide a reliable estimate of the equity cost of 
capital both at the firm level and at the industry level. Another alternative is to use realized stock 
returns to proxy for the equity cost of capital. Realized returns are a function of two things: 
expected returns or discount rates and information surprises (Campbell, 1991). Assuming that 
information surprises are zero in expectation, average realized returns are used as a proxy for 
expected returns. This approach has limitation too, given that the correlation between expected 
returns and ex-post realized returns is weak, and information surprises may not have zero mean 
yielding a biased proxy for expected returns (Elton, 1999). Due to the limitations of these 
approaches, researchers attempt to infer ex-ante equity cost of capital rates using an implied 
approach. Under this approach, one needs to assume an equity valuation model in order to 
estimate the implied cost of equity using the current stock price and market expectations of 
future cash flows or earnings. The valuation models differ in terms of the assumptions made 
regarding growth rates, terminal values, and forecast horizons. There is a debate in the literature 
about the advantages of various ex-ante measures (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Guay et al., 
2005; Easton and Monahon, 2005). Botosan and Plumlee (2005) rank five proxies of the 
expected rate of return by comparing the cross-sectional variation in the proxies that is explained 
by various risk measures. Based on their result, they conclude that target price method used by 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and PEG ratio based method suggested by Easton (2004) are 
consistently and predictably related to risk factors and dominate the alternatives they examine. 
The focus of the analysis in Guey et al. (2005) is on the correlation between realized return and 
various expected return proxies. They show, for all of the estimates that they evaluate, this 
correlation is not significantly different from zero, and it is often negative. The results in Easton 
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and Monahan (2005) suggest that the seven accounting-based proxies that they consider are not 
reliable measures of expected returns. None of the proxies have a significant positive association 
with realized returns even after controlling for the bias and noise in realized returns attributable 
to contemporaneous information surprises. Since there is no consensus on the supremacy of any 
single measure over others, I use two commonly accepted methods of calculating implied equity 
cost of capital to ensure that the results are robust and compelling. 
 While the study mainly focuses on the association between earnings quality and the cost 
of equity capital, the extant literature on the detrminants of the cost of capital suggests that some 
firm-specific factors are associated with the cost of equity capital. These factors are discussed 
below: 
(i) The CAPM model suggests that the firm’s expected returns are positively associated with its 
market beta. I include BETA in equation (4.5) to control for this risk factor. I expect a positive 
relation between BETA and the equity cost of capital. Beta is the slope coefficient from the 
regression of monthly raw returns on the monthly market returns over a rolling five-year 
windows. I use TOPIX return as the market return. 
(ii) Finance literature documents that firm size is negatively associated with the cost of equity. 
Therefore, I include a firm size in equation (4.5) as a control variable and hypothesize that the 
risk of investing in a firm increases when information about the firm is not readily available. 
Since information is easily available for larger firms than for smaller firms, firm size is used as 
one proxy for the availability of information.11 I use the firm’s market capitalization and expect a 
negative association between SIZE and the equity cost of capital since previous research 
suggests that smaller firms are riskier than large firms. 
(iii) Fama and French (1992) find that firms with higher book-to-market ratio earn higher 
realized returns. Chan et al. (1991) find that book-to-market ratio has the most significant 
positive impact on expected returns in the Japanese market. To control for risk associated with 
this measure, I include in equation (4.5) BM, the firm’s book-to-market ratio, and expect a 
positive association between this variable and the equity cost of capital. 
(iv) Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that as the amount of debt in the firm’s capital 
structure increases, the risk of default increases. Therefore, I include leverage as an additional 
                                                 
11 Another motivation for using firm size is presented by Berk (1995), who suggests that firm size is likely to be a 
catchall risk proxy. 
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explanatory variable. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of interest-bearing debt to the market value of 
equity. I expect a positive relation between leverage and the equity cost of capital. 
 I estimate the following regression that relates cost of equity measures with two proxies 
of earnings quality after incorporating the control variables identified above to test my first 
hypothesis: 
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 EQi,t + α2 BETAi,t + α3 SIZEi,t + α4 BMi,t  + α5 LEVi,t + ζi,t      Eq. (4.5) 
where, ImpCoE represents any of the two proxies of implied cost of equity, EQ represents either 
DDSTD or KZABS and BETA, SIZE, BM and LEV are control variables for common risk 
proxies. The hypothesized negative relation between cost of equity and earnings quality will be 
reflected in a positive and significant coefficient of EQ because DDSTD and KZABS are inverse 
measures of earnings quality in that higher values of EQ represent lower quality of earnings and 
vice versa. Thus, a positive and significant α1 will support my first hypothesis. 
 
4.5.2 Empirical Model to Examine Second Hypothesis 
 The first approach (Method 1) of distinguishing the cost of equity effects of innate and 
discretionary earnings quality substitutes InnateEQ and DiscEQ for EQ in the original cost of 
equity regression in equation (4.5). Specifically I estimate following regression: 
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 InnateEQi,t + α2 DiscEQi,t + α3 BETAi,t + α4 SIZEi,t + α5 BMi,t  + α6 LEVi,t + ζi,t 
           Eq. (4.6) 
I conjecture that InnateEQ will have significantly larger effect on cost of equity than DiscEQ. An 
evidence that α1 is significantly larger than α2 from equation (4.6) will support my second 
hypothesis. 
 The second approach (Method 2) adds the summary indicators of innate factors as right-
hand side variables to the original cost of equity capital regressions. The model appears like the 
following12: 
 
 
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 EQi,t + α2 BETAi,t + α3 SIZEi,t + α4 BMi,t  + α5 LEVi,t + α6 VCFOi,t  
                                                 
12 I exclude ASSET, one of the innate factors, from equation (4.6a) to avoid duplication of the same construct since 
firm size as measured by the log transformation of market value of equity is already included in the equation as a 
proxy for size. 
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  + α7VSALESi,t + α8 OPCYCLEi,t + α9 NEGi,t  + α10 INTANi,t  + α11 INTANDUMi,t 
 + α12 CAPITALi,t + ζi,t      Eq. (4.6a) 
The second approach does not provide a distinct estimate of the innate and discretionary 
components of earnings quality; rather, it implies the discretionary effect after controlling for the 
effect of innate factors. In this regression, the coefficient on EQ captures the cost of equity effect 
of the portion of earnings quality that is incremental to the effect captured by the innate factors. 
 
4.6 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.6.1 Description of the Sample 
 Initially, 26,874 firm-year observations for the 18-year period (1996-2013) are retrieved 
from Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest Database. The sample consists of only manufacturing 
companies listed in any one of the Japanese Stock Exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, JASDAQ, 
etc.) and primarily covers all firms from 17 industries based on Nikkei two-digit industrial codes. 
I do not include financial institutions, insurance companies, and firms in service industries since 
earnings quality empirical models used in this study do not reflect their activities. The final 
sample period commences in 2002 and ends in 2012 because estimation of parameters for the 
DD Model requires lead and lag values of cash flows from operation and measures of earnings 
quality require five annual residuals. This means at least 7 years of data is required to calculate 
earnings quality of firm i in year t. I set another criterion to run an industry-year regression for 
all the earnings quality models that each industry should have at least 10 observations in a year. 
This criterion results in dropping all observations from shipbuilding and petroleum industry. 
After deleting firm-years due to missing information on any of the variables used to calculate 
earnings quality and its determinants, I end up with 15,640 firm-year observations representing 
1492 firms having information on total, innate and discretionary earnings quality. For the cost of 
equity test, I calculate industry-adjusted EP ratios and PEG ratio based implied cost of equity. 
Since I use only positive earnings firm-year observations to estimate industry-adjusted EP ratio, 
the sample size reduces to 11,980 firm-year observations with positive earnings. For estimating 
implied cost of equity using Easton (2004) PEG ratio approach, I require assuming that EPS2 ≥ 
EPS1 ≥ 0. In total, these requirements produce a sample of 5,701 firm-year observations for the 
implied cost of equity test.  
4.6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
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 Panel B of Table 4.1 provides descriptive information on two earnings quality measures 
and their innate and discretionary components. The result indicates that the variability of 
earnings quality measure based on DD accrual quality model is less than that of earnings quality 
measure based on KZ absolute abnormal accrual model. Using the coefficient estimates derived 
from the annual regressions of Eq. (4.4), I calculate InnateEQ and DiscEQ using method 1. The 
mean (median) value of the innate component is 0.024 (0.022) for DDSTD and 0.028 (0.026) for 
KZABS, compared to a zero mean (-0.002 median) value of discretionary component for 
DDSTD and a zero mean (-0.006 median) value of discretionary component for KZABS. The 
zero mean value of DiscEQ is expected given that the discretionary component is defined as the 
prediction error from Eq. (4.4). The variability of innate portion of earnings quality is less than 
that of discretionary portion. This is consistent with the idea that innate factors are relatively 
stable, slow to change and are predetermined at any given reporting date than discretionary 
factors. Because EQ is linear in earnings quality (with larger values of EQ indicating poorer 
earnings quality), InnateEQ and DiscEQ are also linear in earnings quality. Therefore, the 
negative median value of DiscEQ implies that the discretionary component of earnings quality 
increases the quality of earnings. Unreported results show that 59% (61%) of the observations 
for DD (KZ) model have negative DiscEQ; this percentage is reliably different from chance 
(50%) at the 0.001 level. Following Francis et al.’s (2005) validity test of Method 1’s 
decomposition of total earnings quality into InnateEQ and DiscEQ, I investigate overtime 
changes in each of these components. Francis et al. (2005) assume that firms with poor innate 
earnings quality would find it difficult to ameliorate their situation than would firms with poor 
discretionary earnings quality. I verify this proposition following Francis et al.’s (2005) method. 
Using a paired-sample test of the percentage year-to-year absolute change in InnateEQ and 
DiscEQ, I find that the average change in DiscEQ is significantly (at the 0.001 level) larger than 
the average change in InnateEQ for both measures. Specifically, the average change for DD (KZ) 
model is 217 (441) percentage points higher for discretionary component than for innate 
component (t-statistic = 15.72 and 11.99 respectively). These results do not change when I use 
raw values rather than percentage change values (t-statistic is 49.61 and 94.90 respectively for 
raw values). Overall, these results support Method 1’s identification of the innate-discretionary 
partition (Francis et al., 2005). 
56 
 
 Panel C of Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the eight innate determinants of 
earnings quality. The sample mean values for the first five factors are 10.605 for ASSET (log of 
total assets), 0.057 for VCFO, 0.109 for VSALES, 5.054 for OPCYCLE (or 156 days) and 20 
percent for negative earnings (NEG). Looking at the variables capturing intangibles intensity, the 
result shows that only 4 percent of the sample firm-years report zero expenditure on R&D and 
advertising. For all sample firm-years (including those with INTAN = 0), the mean value of 
intangible intensity (INTAN) is 4.4 percent. Finally, the mean value of capital intensity 
(CAPITAL) is 32 percent. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables used for this study. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. For the 
variables used in the regressions, the number of observations is mentioned next to the name of the variables. Descriptive statistics for earnings quality 
variables and earnings quality determinants variables are reported for the sample period 2002-2012 based on 15,640 observations. The sample period is 
2002-2012 for earnings-price ratio based implied cost of equity measure and consists of 11,980 observations. The sample period is 2002-2011 for Easton 
PEG ratio based implied cost of equity measure and consists of 5,701 observations. Descriptive statistics for control variables are reported using the 
earnings-price ratio sample of 11,980 observations. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 10% Q1 Median Q3 90% 
Panel A: Implied cost of equity measures 
Earnings-price ratio EP 11,980 0.069 0.054 0.018 0.036 0.056 0.087 0.129 
Industry-adjusted earnings-
price ratio 
IndEP 11,980 0.010 0.051 -0.038 -0.020 0.000 0.026 0.062 
Easton’s implied cost of equity CoE 5,701 0.171 0.103 0.060 0.097 0.152 0.223 0.305 
Panel B: Earnings Quality Variables 
Dechow-Dichev accrual quality DDSTD 15,640 0.024 0.019 0.008 0.013 0.019 0.030 0.045 
Innate component InnateEQ 15,640 0.024 0.011 0.014 0.018 0.022 0.028 0.035 
Discretionary component DiscEQ 15,640 -0.000 0.015 -0.013 -0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.016 
Kasznik’s absolute abnormal 
accrual 
KZABS 15,640 0.029 0.029 0.004 0.009 0.020 0.038 0.062 
Innate component InnateEQ 15,640 0.028 0.012 0.018 0.022 0.026 0.032 0.039 
Discretionary component DiscEQ 15,640 -0.000 0.026 -0.023 -0.016 -0.006 0.010 0.031 
Panel C: Earnings Quality Determinants Variables 
Size (in log) ASSET 15,640 10.605 1.580 8.786 9.516 10.409 11.521 12.742 
Cash flows volatility VCFO 15,640 0.057 0.068 0.019 0.027 0.041 0.063 0.102 
Sales volatility VSALES 15,640 0.109 0.180 0.027 0.042 0.070 0.119 0.203 
Operating Cycle (in log) OPCYCLE 15,640 5.054 0.442 4.490 4.813 5.087 5.333 5.551 
Incidence of negative earnings NEG 15,640 0.203 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 
Intangible intensity INTAN 15,640 0.044 0.241 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.405 0.081 
Absence of reported intangible INTANDUM 15,640 0.040 0.196      
Capital intensity CAPITAL 15,640 0.316 0.137 0.149 0.220 0.309 0.405 0.495 
Panel D: Control Variables 
Systematic risk BETA 11,980 0.907 0.508 0.289 0.547 0.864 1.225 1.573 
Firm size (in log) SIZE 11,980 9.802 1.802 7.679 8.472 9.573 10.897 12.311 
Book-to-market ratio BM 11,980 1.313 0.856 0.470 0.718 1.105 1.667 2.436 
Leverage LEV 11,980 0.806 1.171 0.001 0.081 0.381 1.004 2.114 
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4.7 Results and Analysis 
4.7.1 Earnings Quality and Cost of Equity 
  In this section, I examine the association between earnings quality and proxies for 
costs of equity, as captured by industry-adjusted earnings–price ratios (Section 4.7.1.1) and 
Easton (2004) PEG ratio (Section 4.7.1.2). The sample used in the tests includes 11,980 firm-
year observations for earnings–price ratios test (sample period 2002-2012) and 5,701 firm-year 
observations for Easton PEG ratios test (sample period 2002-2011). I base my analyses on 
pooled cross-sectional regression using the raw values of EQ, for the respective sample period. I 
calculate two-way clustered robust standard errors and t-statistics to assess the significance of the 
estimated coefficients. Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics on cost of equity and common 
risk proxies known to influence the cost of capital. The result shows that mean (median) EP ratio 
is 6.9% (5.6%), with 80% of the sample having EP ratio between 1.8% and 12.9%. The mean 
(median) implied cost of equity based on PEG ratio approach is 17.1% (15.2%), with 80% of the 
sample having implied cost of equity between 6% and 30%.  
Table 4.2: Mean Values of Market Beta (BETA), Earnings-Price Ratio (EP), Industry-
adjusted EP Ratio (IndEP) and Easton’s Implied Cost of Equity (CoE) Across Quintiles of 
Earnings Quality Measures 
Panel A and Panel B report the averages of BETA, EP, IndEP and CoE variable in quintile portfolios formed 
on the basis of modified Dechow-Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure (DDSTD) and Kasznik version of 
Jones (1991) absolute abnormal accrual measure (KZABS) respectively. Quintile portfolios are formed each 
fiscal year separately for the measure of DDSTD and KZABS. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Mean of BETA, EP, IndEP and CoE across accrual quality measure (DDSTD) 
Variable 
Quintiles based on DDSTD 
EQ Quintile (1= High EQ Score; 5= Low EQ Score) 
Mean diff. 
Q5 – Q1 
(t-statistic) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
BETA 0.792 0.828 0.861 0.927 1.05 0.258*** (15.449) 
EP 0.062 0.065 0.066 0.070 0.081 0.019*** (11.234) 
IndEP 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.022 0.019*** (11.432) 
CoE 0.153 0.160 0.172 0.178 0.193 0.040*** (9.643) 
 
Panel B: Mean of BETA, EP, IndEP and CoE across absolute abnormal accrual measure (KZABS) 
Variable 
Quintiles based on KZABS 
EQ Quintile (1= High EQ Score; 5= Low EQ Score) 
Mean diff. 
Q5 – Q1 
(t-statistic) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
BETA 0.859 0.863 0.885 0.895 0.941 0.082*** (4.731) 
EP 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.069 0.076 0.010*** (6.052) 
IndEP 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.017 0.010*** (6.348) 
CoE 0.169 0.160 0.169 0.176 0.182 0.013** (2.761) 
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4.7.1.1 Industry-adjusted Earnings-price Ratios 
 The price-earnings ratio (P/E) gives an idea of what the market is willing to pay for the 
company’s earnings. The higher the P/E, the more the market is willing to pay for the company’s 
earnings. A high P/E indicates overpriced stock for which the market is assumed to have high 
hopes for the stock’s future. Conversely, a low P/E may indicate a lack of confidence by the 
market participants or it can mean that this stock is a sleeper that the market has overlooked. Liu 
et al. (2002) suggest that the price multiple attached to earnings is often viewed as a short-hand 
valuation, and Francis et al. (2005) used the price-earnings ratio as an inverse indicator of the 
cost of equity. Following Francis et al. (2005), I examine whether higher earnings quality results 
in higher price-earnings ratios (lower cost of equity). Specifically, I examine the relation 
between earnings quality and industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios. I use earnings-price (EP) 
ratios to mitigate concerns about the effects of small values of earnings in the denominator, and I 
industry-adjust individual EP ratio because industry membership or a combination of risk and 
earnings growth works well for selecting comparable firms (Francis et al., 2005). 
 To calculate industry-adjusted EP ratios, I start with computing the median EP ratio for 
all positive earnings firms in year t in each of the 15 two-digit Nikkei industry groups. A 
minimum of five positive earnings firms is required in each industry in year t (excluding firm i). 
Firm i’s industry-adjusted EP ratio (IndEP) is then calculated as the difference between its EP 
ratio and the median industry EP ratio in year t.13 If investors decide to pay lower price for 
lower-quality earnings, such earnings are expected to have larger IndEP values. In Table 4.2, the 
mean values of EP and IndEP are presented for each quintile of the ranked EQ distribution for 
both earnings quality metrics. The result shows that both EP and IndEP are highest for the firms 
with the poorest earnings quality (firms in Q5) and that the differences in the mean EP and 
IndEP between the worst earnings quality quintile (Q5) and the best earnings quality quintile 
(Q1) are  reliably differnet from zero suggesting that investors pay less for lower quality earnings. 
This result is consistent with the results in Francis et al. (2005). A regression analysis is 
conducted to provide a formal test of the association between earnings quality and industry-
adjusted EP ratios. The results are presented in TotalEQ column of Table 4.3 for both earnings 
quality measures. The regression model controls for beta, firm size, book-to-market ratio, and 
leverage, which are deemed to be associated with the proxy for the cost of equity capital.  
                                                 
13 Alternatively, using the ratio of firm i’s EP to the median industry EP produces materially similar results. 
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Table 4.3: Regression of Industry-adjusted Earnings-Price Ratio on Earnings Quality and 
Other Control Variables 
This table reports estimation of Eq. (4.5)  
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 EQi,t + α2 BETAi,t + α3 SIZEi,t + α4 BMi,t  + α5 LEVi,t + ζi,t  Eq. (4.5) 
where ImpCoE represents industry-adjusted EP ratio (IndEP), EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality 
calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality model and Kasznik version of Jones 
(1991) abnormal accrual model. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is 2002-
2012 and consists of 11,980 observations. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. t-
statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 
2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
   EQ = DDSTD measure EQ = KZABS measure 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Base Model 
TotalEQ 
Eq. (4.5) 
TotalEQ 
Eq. (4.5) 
Intercept 
 0.048*** 
(9.96) 
0.035*** 
(7.44) 
0.041*** 
(9.04) 
EQi,t (+) 
 0.322*** 
(6.49) 
0.167*** 
(5.82) 
BETAi,t (+) 
0.006*** 
(3..95) 
0.004*** 
(2.73) 
0.005*** 
(3.61) 
SIZEi,t (-) 
-0.005*** 
(-12.07) 
-0.004*** 
(-11.22) 
-0.005*** 
(-11.99) 
BMi,t   (+) 
0.003*** 
(3.34) 
0.004*** 
(4.19) 
0.004*** 
(3.60) 
LEVi,t (+) 
0.003*** 
(3.95) 
0.003*** 
(4.03) 
0.003*** 
(4.19) 
N  11,980 11,980 11,980 
Adjusted R2  6.24% 7.28% 6.88% 
 
 
 Results (The Base Model column of Table 4.3) show that IndEP is positively related to 
market beta (Beta), book-to-market ratio (BM) and leverage (LEV) consistent with riskier and 
distressed firms have larger earnings-price ratios. The relationship between IndEP and SIZE is 
found to be negative, confirming the notion that smaller firms have higher cost of equity. The 
TotalEQ columns of Table 4.3 show that firms with poor earnings quality as denoted by higher 
EQ values have higher earnings-price ratios after controlling for the effects of other factors 
affecting earnings-price ratios. This result is consistent with the hypothesized association 
between earnings quality and the cost of equity, indicating that investors are willing to pay lower 
price for a yen of earnings when the quality of earnings deteriorates. In sum, the result implies 
that firms with lower quality earnings experience higher cost of equity capital. 
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4.7.1.2 Easton’s Implied Cost of Equity 
 Recent literature has estimated the expected rate of return implied by market prices, 
accounting numbers and forecast of earnings and dividends. Estimates of the expected rate of 
return, which are often used as proxies for the cost of equity capital,14 are obtained by inverting 
accounting-based valuation models. I use Easton (2004) PEG ratio-based implied cost of equity 
measures as a proxy for firm’s cost of equity. Easton derived his valuation model from abnormal 
growth in earnings valuation model, which in turn is derived from the dividend capitalization 
model, by taking simplifying assumptions.15 Valuations based on PEG ratio are special cases of 
the abnormal growth in earnings valuation model. The model assumes that abnormal earnings 
persist in perpetuity (growth in abnormal earnings = 0) and DPS1 = 0. To estimate this model, 
one needs positive changes in forecasted future earnings. I estimate cost of equity by using the 
following simplified formula suggested by Easton (2004): 
CoE = √(EPS2 − EPS1)/P0 
 A large body of literature uses analysts’ forecasts of earnings, which are known to be 
optimistic, to determine the expected rate of return implied by these forecasts, yielding upwardly 
biased estimates. Easton and Sommers (2007) estimate the bias, computed as the difference 
between the estimates of the implied expected rate of return based on analysts’ earnings forecast 
and estimates based on current and future earnings realizations based on perfect foresight 
forecasts. They show that the bias is statistically and economically significant. The problem with 
both consensus analysts’ forecast and “perfect foresight” assumption is that stock price reflects 
investors’ expectation of future earnings, which may differ from analysts’ forecast and actual 
earnings realization in the future. Following Easton and Sommers (2007), I use actual earnings 
per share information and stock price three months after fiscal year end to estimate implied cost 
of equity. I also assume that EPS2 ≥ EPS1 ≥ 0. 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Although the term cost of capital is commonly used to describe the implied expected rates of return, they are not 
the cost of capital unless the market prices are efficient and the earnings forecasts are the market’s earnings 
expectations. 
15 Reverse engineering to obtain the implied expected rate of return depends critically on the maintained assumption 
about the growth rate beyond the period for which forecasts are available. 
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Table 4.4: Regression of Easton’s Implied Cost of Equity on Earnings Quality and Other 
Control Variables  
This table reports estimation of Eq. (4.5)  
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 EQi,t + α2 BETAi,t + α3 SIZEi,t + α4 BMi,t  + α5 LEVi,t + ζi,t  Eq. (4.5) 
where ImpCoE represents Easton’s implied cost of equity (CoE), EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality 
calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality model and Kasznik version of Jones 
(1991) abnormal accrual model. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is 2002-
2011 and consists of 5,701 observations. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. t-
statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 
2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
   EQ = DDSTD measure EQ = KZABS measure 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Base Model 
TotalEQ 
Eq. (4.5) 
TotalEQ 
Eq. (4.5) 
Intercept 
 0.181*** 
(12.13) 
0.160*** 
(10.93) 
0.175*** 
(11.76) 
EQi,t (+) 
 0.575*** 
(4.90) 
0.173*** 
(3.05) 
BETAi,t (+) 
0.022*** 
(7.06) 
0.019*** 
(6.30) 
0.022*** 
(7.02) 
SIZEi,t (-) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.07) 
-0.007*** 
(-6.54) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.97) 
BMi,t   (+) 
0.025*** 
(7.70) 
0.027*** 
(8.23) 
0.025*** 
(7.77) 
LEVi,t (+) 
0.023*** 
(10.33) 
0.023*** 
(10.38) 
0.023*** 
(10.41) 
N  5,701 5,701 5,701 
Adjusted R2  21.46% 22.21% 21.67% 
  
 Table 4.4 reports results of estimating a base version of Equation (4.5) that includes only 
the risk proxies. This regression provides a validation of PEG ratio based implied cost of equity 
estimates; I expect these estimates to be positively related to Beta (firms with higher betas have 
higher costs of equity), negatively related to SIZE (smaller firms have larger costs of equity), and 
positively related to BM (firms with larger book-to-market ratios have higher costs of equity) 
and LEV (firms with higher proportion of debt in the capital structure are riskier and have higher 
cost of equity). The mean coefficients on these variables are consistent with predicted relations. 
 Table 4.2 presents preliminary evidence on the relation between CoE and EQ. I report the 
mean CoE for each quintile of the ranked EQ distribution for both earnings quality metrics. The 
result shows that as I move from Q1 (the best earnings quality firms) to Q5 (the worst earnings 
quality firms) CoE increases monotonically for DDSTD measure (the increase is not monotonic 
for KZABS measure), meaning that the cost of equity increases as earnings quality declines. The 
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difference in mean values between extreme quintiles of earnings quality is significantly different 
from zero, suggesting that the cost of equity is higher for the worst earnings quality firms. The 
systematic risk as measured by market beta increases monotonically across earnings quality 
quintiles and the difference in mean values between the best and worst earnings quality quintile 
is reliably different from zero. 
 The result of examining whether earnings quality has the ability to explain the cross-
sectional variation in firm-specific equity cost of capital estimates is presented in Table 4.4 in 
which TotalEQ column reports the result of estimating equation (4.5) using DDSTD and KZABS 
measures. The result shows that even after accounting for the effects of known determinants of 
the cost of equity, both measures of earnings quality exhibit significant association with the 
equity cost of capital. One implication of this result is that firms can enjoy a lower equity cost of 
capital by providing high-quality earnings information. These results lead to the conclusion that 
the quality of earnings affects the equity cost of capital beyond additional risk factors priced by 
the market, such as beta, size, book-to-market ratio, and leverage. 
 
4.7.2 Determinants of Earnings Quality  
 To determine the importance of the innate determinants in explaining earnings quality, I 
estimate annual regressions of each earnings quality measure on the eight determinants. Table 
4.5 reports the mean of the 11 coefficient estimates, where the t-statistics are based on the 
standard error of the 11 annual estimates. The result shows that the innate determinants explain 
moderate to low level of cross-sectional variation in accruals-based earnings quality measures 
(34 percent for DDSTD and 16 percent for KZABS). The explanatory power of the innate 
determinants is higher for standard deviation of residuals based earnings quality measure than 
absolute value of residuals based earnings quality measure. The five determinants (size, cash 
flow volatility, sales volatility, incidence of negative earnings and capital intensity) show 
consistent result (correct in predicted sign and significant) across both earnings quality measures. 
The length of operating cycle and the intangible intensity are positively related but not 
statistically significant in explaining the variation of any earnings quality measure. Intangible 
dummy shows consistent sign across earnings quality measures and is significantly related to 
DDSTD but insignificant for KZABS measures. To sum up, the eight innate determinants work 
moderately well in capturing firm’s business model and operating environment. 
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Table 4.5: Regression of Earnings Quality on Innate Determinants  
This table reports estimation of Eq. (4.4)  
EQi,t = γ0 + γ1ASSETi,t + γ2VCFOi,t + γ3VSALESi,t + γ4OPCYCLEi,t + γ5NEGi,t + γ6INTANi,t + 
γ7INTANDUMi,t + γ8CAPITALi,t + μi,t     Eq. (4.4) 
where EQ is a measure of earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and 
Kasznik version of Jones (1991) model. The innate determinants are defined in Appendix A. The sample 
period is 2002-2012 and consists of 15,640 observations. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 
1% levels. I estimate above equation separately for each year and reported coefficients are averages of 11 
annual coefficients. t-statistics are calculated on the basis of the distribution of annual coefficients and 
presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, 
respectively. 
 
  EQ = DDSTD measure EQ = KZABS measure 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Eq. (4.4) Eq. (4.4) 
Intercept 
 0.03184*** 
(14.48) 
0.02851*** 
(6.45) 
ASSET i,t (-) 
-0.00134*** 
(-15.65) 
-0.00125*** 
(-8.68) 
VCFOi,t (+) 
0.08979*** 
(16.45) 
0.10856*** 
(9.16) 
VSALESi,t (+) 
0.01450*** 
(8.32) 
0.01308*** 
(4.57) 
OPCYCLEi,t (+) 
0.00014 
(0.23) 
0.00159 
(1.93) 
NEGi,t (+) 
0.02017*** 
(19.16) 
0.01442*** 
(8.87) 
INTANi,t (+) 
0.00653 
(1.17) 
0.00079 
(0.16) 
INTANDUMi,t (-) 
-0.00393*** 
(-5.09) 
-0.00056 
(-0.46) 
CAPITALi,t (-) 
-0.01555*** 
(-24.48) 
-0.01741*** 
(-7.81) 
No. of Year  11 11 
Adjusted R2  34% 16% 
 
4.7.3 The Pricing of Innate versus Discretionary Earnings Quality 
 The first approach to distinguishing between the cost of equity effects of innate and 
discretionary earnings quality substitutes InnateEQ and DiscEQ for EQ in the original cost of 
equity regression. The second approach adds the summary indicators of innate factors as right-
hand side variables to the original cost of equity regression. In both approaches, and for each cost 
of equity test, I continue to control for variables found by prior research to be associated with the 
cost of equity. 
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 Results of the tests based on industry-adjusted EP ratios as the measure of the cost of 
equity capital are reported in Table 4.6. For DD model based earnings quality measures, under 
Method 1, which explicitly separates the innate component of earnings quality, the result shows 
that both components have significant pricing effect but the difference between innate and 
discretionary pricing effect is not significant at conventional level (F-statistic = 0.21). Under 
Method 2, the discretionary component of earnings quality has a significant pricing effect. KZ 
model based earnings quality measure shows significant pricing effect of both components with 
the stronger effect of innate earnings quality than that of discretionary earnings quality under 
both methods. The difference between innate versus discretionary pricing effect is significant at 
the conventional level (F-statistic = 12.48). Table 4.7 documents results for implied cost of 
equity estimates. For DD model based earnings quality measures, under Method 2, discretionary 
earnings quality has a positive coefficient that is smaller and less significant than is the 
coefficient on total earnings quality. When both innate and discretionary components are 
included (Method 1), the coefficient on the innate component exceeds the coefficient on the 
discretionary component, with the difference being (F-statistic = 32.95) significant at the 
conventional level. For KZ absolute abnormal accrual based measures, Table 4.7 shows that 
innate component is significantly related to implied cost of equity (Method 1) but discretionary 
component is not significant. The difference between innate versus discretionary pricing effect is 
significant at the conventional level (F-statistic = 29.88). Method 2 also provides similar result 
since the earnings quality is not significant once the innate factors are controlled for, which 
means that discretionary component has no significant pricing effect. 
 
4.7.4 Summary of Results 
 In summary, I can draw following inferences from the study: 
First, overall results suggest that earnings quality is inversely related to the cost of equity capital, 
implying that investors consider earnings quality in pricing securities. Univariate analysis shows 
that systematic risk as measured by beta, industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios and Easton’s 
implied cost of equity measures increase steadily as earnings quality becomes poor. Later, 
regression results confirm that firms with poor earnings quality experience higher cost for 
accessing to capital market. 
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Table 4.6: Regression of Industry-adjusted Earnings-Price Ratio on Components of 
Earnings Quality and Other Control Variables  
This table reports estimation of Eq. (4.6) and (4.6a)  
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 InnateEQi,t + α2 DiscEQi,t + α3 BETAi,t + α4 SIZEi,t + α5 BMi,t  + α6 LEVi,t + ζi,t        Eq. (4.6) 
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 EQi,t + α2 BETAi,t + α3 SIZEi,t + α4 BMi,t  + α5 LEVi,t + α6 VCFOi,t + α7 VSALESi,t + 
α8OPCYCLEi,t + α9 NEGi,t  + α10 INTANi,t  + α11 INTANDUMi,t + α12 CAPITALi,t + ζi,t         Eq. (4.6a) 
where, ImpCoE represents industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio (IndEP), InnateEQ and DiscEQ are inverse 
measure of innate and discretionary earnings quality respectively. Specifically, InnateEQ is the fitted value 
from Eq. (4.4) and DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (4.4). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The 
sample period is 2002–2012 and consists of 11,980 observations. All variables are winsorized at the bottom 
and top 1% levels. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard 
errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
  EQ = DDSTD measure EQ = KZABS measure 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Method 1 
Eq. (4.6) 
Method 2 
Eq. (4.6a) 
Method 1 
Eq. (4.6) 
Method 2 
Eq. (4.6a) 
Intercept 
 0.033*** 
(5.72) 
0.103*** 
(9.91) 
0.030*** 
(5.14) 
0.017*** 
(10.31) 
InnateEQi,t (+) 
0.360*** 
(4.02) 
 0.430*** 
(5.01) 
 
DiscEQi,t (+) 
0.312*** 
(5.42) 
 0.137*** 
(4.92) 
 
EQi,t (+) 
 0.267*** 
(4.76) 
 0.112*** 
(4.10) 
BETAi,t (+) 
0.004*** 
(2.70) 
0.005*** 
(3.63) 
0.005*** 
(3.21) 
0.006*** 
(4.07) 
SIZEi,t (-) 
-0.004*** 
(-10.21) 
-0.004*** 
(-11.03) 
-0.004*** 
(-9.97) 
-0.005*** 
(-11.47) 
BMi,t   (+) 
0.004*** 
(4.20) 
0.005*** 
(4.29) 
0.004*** 
(3.73) 
0.004*** 
(3.98) 
LEVi,t (+) 
0.003*** 
(4.02) 
0.004*** 
(4.53) 
0.003*** 
(4.46) 
0.004*** 
(4.46) 
VCFOi,t (+) 
 0.068*** 
(3.34) 
 0.091*** 
(4.37) 
VSALESi,t (+) 
 0.008 
(0.97) 
 0.012 
(1.47) 
OPCYCLEi,t (+) 
 -0.013*** 
(-8.97) 
 -0.013*** 
(-9.16) 
NEGi,t (+) 
 -0.009*** 
(-2.81) 
 -0.005 
(-1.46) 
INTANi,t (+) 
 -0.030* 
(-1.96) 
 -0.021 
(-1.36) 
INTANDUMi,t (-) 
 0.003 
(0.86) 
 0.003 
(0.75) 
CAPITALi,t (-) 
 -0.014*** 
(-3.09) 
 -0.016*** 
(-3.40) 
N  11,980 11,980 11,980 11,980 
Adjusted R2  7.28% 8.91% 7.03% 8.67% 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: α1 = α2 
H1: α1 > α2 
 
0.21 
(0.648) 
 
12.48*** 
(0.000) 
 
67 
 
Table 4.7: Regression of Easton Implied Cost of Equity on Components of Earnings 
Quality and Other Control Variables  
This table reports estimation of Eq. (4.6) and (4.6a).  
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 InnateEQi,t + α2 DiscEQi,t + α3 BETAi,t + α4 SIZEi,t + α5 BMi,t  + α6 LEVi,t + ζi,t        Eq. (4.6) 
ImpCoEi,t = α0 + α1 EQi,t + α2 BETAi,t + α3 SIZEi,t + α4 BMi,t  + α5 LEVi,t + α6 VCFOi,t + α7 VSALESi,t + 
α8OPCYCLEi,t + α9 NEGi,t  + α10 INTANi,t  + α11 INTANDUMi,t + α12 CAPITALi,t + ζi,t         Eq. (4.6a) 
where ImpCoE represents Easton’s implied cost of equity (CoE), InnateEQ and DiscEQ are inverse measure of 
innate and discretionary earnings quality respectively. Specifically, InnateEQ is the fitted value from Eq. (4) 
and DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (4). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The sample period is 
2002–2011 and consists of 5,701 observations. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. t-
statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 
2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
  EQ = DDSTD measure EQ = KZABS measure 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Method 1 
Eq. (4.6) 
Method 2 
Eq. (4.6a) 
Method 1 
Eq. (4.6) 
Method 2 
Eq. (4.6a) 
Intercept 
 0.109*** 
(6.74) 
0.182*** 
(5.80) 
0.121*** 
(7.15) 
0.187*** 
(6.07) 
InnateEQi,t (+) 
1.800*** 
(6.59) 
 1.432*** 
(5.65) 
 
DiscEQi,t (+) 
0.224* 
(1.84) 
 0.022 
(0.39) 
 
EQi,t (+) 
 0.294** 
(2.33) 
 0.072 
(1.28) 
BETAi,t (+) 
0.017*** 
(5.43) 
0.014*** 
(4.57) 
0.019*** 
(6.12) 
0.164*** 
(4.73) 
SIZEi,t (-) 
-0.005*** 
(-4.27) 
-0.006*** 
(-5.30) 
-0.005*** 
(-4.95) 
-0.006*** 
(-5.48) 
BMi,t   (+) 
0.028*** 
(8.36) 
0.027*** 
(8.15) 
0.026*** 
(7.83) 
0.026*** 
(8.01) 
LEVi,t (+) 
0.023*** 
(10.29) 
0.020*** 
(8.92) 
0.024*** 
(10.66) 
0.020*** 
(8.87) 
VCFOi,t (+) 
 0.048 
(1.10) 
 0.087** 
(1.98) 
VSALESi,t (+) 
 0.043 
(1.63) 
 0.041* 
(1.86) 
OPCYCLEi,t (+) 
 -0.006 
(-1.23) 
 -0.007 
(-1.28) 
NEGi,t (+) 
 0.048*** 
(5.79) 
 0.052*** 
(6.29) 
INTANi,t (+) 
 -0.039 
(-1.07) 
 -0.031 
(-0.87) 
INTANDUMi,t (-) 
 0.001 
(0.09) 
 0.001 
(0.09) 
CAPITALi,t (-) 
 -0.011 
(-0.83) 
 -0.012 
(-0.93) 
N  5,701 5,701 5,701 5,701 
Adjusted R2  22.89% 23.24% 22.46% 23.14% 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: α1 = α2 
H1: α1 > α2 
 
32.95*** 
(0.000) 
 
29.88*** 
(0.000) 
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Second, the summary indicators of innate operating and environmental factors explain a 
moderate portion of accrual quality and low portion of absolute abnormal accruals. 
Third, I get fairly consistent evidence regarding differential pricing effect of innate versus 
discretionary earnings quality. Innate earnings quality has a larger pricing effect than 
discretionary earnings quality except for DDSTD’s effect on industry-adjusted EP ratio. This 
result indicates that investors place greater emphasis on the innate component of earnings quality 
that reflects intrinsic features of a firm’s business model, suggesting that investors are concerned 
with the source of information risk. 
 
4.7.5 Sensitivity Tests 
 I conduct several sensitivity tests following the procedures of Francis et al. (2005) to 
ensure that my primary results hold when different estimation procedures, different specification 
for earnings quality variable, or alternative proxies for earnings quality are used. The summary 
results of various sensitivity tests are discussed in this section. First, I apply different estimation 
procedure. I re-run all the regression models using Fama-MacBeth (1973) annual regression 
approach and evaluate the significance of the results using the time-series standard errors of 
annual coefficient estimates. Unreported results show that annual regression approach produces 
qualitatively similar results as the pooled regression approach. Second, I repeat all the 
regressions using the quintile rank values of earnings quality measures in place of the raw values 
of earnings quality measures. The quintile ranks are useful for mitigating the effects of outliers 
and controlling for non-linearities. Unreported results suggest that the use of quintile rank values 
in the regression yields essentially the same results as those originally reported. Third, I examine 
the sensitivity of the results by excluding firms in the worst earnings quality quintile and find 
that all the results (not reported) are materially similar to those reported. However, the effect of 
earnings quality is attenuated as reflected in smaller magnitude of the coefficients after 
eliminating firm-year observations in Q5. Finally, with regard to alternative proxies, I repeat my 
tests using the standard deviation of residuals from the baseline Dechow-Dichev (2002) model 
and the absolute value of residuals from modified Jones (1991) model. The unreported result 
shows that the results for alternative proxies of earnings quality are statistically significant and 
qualitatively similar to those reported. Overall, the sensitivity tests confirm a significant negative 
association between earnings quality and the cost of equity capital. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
 Drawing on prior research, I investigate the relation between two accruals-based earnings 
quality measures and two proxies for implied cost of equity for a large sample of Japanese 
manufacturing firms over the period 2002-2012. I find that lower quality earnings are associated 
with smaller price multiples on earnings, higher cost of equity derived from inverting abnormal 
growth in earnings valuation model as implemented in Easton (2004) and larger equity betas. 
The results suggest that investors are aware of earnings quality while pricing securities. 
Moreover, these results persist after controlling for the known factors that can affect the cost of 
equity and are insensitive to different estimation procedures, variable specification, skewness 
and alternative proxies of earnings quality.   
 I also examine the costs of equity effects of two distinct components of earnings quality. I 
follow Francis et al. (2005) in order to decompose total earnings quality into innate and 
discretionary portion. Then, I test the pricing effect of innate versus discretionay component of 
earnings quality and find that innate and discretionary components of earnings quality have 
distinguishable costs of equity effects (except for DDSTD’s effect on IndEP where I do not find 
significantly different impact of innate versus discretionary component) in that the innate 
component of earnings quality, on average, has a significantly stronger pricing effect than the 
discretionary component of earnings quality. This finding implies that investors are cognizant of 
the source of earnings quality in the determination of cost of equity. Consequently, they accord 
greater weight to earnings that reflect innate characteristics of the firm’s operating environment, 
compared to earnings that reflect some mixture of management’s attempt to provide informative 
signal, managerial opporutnism and pure noise. This result has important implications for capital 
allocation because rational investors who are aware of the innate and discretionary components 
of earnings quality will aptly place less emphasis to the latter in their determination of the cost of 
equity capital (Francis et al., 2005). 
 The results documented in this chapter have two implications for the assessment of 
financial reporting quality. First, the study indicates that earnings quality, which is used as a 
summary measure of overall financial reporting quality, is an important factor investors consider 
in pricing securities. Second, the result suggests that earnings quality is predominantly driven by 
management’s long-term strategic decisions that affect innate factors rather than management’s 
short-term reporting choices. 
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Chapter Five 
Earnings Quality and Firm-specific Return Volatility 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 The factors affecting firm-specific return volatility have stimulated considerable interest 
among financial economists and accountants in recent years since the publication of Campbell et 
al. (2001) paper exploring a surprising result that the firm-specific return volatility, commonly 
known as idiosyncratic volatility, has increased dramatically while the aggregate market 
volatility and industry volatilities remained basically unchanged through time. This finding 
echoes another related work by Morck et al. (2000) in which the surge of the ratio of firm-
specific risk to systematic risk in the U.S. stock markets is documented. Since then, several 
studies try to offer possible explanations for this phenomenon. The proposed explanations 
include increasing leverage, higher incidence of spin-offs of conglomerates, firms issuing stocks 
earlier in their life-cycles, increase in option-based compensation (Campbell et al., 2001); 
increased proportion of institutional ownership and  expected earnings growth (Xu and Malkiel, 
2003); firm fundamentals having become more volatile (Wei and Zhang, 2006); newly listed 
firms becoming increasingly younger (Fink et al., 2010) and riskier (Brown and Kapadia, 2007); 
fundamental cash flow shocks due to product markets becoming more competitive (Irvine and 
Pontiff, 2009); trading of low-priced stocks by retail investors (Brandt et al., 2010); earnings 
management (Hutton et al., 2009) and deteriorating financial reporting quality (Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 2011; Chen et al., 2012). The objective of this chapter is to investigate whether 
earnings quality and its components explain cross-sectional differences in firm-specific return 
volatility of Japanese manufacturing firms for the period 2003-2012. In particular, this study is 
motivated by Hutton et al. (2009) and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) finding that earnings 
opacity or deteriorating earnings quality is strongly associated with firm-specific return volatility 
in the cross-section of U.S. stocks. While the extant literature demonstrates a link between 
earnings quality and firm-specific return volatility, this study will also investigate the relation 
between firm-specific return volatility and two distinct components (innate versus discretionary 
component) of earnings quality to shed light on which component of earnings quality drives the 
association between earnings quality and firm-specific return volatility. 
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 In Japanese stock markets, the behavior of aggregate firm-specific return volatility stands 
in sharp contrast to that of U.S. markets. Hamao et al. (2003) report a dramatic fall in firm-level 
volatility immediately after the market crash in the 1980s and an increase in market-wide 
volatility. They attribute this unusual structure of firm-specific return volatility to sharp increase 
in earnings homogeneity among Japanese firms post-crash period. The Japanese stock market 
has long been the second largest financial market in terms of market capitalization after U.S. 
markets (Chang et al., 2010). Given the contrasting behavior of firm-specific return volatility in 
the U.S. and the Japanese markets, the evidence from Japan is expected to enhance the 
robustness and assess the external validity of the results found in the U.S. markets. While Chang 
and Dong (2006) investigate the role of firm-level earnings in explaining cross-sectional 
differences in idiosyncratic volatility using Japanese data, I relate the more specific notion of 
“earnings quality” to cross-sectional differences in firm-specific return volatility.  
 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 This section reviews prior literature on the relation between earnings quality and firm-
specific return volatility and forms two hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. 
 
5.2.1 Earnings Quality and Firm-specific Return Volatility 
 Although the literature on determinants and consequences of earnings quality is abundant, 
studies that examine firm-specific return volatility effect of earnings quality are few, and the 
results are mixed. The mixed results are attributable to the different interpretation of what firm-
specific return volatility captures. The nature and direction of the association between earnings 
quality and firm-specific return volatility are also related to a larger debate in accounting and 
finance literature on whether firm-specific return volatility reflects firm-specific information or 
noise.  
 Roll (1988) was the first to formalize the idea that stock return synchronicity 
(asynchronicity), a measure of firm-specific return volatility, is negatively (positively) associated 
with the amount of firm-specific information being impounded into individual stock price. 
Morck et al. (2000) find that synchronicity is higher in countries with less developed financial 
systems and weaker private property rights. Jin and Myers (2006) document positive associations 
between synchronicity and several measures of financial information opacity for a cross-section 
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of countries. Durnev et al. (2003), Ferreira and Laux (2007), and Hutton et al. (2009) find results 
similar to Jin and Myers (2006) in the U.S. context. These studies conclude that poor earnings 
quality is associated with lower firm-specific return volatility, measured by asynchronicity. That 
is, when earnings quality is low, less firm-specific information is available and synchronicity 
(asynchronicity) is higher (lower). It is interesting to note that prior studies that rely on 
information based explanation of return volatility invariably used R2 based measure, and some 
studies interpret lower R2 as equivalent to higher firm-specific return volatility.16 If lower R2 
(higher asynchronicity) is associated with more firm-specific information and better information 
environment, and higher earnings quality is a key feature of better information environment 
(higher quality earnings is associated with lower PIN, lower bid-ask spread, and greater 
liquidity), I predict that higher earnings quality will be associated with higher asynchronicity. 
Thus, I propose the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
Information Hypothesis (H3a): Earnings quality is positively associated with firm-specific  
          return volatility. 
 
 In contrast, a parallel body of research argues that more firm-specific return volatility 
captures noisier stock prices (West, 1988; Teoh et al., 2008). Pastor and Veronesi (2003) model 
the relation between uncertainty about a firm’s average profitability and return volatility, and 
show that higher uncertainty induces larger return volatility. If managers distort the reported 
earnings through discretionary choices, the resulting information risk can potentially increase 
investors’ uncertainty about future profitability of the firm and thus affect return volatility. 
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) find that poor financial reporting quality is significantly 
associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility in cross-section and over time. Bartram et al. 
(2012) directly examine the relation between idiosyncratic return volatility and corporate 
disclosure quality and find a negative association between the two. Chen et al. (2012) examine 
the importance of managerial discretion in determining idiosyncratic volatility and show that 
idiosyncratic return volatility is negatively associated with information quality revealed in 
managerial discretion. The above-cited papers argue primarily for a negative association between 
earnings quality and firm-specific return volatility in the sense that high-quality earnings reduce 
                                                 
16 One such study is Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) who argue that insiders may be more inclined to sell their shares 
if their firm’s stock displays excessive idiosyncratic risk or low stock return synchronicity (p-1130). 
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firm-specific return volatility by eliminating informational uncertainty. Most of these studies use 
residual variance from an asset pricing model as a measure of firm-specific return volatility. If 
higher firm-specific return volatility represents more pricing error that is common in poor 
information environment, and lower earnings quality is symptomatic of poor information 
environment, it can be inferred that higher earnings quality will be associated with lower 
idiosyncratic volatility consistent with a noise-based explanation. This discussion leads to a 
competing hypothesis on the relation between earnings quality and firm-specific return volatility, 
stated in the alternative form: 
Noise Hypothesis (H3b): Earnings quality is negatively associated with firm-specific return  
          volatility. 
 
5.2.2 Innate versus Discretionary Component of Earnings Quality and Firm-specific 
Return Volatility 
 The existing empirical studies suggest an association between total earnings quality and 
firm-specific return volatility. However, Francis et al. (2005) assert that earnings quality is 
driven not only by the discretionary reporting choices of the managers (discretionary component) 
but also by the innate features of the ﬁrm’s business model and operating environment (innate 
component). Although there is no theoretical and empirical literature examining the impact of 
innate versus discretionary component of earnings quality on firm-specific return volatility that is 
expected to shed light on whether the observed association between earnings quality and firm-
specific return volatility is primarily driven by the innate component or discretionary component 
or both, I form an intuition from Francis et al. (2005) who investigate the differential impact of 
innate versus discretionary component of accrual quality on the cost of equity. Literature on 
managerial discretion offers three competing views on the intent of exercising discretion 
(Holthausen, 1990) - to reveal managers’ private information about the future prospects of a firm, 
to conceal the true underlying economic performance of the firm, and to minimize contracting 
costs amongst the various contracting parties. Guay et al. (1996) also recognize that discretionary 
accruals reflect a mixture of three distinct effects - managerial attempts to signal firm 
performance, earnings management, and pure noise. In a broad cross-section of firms, some 
managers will use accruals to convey private information while some managers will use accruals 
opportunistically (Healy, 1996). Thus, I expect that discretionary component of earnings quality 
74 
 
will reflect a blend of performance effect, opportunism, and noise. As a result of this, the net 
effect of management’s discretionary choices could be positive, negative or neutral depending on 
which effect dominates. Considering this possibility, I expect that the effect of discretionary 
component will be less pronounced than that of innate component. My second hypothesis is 
based on the prediction of differential effects between innate and discretionary component of 
earnings quality, stated in alternative form: 
H4: The innate component of earnings quality has larger impact on firm-specific return 
volatility than discretionary component of earnings quality 
 
5.3 Variable Measurement 
 In this section, I explain measurement of two proxies for firm-specific return variation 
(idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity), two proxies for earnings quality (accruals quality 
and absolute abnormal accruals) and other control variables. Appendix B summarizes the 
measurement of each of these variables.  
 
5.3.1 Firm-specific Return Volatility 
 Prior research uses either idiosyncratic volatility or asynchronicity as substitute measures 
of firm-specific return variation. Following prior research (Hutton et al., 2009; Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam, 2011), I estimate both measures and describe the estimation procedure below in 
greater detail. 
  
5.3.1.1 Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 The idiosyncratic volatility of a stock is not directly observable. Moreover, it is related to 
asset pricing models as it is estimated relative to the systematic volatility of the stock. This 
approach of estimating idiosyncratic volatility using residuals from an asset pricing model is 
more popular and widely used in the finance and accounting literature. I use the standard market 
model derived from CAPM to estimate idiosyncratic volatility: 
Ri = αi + βi Rm + ei               Eq. (5.1) 
In equation (5.1), Ri is the return on stock i, and Rm is the return on a market index. I estimate 
above equation for every firm included in the sample for each year using daily firm-specific 
return data and return on market index over a period of 12 months ending on three months after 
fiscal year end in order to ensure that information about firm’s earnings quality is available to the 
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market.17 I use TOPIX return data as market return. I measure idiosyncratic volatility [σe2] as the 
variance of the error term in equation (5.1). Specifically, [σe2] is the variance of residuals from a 
firm-specific regression of stock returns on market index return on a daily basis over a 12 month 
period ending on three months after fiscal year t. Since the fiscal year end of most Japanese firms 
is March, return calculations begin at the end of June, three months after the fiscal year end. I 
take the natural logarithm of the idiosyncratic volatility measure for empirical analyses. A high 
value of idiosyncratic volatility implies greater firm-specific return volatility. 
 
5.3.1.2 Asynchronicity 
 Roll (1988) was the first to formalize that R2 from the market model or some of its 
variants can be used as a measure of stock return synchronicity. Several studies treat higher 
synchronicity as equivalent to lower idiosyncratic volatility (i.e., high R2 from the market model 
is equivalent to low residual variance from the market model) and vice versa. Asynchronicity is 
the lack of synchronous movement of a firm’s stock return with the market return and is 
measured using a transformed R2 variable that captures the lack of return synchronicity (1-R2). 
Since R2 is bounded between zero and one, it creates complications for empirical estimation. I 
follow common practice in the literature (Morck et al., 2000; Hutton et al., 2009) and define 
asynchronicity using a logistic transformation of (1-R2), which can range from negative to 
positive infinity: 
Asynchronicity (Ф) = ln[(1-R2)/R2] 
Here, R2 is the coefficient of determination from the estimation of equation (5.1). The log 
transformation of R2 creates an unbounded continuous variable out of a variable originally 
bounded by 0 and 1. Thus, a high value of asynchronicity indicates a high level of firm-specific 
return volatility.  
               
5.3.2 Earnings Quality 
 I use two measures of earnings quality: Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality 
(DDSTD) and Kasznik (1999) version of modified Jones (1991) absolute abnormal accruals 
(KZABS). These measures are described in greater detail below. 
                                                 
17 I define the end of fiscal year as the end of third month after fiscal year end because Japanese firms are required to 
submit audited financial statements within three months of the fiscal year end. 
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5.3.2.1 Accrual Quality (DDSTD) Measure Based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model 
 My first measure of earnings quality is accrual quality (DDSTD), which is based on an 
approach proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and implemented by Francis et al. (2005). 
This approach relies on the idea that working capital accruals reflect managers’ anticipation of 
current and future cash flows realizations or reversal of past cash flows, and the ability of 
accruals to reflect such pattern could be severely affected by the estimation errors in accruals, 
regardless of management intent. Such estimation error could arise from managerial incentives to 
manipulate earnings or from environmental uncertainty and management lapses although the 
source of the error is not relevant in this approach. The ultimate aim of this method is to 
determine the extent of accruals estimation error in the mapping of accruals into past, present and 
future cash flows as modeled by Dechow and Dichev (2002): 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + νi,t   Eq. (5.2) 
where TCA is the total current accruals computed as ∆CA – ∆CL – ∆Cash + ∆STDEBT, ∆CA is 
the change in current assets, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, ∆Cash is the change in cash, 
∆STDEBT is the change in short-term debt included in current liabilities. CFO is the cash flows 
from operations calculated as NI-TCA+DEP, where NI is the net income, TCA is the total 
current accruals and DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense. Subscripts i and t are the 
firm and time subscripts, respectively.  
 McNichols (2002) proposes that adding changes in sales revenues and the level of 
property, plant and equipment lead to a better-specified model and improves the accrual quality 
measure. So, I augment equation (5.2) as follows (all variables excluding the intercept are scaled 
by average total assets): 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + φ4ΔREVi,t + φ5PPEi,t + νi,t     Eq. (5.2a) 
where ΔREV is the change in revenues and PPE is the gross value of property, plant and 
equipment. I estimate equation (5.2a) for every industry-year in each of 15 Nikkei two-digit 
industry groups in which I require at least 10 firms in each year. Finally, the earnings quality 
(DDSTDi,t) metric is defined as the standard deviation of firm i’s residuals, calculated over years 
t-4 through t, i.e., DDSTDi,t = σ(υi,t-4,t). Larger standard deviation of residuals indicates poor 
accruals and earnings quality. 
 
 
77 
 
5.3.2.2 Absolute Abnormal Accruals (KZABS) Based on Kasznik (1999) Version of 
Modified Jones (1991) Model 
 Another widely used accrual based measure of earnings quality is the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals generated by different versions of Jones (1991) approach. This measure relies 
on the association between accruals and accounting fundamentals to separate an accruals 
measure into normal and abnormal component. The portion of accruals, which is not well 
explained by firm fundamentals, is deemed abnormal, and such abnormal accruals are presumed 
to reduce the quality of accruals and earnings. To determine abnormal accruals, I apply Kasznik 
version of modified Jones (1991) model and estimate the following regression for each of 15 
Nikkei two-digit industry groups with at least 10 firms in each year (all variables excluding the 
intercept are scaled by average total assets): 
TAi,t = δ0 + δ1(ΔREVi,t - ΔARi,t) + δ2PPEi,t + δ3∆CFOi,t + ηi,t            Eq. (5.3) 
where TA is the firm i’s total accruals, computed as TCA-DEP, TCA is the total current accruals, 
DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense, ΔREV is the change in revenues, ΔAR is the 
change in accounts receivable, PPE is the gross value of property, plant and equipment, and 
∆CFO is the change in cash flows from operation. Equation (5.3) is a modified and extended 
version of Jones (1991) model, which describes total accruals as a function of the change in 
revenue and the level of property, plant and equipment. Following the suggestion of Dechow et 
al. (1995), Kasznik adjusts the sales revenue variable for the change in accounts receivable. 
Kasznik also includes the change in operating cash flows as an explanatory variable based on 
Dechow’s (1994) finding that cash flow from operation is significantly negatively correlated 
with total accruals. I prefer Kasznik version over modified Jones version because the former 
version considers significant correlation between cash flows from operation and total accruals in 
addition to two fundamental accounting variables used by the latter version and results into 
higher adjusted R2. I treat the residual, ηi,t, from equation (5.3) as abnormal accruals and use the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals, i.e., KZABSi,t = |ηi,t| as my second proxy for earnings 
quality. I interpret higher (lower) values of KZABS as measures of lower (higher) earnings 
quality.  
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5.3.3 Control Variables 
 In analyzing the relation between firm-specific stock return volatility and earnings quality, 
I attempt to account for two confounding factors that can cause changes in firm-specific return 
volatility (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2011) and control for several variables that are posited 
to influence idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity, two proxies for firm-specific return 
variation, in the cross section. 
 
5.3.3.1 Earnings Related Value Relevant Information 
 Idiosyncratic volatility can result from the firms’ extended disclosure of earnings related 
value-relevant information (summary income statements, summary balance sheet and cash flow 
statement information, transitory earnings components, street earnings number etc.) around 
earnings announcement because increase in return volatility is positively associated with these 
concurrent disclosures (Francis et al., 2002; Collins et al., 2009). Following Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (2011), I control for the expanded dissemination of value-relevant disclosures by 
the squared annual buy and hold return (RET2) which is likely to incorporate value-relevant 
information disseminated during the fiscal year. 
 
5.3.3.2 Informativeness of Earnings Quality for Future Cash Flow 
 Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) claim that an increase in earnings management 
reduces the precision of the earnings signal and is thus related to increased idiosyncratic return 
volatility. However, managerial discretion may improve the informativeness of earnings 
(Subramanyam, 1996). Badertscher et al. (2012) show that depending on the motivation to 
manage earnings, i.e., opportunistic versus informational reasons, accruals can be more or less 
informative about future cash flows. To account for the possibility that the relation between 
earnings quality and idiosyncratic return volatility could be attributable to informativeness of 
earnings quality for future cash flows (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2011), I include the next 
year’s operating cash flows (CFOt+1) as a proxy for the information contained in earnings quality 
about future cash flows. 
 
5.3.3.3 Cash Flows Volatility 
 Vuolteenaho (2002) shows that firm-level stock returns are a function of both expected 
return news and unexpected cash flow news. In other words, volatility of firm-specific stock 
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returns can be related to the volatility of cash flows. Wei and Zhang (2006) find that 
idiosyncratic volatility is related to volatility of accounting return on equity. Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam (2011) control for the conditional variance in cash flows via the variability of 
cash flows (VCFO).18 I measure the cash flows volatility as the standard deviation of cash flows 
from operation scaled by average total assets over the trailing five-year window and expect a 
positive relation between VCFO and stock return volatility. 
 
5.3.3.4 Operating Performance 
 Based on the findings by Hanlon et al. (2004) that operating performance, defined either 
as earnings or operating cash flows scaled by total assets, is negatively associated with stock 
return volatility in the cross section, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) introduced lagged CFO 
as a control variable to proxy for operating performance. Hutton et al. (2009) control 
contemporaneous ROE as a measure of firm performance. Following their guide, I use 
accounting return on equity (ROE) as a control variable19 and expect a negative relation between 
ROE and firm-specific stock return volatility. Wei and Zhang (2006) also find that accounting 
return on equity is negatively associated with idiosyncratic return volatility. 
 
5.3.3.5 Firm Size  
 Pastor and Veronesi (2003) show that small firms experience higher return volatility. 
Hutton et al. (2009) show that larger firms operating in a wider cross section of the economy 
have higher R2s.  Hence, I control for firm size where SIZE is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization.  
 
5.3.3.6 Leverage  
 Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) argues that levered firms are more likely to 
experience financial distress, suggesting a positive association between stock-return volatility 
and financial leverage in the cross-section. Hutton et al. (2009) posit that leverage affects the 
division of risk between equity and debt holders and thus is expected to affect R2 through its 
                                                 
18 I use standard deviation of earnings scaled by average total assets or lagged book value of equity instead of 
standard deviation of cash flows in the estimating equation and find that my results are not affected by these 
alternative variables. Callen and Segal (2004) extend Vuolteeenaho’s (2002) variance decomposition framework to 
document that in addition to cash flow news, accruals explain return volatility. In unreported results, I control for 
accrual volatility in all empirical specifications and find that none of my inferences change. 
19 My inferences are unaltered whether I use operating cash flows or accounting return on assets (ROA) instead. 
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impact on the sensitivity of firm returns to macroeconomic conditions. Following previous 
studies, I define financial leverage (LEV) as the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total 
assets. 
 
5.3.3.7 Book-to-market Ratio 
 Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) contend that firms with greater growth opportunities 
are likely to experience greater stock return volatility. Hutton et al. (2009) argue that the market-
to-book ratio places firms along a growth-versus-value spectrum and thus could be 
systematically related to R2. I use book-to-market (BM) ratio as a proxy for growth firms where 
lower book-to-market ratio reflects higher growth opportunities and expect a negative relation 
between BM and firm-specific return volatility. 
 
5.3.3.8 Stock Return Performance 
 Duffie (1995) shows that stock return performance and stock return volatility are 
inversely related with each other. Following Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011), I define firm 
stock returns (RET) as contemporaneous annual buy and hold returns. 
 
5.3.3.9 Loss Firm 
 The frequency of losses has increased over the last five decades (Givoly and Hyan, 2000) 
reflecting either lower operating cash flows or significant negative accruals or a combination of 
the two. The quality of earnings is expected to be low for loss firms if the loss is predominantly 
driven by negative accruals as opposed to lower operating cash flows (Rajgopal and 
Venkatchalam, 2011). In that case, stock return volatility might be higher for loss firms. I use a 
dummy variable (LOSS) to capture the effect of reporting losses on return volatility. LOSS is set 
to one (zero otherwise) if the firm-year reports negative earnings. 
 
5.3.3.10 Skewness and Kurtosis 
 Jin and Myers (2006) include contemporaneous skewness and kurtosis as control 
variables in their examination of R2 and earnings opacity. Following their lead, Hutton et al. 
(2009) also add these variables as control variables in some of their regressions of asynchronicity 
on earnings opacity. I measure SKEW and KURT as the skewness and kurtosis of firm-specific 
daily returns and control these variables in all specifications. 
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5.4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 I discuss sample selection criteria and the summary statistics for all the variables in this 
section. 
 
5.4.1 Sample Selection 
 The sample period for this study spans the period 2003-2012. My sample consists of 
12,284 firm-year observations representing 1,490 individual firms across 15 industries that have 
the required data. Data for the dependent variable, variable of interest and control variables come 
from a variety of sources. Accounting data come from Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest Database, 
and stock price and return data come from Nikkei Portfolio Master Return Database.20  My 
sample consists of only manufacturing companies listed in any one of the Japanese Stock 
Exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, JASDAQ, etc.) and primarily covers all firms from 15 
industries based on Nikkei two-digit industrial codes. I do not include financial institutions, 
insurance companies, and firms in service industries since earnings quality empirical models 
used in this study do not reflect their activities. Because estimation of parameters for the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model requires lead and lag values of cash flows from operation and 
measures of earnings quality require five annual residuals, initially I collect necessary data for 
the 18-year period (1996-2013) to compute earnings quality measures.  After restricting my 
sample to firms with complete data for all the dependent, independent and control variables by 
eliminating firm-years due to missing information on any of the variables, I end up with 12,284 
firm-year observations for the final sample period. All of my empirical analyses are based on 
12,284 firm-years. 
 
5.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 5.1.1 reports summary statistics on the key variables used in the study. I winsorize 
all the variables at the 1 and 99 percent levels to avoid the effects of influential outliers. Panel A 
of Table 5.1.1 shows that the mean (median) idiosyncratic volatility (after log transformation) 
based on the traditional CAPM model is about 1.47 (1.44) whereas the mean (median) 
                                                 
20 Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest Database and Nikkei Portfolio Master Return Database in Japan correspond to 
Compustat and CRSP in the U.S., respectively. 
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asynchronicity based on R2 from CAPM model is about 2.16 (1.65).21 The correlation between 
two measures of firm-specific return volatility, reported in Table 5.1.2, is moderate at 0.24 
implying that two measures might capture different aspect of the same construct and 
emphasizing the need to use both measures as proxies for firm-specific return volatility. Table 
5.1.1, Panel B and C, provides descriptive information on two earnings quality measures and 
their innate and discretionary components and the eight determinants that comprise the innate 
component of earnings quality. I find that the variability of earnings quality measure based on 
DD accrual quality model is less than that of earnings quality measure based on KZ absolute 
abnormal accrual model. The correlation (tabulated in Table 5.1.2) between the two proxies of 
earnings quality is 0.45 over the sample period. The correlation is not high enough to make one 
of these proxies redundant. Therefore, I consider both proxies in empirical analysis. 
 The mean (median) value of the innate component is 0.023 (0.021) for DDSTD and 0.027 
(0.025) for KZABS, compared to a zero mean (-0.003 median) value of discretionary component 
for DDSTD and a zero mean (-0.006 median) value of discretionary component for KZABS. The 
zero mean value of DiscEQ is expected given that the discretionary component is defined as the 
prediction error from (5.8). For the innate determinants, the sample mean values for the first five 
variables are 10.782 for total assets (log of total assets), 0.046 for cash flows volatility, 0.083 for 
sales volatility, 5.068 for operating cycle (or 156 days) and 20 percent for negative earnings 
incidence. The variable capturing intangibles intensity shows that only 2.6 percent of the sample 
firm-years report zero expenditure on R&D and advertising. For all sample firm-years (including 
those with INTAN = 0), the mean value of INTAN is 3.4 percent. Finally, the mean value of 
CAPITAL is 32.1 percent. The average firm has a market capitalization of 129,569 million yen 
(untabulated), a book-to-market ratio of about 1.311, significant operating cash flows as a 
percentage of average total assets (5.3%), return on equity of 2.4% and financial leverage of 
20.6% of average total assets (Panel D, Table 5.1.1).  
                                                 
21 Unreported result shows that the mean (median) R2 from traditional CAPM based market model is 0.20 (0.16) for 
the sample period. This weak fit of the market model is in line with previous studies conducted in U.S. context. For 
example, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) observe that the mean (median) R2 from the estimation of modified market 
model is 0.19 (0.15). However, despite weak association between firm return and market return, these R2s (and the 
related asynchronicity metric) exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation. 
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Table 5.1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables used for this study. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. For the 
variables used in the regressions, the number of observations is 12,284 for the sample period 2003-2012. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 10% Q1 Median Q3 90% 
Panel A: Volatility measures 
Idiosyncratic volatility  [σe
2] 1.474 0.828 0.425 0.894 1.437 2.023 2.572 
Asynchronicity Ф 2.162 1.895 0.185 0.768 1.651 3.152 5.11 
Beta squared [β2] 0.730 0.722 0.019 0.141 0.537 1.111 1.721 
Panel B: Earnings quality measures 
Dechow-Dichev accrual quality DDSTD 0.022 0.015 0.008 0.012 0.018 0.028 0.041 
Innate component InnateEQ 0.023 0.008 0.014 0.017 0.021 0.027 0.033 
Discretionary component DiscEQ -0.000 0.013 -0.013 -0.008 -0.003 0.004 0.014 
Kasznik absolute abnormal accrual KZABS 0.026 0.024 0.003 0.009 0.019 0.036 0.057 
Innate component InnateEQ 0.027 0.009 0.018 0.021 0.025 0.031 0.037 
Discretionary component DiscEQ -0.000 0.024 -0.023 -0.016 -0.006 0.009 0.028 
Panel C: EQ determinants 
Total assets (in log) ASSET 10.782 1.511 9.071 9.708 10.574 11.643 12.865 
Cash flows volatility VCFO 0.046 0.032 0.018 0.026 0.038 0.057 0.083 
Sales volatility VSALES 0.083 0.072 0.026 0.039 0.064 0.103 0.162 
Operating Cycle (in log) OPCYCLE 5.068 0.416 4.522 4.835 5.096 5.336 5.547 
Incidence of negative earnings NEG 0.202 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 
Intangible intensity INTAN 0.034 0.091 0.003 0.010 0.023 0.043 0.075 
Absence of reported intangible INTANDUM 0.026 0.159      
Capital intensity CAPITAL 0.321 0.129 0.161 0.228 0.314 0.404 0.492 
Panel D: Control Variables 
Earnings related value-relevant 
information 
RET2 0.226 0.528 0.002 0.012 0.058 0.191 0.505 
Informativeness of earnings quality 
for future cash flows 
CFO 0.053 0.059 -0.011 0.025 0.056 0.086 0.118 
Operating performance ROE 0.024 0.132 -0.077 0.009 0.042 0.080 0.126 
Firm size (in log) SIZE 9.898 1.793 7.789 8.575 9.677 10.990 12.397 
Leverage LEV 0.206 0.169 0.002 0.054 0.178 0.323 0.448 
Book-to-market ratio BM 1.311 0.848 0.480 0.722 1.097 1.653 2.432 
Stock return performance RET 0.091 0.468 -0.394 -0.205 0.000 0.278 0.689 
Loss firms LOSS 0.201 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Return skewness SKEW 0.381 0.977 -0.625 -0.105 0.274 0.780 1.559 
Return kurtosis KURT 6.491 7.508 0.82 1.814 3.821 8.126 15.555 
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Table 5.1.2 Correlation Matrix 
The table presents Pearson correlation coefficients among dependent variables and variables of interest for this 
study.  The number of observations used to calculate correlation coefficients is 12,284. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
Variable ln[σe
2] [Ф] ln[β2] DDSTD KZABS 
ln[σe
2] 1     
[Ф] 0.2428*** 1    
ln[β2] 0.0751*** -0.8758*** 1   
DDSTD 0.2714*** 0.0469*** 0.0876*** 1  
KZABS 0.1719*** 0.0517*** 0.0273*** 0.4507*** 1 
 
 Table 5.1.2 reports Pearson correlation coefficients among key variables. Consistent with 
prior literature, all the correlation coefficients between two measures of firm-specific return 
variability (idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity) and two inverse measures of earnings 
quality (DDSTD and KZABS) are significantly positive suggesting that better quality earnings 
reduce firm-specific return volatility. The correlation between idiosyncratic volatility 
(asynchronicity) and DDSTD is 0.271 (0.047) while the correlation between idiosyncratic 
volatility (asynchronicity) and KZABS is 0.172 (0.052). Moreover, both the inverse measures of 
earnings that provide high-quality earnings information enjoy lower systematic risk. Finally, the 
correlations between two measures of firm-specific return volatility and beta (ln[β2]) are 
surprisingly opposite in that idiosyncratic volatility is marginally positively correlated with beta 
but asynchronicity is strongly negatively correlated with beta.  
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
 In this section, I present the results of three sets of analyses. First, I try to validate the 
assumption of what firm-specific return volatility captures by relating it with known 
characteristics of firm’s information environment. Second, I present and discuss the results of 
multivariate regression analysis used to study the relation between firm-specific return volatility 
and earnings quality. Third, I explore the relation of firm-specific return volatility with two 
distinct components of earnings quality. 
 
5.5.1 Empirical Test of the Relation between Firm-specific Return Volatility and 
Information Environment 
 I compute the following proxies for the firm’s information environment: bid-ask spread, 
illiquidity measure (Amihud 2002), volatility of the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure, 
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institutional ownership and zero return days. The description of each of these variables is given 
in Appendix B. If the interpretation that higher volatility represents greater informational 
efficiency of stock market is correct, I should find that firms with higher volatility are 
characterized by lower spread, lower illiquidity and liquidity risk, higher institutional ownership, 
and less zero return days. In contrast, if higher volatility reflects noisy stock prices, then I should 
find the opposite. I form quintile portfolios sorted on both measures of firm-specific return 
volatility and investigate whether the characteristics of liquidity and other information 
environment proxies in the extreme portfolios behave in a manner consistent with noise or news. 
Results presented in Panels A and B of Table 5.2 are consistent with the noise hypothesis not the 
information hypothesis. Regardless of the measures of firm-specific return volatility on the basis 
of which quintile portfolios are formed, firms in the highest quintile portfolio exhibit greater 
levels of SPREAD, ILLIQUID, ILLIQVOL, ZRDAYS, and lower level of INSTITUTE relative 
to the lowest quintile portfolio. In fact, each of the information environment variables increases 
monotonically across the quintile portfolios of firm-specific return volatility. This is strong 
evidence that higher levels of ln[σe2] and Ф are more symptomatic of noise in returns rather than 
firm-specific information is being impounded in stock prices. 
Table 5.2: Information Environment Variables across Quintiles of Idiosyncratic Volatility 
and Asynchronicity 
Panel A and B report the averages for each variable capturing different aspects of firms’ information 
environment in quintile portfolios formed on idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity covering the period 
2003-2012. Quintile portfolios are formed each fiscal year separately for the two measures of firm-specific 
return volatility (ln[σe
2] and Ф). For Panels C and D, I provide the mean difference in Quintile 5 – Quintile 1 
portfolios for each information environment variable across different size quintiles with size (log 
transformation of market capitalization) measured at t-1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
Panel A: Mean of information environment variables across quintiles of idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe
2]) 
Variable 
Quintiles based on ln[σe
2] Mean diff. 
(5) – (1) 
(t-
statistic) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SPREAD 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.013 0.020 0.014*** (23.82) 
ILLIQUID 0.033 0.052 0.091 0.147 0.289 0.256*** (27.16) 
ILLIQVOL 0.056 0.091 0.161 0.263 0.532 0.476*** (27.29) 
INSTITUTE 21.023 22.271 18.642 13.852 7.900 -13.124*** (-30.12) 
ZRDAYS 0.144 0.149 0.165 0.186 0.210 0.066*** (12.76) 
Panel B: Mean of information environment variables across quintiles of asynchronicity (Ф)  
Variable 
Quintiles based on Ф Mean diff. 
(5) – (1) 
(t-
statistic) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SPREAD 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.018 0.029 0.024*** (29.21) 
ILLIQUID 0.002 0.010 0.039 0.182 0.379 0.377*** (41.88) 
ILLIQVOL 0.003 0.013 0.070 0.345 0.672 0.669*** (40.29) 
INSTITUTE 31.709 22.732 15.606 8.893 4.647 -27.062*** (-70.44) 
ZRDAYS 0.052 0.071 0.100 0.209 0.412 0.360*** (82.15) 
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Panel C: Mean difference of information environment variables between Quintile 5 and Quintile 1 portfolios of 
idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe
2]) by each size quintile 
Variable 
Quintile based 
on ln[σe
2] 
Size Quintile 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SPREAD 
1 0.016 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.003 
5 0.033 0.030 0.023 0.017 0.009 
Difference (5-1) 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 
(t-statistic) (6.43) (16.88) (13.85) (13.10) (16.74) 
ILLIQUID 
1 0.121 0.033 0.009 0.001 0.000 
5 0.673 0.394 0.230 0.121 0.028 
Difference (5-1) 0.552*** 0.361*** 0.221*** 0.120*** 0.028*** 
(t-statistic) (20.07) (17.00) (13.09) (9.45) (5.13) 
ILLIQVOL 
1 0.207 0.059 0.014 0.002 0.000 
5 1.230 0.707 0.425 0.240 0.058 
Difference (5-1) 1.023*** 0.648*** 0.411*** 0.238*** 0.058*** 
(t-statistic) (20.57) (16.68) (12.91) (9.10) (4.71) 
INSTITUTE 
1 4.895 11.885 18.418 28.918 40.806 
5 2.247 2.495 4.450 9.188 21.051 
Difference (5-1) -2.648*** -9.390*** -13.968*** -19.730*** -19.755*** 
(t-statistic) (-6.15) (-18.52) (-21.80) (-24.13) (-21.70) 
ZRDAYS 
1 0.288 0.153 0.086 0.049 0.043 
5 0.322 0.275 0.211 0.154 0.088 
Difference (5-1) 0.034*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.105*** 0.045*** 
(t-statistic) (5.11) (11.39) (16.02) (17.39) (8.56) 
 
Panel D: Mean difference of information environment variables between Quintile 5 and Quintile 1 portfolios of 
asynchronicity (Ф) by each size quintile 
Variable 
Quintile based 
on Ф 
Size Quintile 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SPREAD 
1 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 
5 0.045 0.034 0.032 0.029 0.018 
Difference (5-1) 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 
(t-statistic) (17.43) (18.79) (14.22) (16.01) (11.26) 
ILLIQUID 
1 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
5 0.713 0.409 0.369 0.268 0.139 
Difference (5-1) 0.705*** 0.407*** 0.368*** 0.268*** 0.139*** 
(t-statistic) (27.91) (22.55) (19.59) (17.59) (13.12) 
ILLIQVOL 
1 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
5 1.207 0.705 0.665 0.492 0.295 
Difference (5-1) 1.197*** 0.703*** 0.664*** 0.492*** 0.295*** 
(t-statistic) (26.64) (20.67) (18.22) (16.31) (12.32) 
INSTITUTE 
1 15.203 24.760 33.306 40.161 45.059 
5 2.053 2.184 2.808 4.064 12.119 
Difference (5-1) -13.150*** -22.575*** -30.498*** -36.097*** -32.940*** 
(t-statistic) (-24.33) (-36.33) (-47.615) (-57.92) (-35.69) 
ZRDAYS 
1 0.082 0.059 0.042 0.037 0.038 
5 0.447 0.446 0.437 0.416 0.312 
Difference (5-1) 0.365*** 0.387*** 0.395*** 0.379*** 0.274*** 
(t-statistic) (36.74) (43.12) (44.54) (39.48) (27.89) 
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 Following Li et al. (2014), I examine whether the findings in Panels A and B are stable 
across various size quintiles because Roll (1988) finds that firm size is significantly correlated 
with R2. Specifically, I create five size quintiles within each measure of firm-specific return 
volatility quintile portfolio. I then examine whether the information environment variables 
behave similarly across each of the size quintiles. Results reported in Panels C and D show that 
initial findings are robust to controlling for size. Across each of the size quintiles the higher firm-
specific return volatility, irrespective of its proxies, is associated with higher bid-ask spread, 
higher illiquidity, lower institutional ownership and more zero return days. The differences in 
information environment variables between extreme quintiles of idiosyncratic volatility and 
asynchronicity within each size quintile are statistically significant. 
 
5.5.2 Empirical Test of the Relation between Firm-specific Return Volatility and Earnings 
Quality 
 Prior studies rely on two proxies of firm-specific return volatility: (1) idiosyncratic 
volatility, often measured as the variance of the residual from a regression of individual stock 
return on market return; and (2) asynchronicity, operationalized as the inverse of R2 from the 
market model. These two measures are used interchangeably in the literature. Following prior 
literature, I use both the measures as proxies for firm-specific return volatility as the dependent 
variable and estimate the following cross-sectional regression that relates these proxies of firm-
specific return volatility with two proxies of earnings quality after incorporating the control 
variables identified in Section 5.3.3 in order to test my first hypothesis: 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET2i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + 
α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 + α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + α12KURTi,t + ζi,t    Eq. (5.4) 
Where, VOL represents idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe2]) and asynchronicity (Ф) estimated using 
the market model (CAPM). EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (DDSTD) and Kasznik version of modified Jones 
(1991) model (KZABS) and all other variables are defined in Appendix B. Following Rajgopal 
and Venkatachalam (2011), I lag EQ by one year relative to VOL to avoid picking up mere 
contemporaneous associations between firm-specific return volatility and earnings quality. I 
estimate equation (5.4) as a pooled cross-sectional regression and calculate t-statistics on the 
basis of two-way clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009).  
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Table 5.3: Regression of Traditional CAPM Based Idiosyncratic Volatility, Asynchronicity 
and Beta on Earnings Quality and Other Control Variables 
This table reports estimation of Eq. (5.4)  
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET
2
i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 
+ α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + α12KURTi,t + ζi,t    Eq. (5.4) 
where VOL represents idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe
2]), asynchronicity (Ф) and beta (ln[β2]) estimated using 
market model (CAPM). EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model and Kasznik version of modified Jones (1991) model. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix B. The sample period is 2003-2012 and consists of 12,284 observations for all models. All variables 
are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) 
clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
  
Idiosyncratic Volatility 
(ln[σe2]) 
Asynchronicity  
(Ф) 
Beta Squared 
ln[β2] 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
EQ=DDSTD 
measure 
EQ=KZABS 
measure 
EQ=DDSTD 
measure 
EQ=KZABS 
measure 
EQ=DDSTD 
measure 
EQ=KZABS 
measure 
EQi,t-1 (+/-) 
6.384*** 
(9.53) 
2.087*** 
(6.58) 
-11.873*** 
(-8.12) 
-1.103 
(-1.50) 
19.090*** 
(11.15) 
2.944*** 
(3.38) 
RET2i,t-1 (+) 
0.069** 
(2.29) 
0.076** 
(2.52) 
-0.112* 
(-1.77) 
-0.127** 
(-1.98) 
0.440*** 
(6.99) 
0.462*** 
(7.26) 
CFOi,t+1 (-) 
-0.011 
(-0.07) 
-0.060 
(-0.37) 
0.424 
(1.50) 
0.521* 
(1.85) 
-1.031*** 
(-3.03) 
-1.185*** 
(-3.50) 
VCFOi,t-1 (+) 
1.109*** 
(3.94) 
2.085*** 
(7.82) 
3.793*** 
(7.33) 
1.212** 
(2.37) 
-2.226*** 
(-3.66) 
1.601*** 
(2.73) 
ROEi,t-1 (-) 
0.042 
(0.48) 
0.046 
(0.52) 
-0.059 
(-0.35) 
-0.006 
(-0.03) 
-0.119 
(-0.62) 
-0.179 
(-0.93) 
SIZEi,t-1 (-) 
-0.150*** 
(-18.11) 
-0.154*** 
(-18.78) 
-0.652*** 
(-33.21) 
-0.644*** 
(-32.84) 
0.533*** 
(23.73) 
0.521*** 
(23.11) 
LEVi,t-1 (+) 
0.932*** 
(15.84) 
0.963*** 
(16.22) 
-0.849*** 
(-7.04) 
-0.898*** 
(-7.46) 
1.757*** 
(12.45) 
1.840*** 
(13.07) 
BMi,t-1 (-) 
0.026 
(1.25) 
0.019 
(0.88) 
-0.058 
(-1.64) 
-0.043 
(-1.20) 
0.009 
(0.21) 
-0.015 
(-0.32) 
RETi,t (-) 
-0.100 
(-1.28) 
-0.096 
(-1.21) 
-0.091 
(-1.03) 
-0.096 
(-1.05) 
0.469*** 
(6.15) 
0.478*** 
(5.95) 
LOSSi,t-1 (+) 
0.256*** 
(8.22) 
0.266*** 
(8.56) 
-0.087 
(-1.40) 
-0.117* 
(-1.83) 
0.312*** 
(4.56) 
0.357*** 
(5.08) 
SKEWi,t (+) 
0.233*** 
(14.41) 
0.236*** 
(14.31) 
0.072 
(0.94) 
0.065 
(0.85) 
0.190** 
(2.31) 
0.201** 
(2.41) 
KURTi,t (+) 
-0.003 
(-1.23) 
-0.003 
(-1.27) 
0.021** 
(2.00) 
0.021** 
(2.01) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.032*** 
(-2.67) 
Intercept  
2.412*** 
(19.45) 
2.498*** 
(20.24) 
8.815*** 
(31.97) 
8.616*** 
(31.29) 
-7.240*** 
(-21.79) 
-6.940*** 
(-20.85) 
N  12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 
Adjusted 
R2 
 
39.67% 39.17% 39.71% 39.20% 27.28% 26.20% 
  
 Table 5.3 presents the results of estimating Eq. (5.4) using two proxies of earnings 
quality. Here, I use idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity as the dependent variable. The 
result shows that the coefficient on EQ is positive and statistically significant for both measures 
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of earnings quality when idiosyncratic volatility is used as the dependent variable. This finding is 
consistent with the noise hypothesis suggesting that the higher the earnings quality the lower the 
idiosyncratic volatility. When I use asynchronicity instead of idiosyncratic volatility as the 
dependent variable, I find negative and significant coefficient for DDSTD measure and negative 
coefficient for KZABS measure suggesting that the higher the earnings quality, the higher the 
asynchronicity. This finding is consistent with information hypothesis. Overall, the results are 
incongruous when I use two different but commonly used or often interchangeable measures of 
firm-specific return volatility as dependent variable keeping the independent variables unaltered. 
Asynchronicity supports information hypothesis but idiosyncratic volatility favors noise 
hypothesis. The discordant finding raises two concerns: (1) whether asynchronicity and 
idiosyncratic volatility do capture the same underlying construct, or (2) if asynchronicity and 
idiosyncratic volatility capture the same underlying construct, what could be the plausible reason 
for the conflicting result researchers often obtain? Li et al. (2014) resolve the inconsistency by 
showing that both asynchronicity and idiosyncratic volatility are higher in firms with poor 
information environment which are inconsistent with the common interpretation that firms with 
high asynchronicity or idiosyncratic volatility have more firm-specific information being 
impounded into stock price. They also explain why a negative coefficient implying positive 
association between asynchronicity and earnings quality is obtained by decomposing 
asynchronicity into three components. In particular, they demonstrate the role of individual 
component of R2 in reconciling the contradictory findings of the literature when two apparently 
similar measures of firm-specific return volatility are used as dependent variable. Starting with 
the standard market model [Eq. (5.1)] and using simple arithmetic, they decompose 
asynchronicity (Φ), a measure of firm-specific return volatility based on logarithmic 
transformation of inverse of R2, into three components: 
Asynchronicity (Φ) = ln[(1-R2)/R2] = ln[σe2] – ln[β2] – ln[σrm2]  Eq. (5.5) 
The above equation shows that any increase in asynchronicity, Φ, can occur because of any or all 
of three factors: (i) an increase in idiosyncratic risk (σe2), (ii) a decrease in beta (β2), and (iii) a 
decrease in market-wide return volatility (σrm2). Since volatility of market return (σrm2) is a cross-
sectional constant in a firm-level analysis within a country for a given year, equation (5.5) 
reduces to: 
Asynchronicity (Φ) = ln[(1-R2)/R2] = ln[σe2] – ln[β2]   Eq. (5.6) 
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Thus, a positive association between Φ and earnings quality can arise if idiosyncratic return 
volatility (σe2) across firms is positively associated with earnings quality; β across firms is 
negatively related to earnings quality; or the negative correlation between β and earnings quality 
outweighs the negative correlation between σe2 and earnings quality. Following Li et al. (2014), 
since σrm2 is a cross-sectional constant for a given year but beta varies across firms, I use only 
beta (ln[β2]) as the dependent variable in Eq. (5.4) to examine the relation between this 
component of asynchronicity and my variable of interest. The ln[β2] column in Table 5.3 shows 
that the coefficient on DDSTD and KZABS is positive and statistically significant when ln[β2] is 
the dependent variable. More important, the positive coefficient on DDSTD and KZABS in the 
ln[β2] regression is greater than the positive coefficient on DDSTD and KZABS in the ln[σe2] 
regression. Thus, consistent with Li et al. (2014), I conclude that the negative coefficient on 
DDSTD and KZABS when asynchronicity is the dependent variable is driven by the dominant 
impact of earnings quality on beta relative to the impact of earnings quality on idiosyncratic 
volatility. Note that DDSTD and KZABS represent inverse measures of earnings quality and thus 
a positive (negative) coefficient implies negative (positive) association between dependent and 
independent variables. 
 Li et al. (2014) recommend two non-mutually exclusive solutions when the results using 
idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity are not consistent: (i) triangulate results with measures 
of poor information environment; and (ii) control for firm-year beta in cross-sectional settings. In 
section 5.5.1, I show that both measures of firm-specific return volatility are associated with 
characteristics of poor information environment, supporting noise hypothesis. Here, I use the 
second approach and re-estimate the regressions reported in Table 5.4 after controlling for firm-
specific beta. Specifically, I estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression: 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET2i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + 
α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 + α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + α12KURTi,t + α13ln[β2]i,t + ζi,t 
                    Eq. (5.7) 
where VOL represents idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe2]) and asynchronicity (Ф) estimated using 
market model (CAPM). EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (DDSTD) and Kasznik version of modified Jones 
(1991) model (KZABS) and all other variables are defined in Appendix B.  
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Table 5.4: Regression of Traditional CAPM Based Idiosyncratic Volatility and 
Asynchronicity on Earnings Quality and Other Control Variables after Controlling for 
Beta 
This table reports estimation of Eq. (5.7)  
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET
2
i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 
+ α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + α12KURTi,t + α13ln[β
2]i,t + ζi,t  Eq. (5.7) 
where VOL represents idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe
2]) and asynchronicity (Ф) estimated using market model 
(CAPM). EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model and Kasznik version of modified Jones (1991) model. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. 
The sample period is 2003-2012 and consists of 12,284 observations for all models. All variables are 
winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) 
clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
  Idiosyncratic Volatility (ln[σe2]) Asynchronicity (Ф) 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
EQ = DDSTD 
measure  
EQ = KZABS 
measure 
EQ = DDSTD 
measure  
EQ = KZABS 
measure 
EQi,t-1 (+/-) 
4.639*** 
(7.38) 
1.809*** 
(6.15) 
2.534*** 
(3.99) 
1.114*** 
(3.62) 
RET2i,t-1 (+) 
0.029 
(1.09) 
0.032 
(1.22) 
0.220*** 
(9.30) 
0.222*** 
(9.31) 
CFOi,t+1 (-) 
0.083 
(0.52) 
0.052 
(0.33) 
-0.355** 
(-2.05) 
-0.371** 
(-2.14) 
VCFOi,t-1 (+) 
1.312*** 
(4.73) 
1.933*** 
(7.48) 
2.113*** 
(7.70) 
2.418*** 
(9.37) 
ROEi,t-1 (-) 
0.053 
(0.65) 
0.062 
(0.77) 
-0.149** 
(-2.24) 
-0.141** 
(-2.14) 
SIZEi,t-1 (-) 
-0.199*** 
(-25.77) 
-0.204*** 
(-26.63) 
-0.249*** 
(-30.63) 
-0.252*** 
(-31.19) 
LEVi,t-1 (+) 
0.771*** 
(12.90) 
0.789*** 
(13.11) 
0.477*** 
(7.51) 
0.487*** 
(7.70) 
BMi,t-1 (-) 
0.025 
(1.31) 
0.020 
(1.03) 
-0.051*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.00) 
RETi,t (-) 
-0.143* 
(-1.93) 
-0.141* 
(-1.89) 
0.263*** 
(5.29) 
0.264*** 
(5.34) 
LOSSi,t-1 (+) 
0.227*** 
(7.85) 
0.233*** 
(8.10) 
0.149*** 
(4.40) 
0.151*** 
(4.52) 
SKEWi,t (+) 
0.215*** 
(14.47) 
0.217*** 
(14.42) 
0.216*** 
(11.23) 
0.216*** 
(11.26) 
KURTi,t (+) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.002 
(-0.90) 
-0.002 
(-0.90) 
ln[β2] i,t (+/-) 
0.091*** 
(11.77) 
0.094*** 
(12.26) 
-0.755*** 
(-76.84) 
-0.753*** 
(-77.34) 
Intercept  
3.078*** 
(27.12) 
3.153*** 
(28.13) 
3.351*** 
(29.91) 
3.390*** 
(30.78) 
N  12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 
Adjusted R2  43.35% 43.16% 87.65% 87.64% 
 
 Results reported in Table 5.4 show that the relation between inverse earnings quality and 
idiosyncratic volatility continues to be positive, despite the strong positive relation between beta 
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and idiosyncratic volatility. However, the relation between inverse earnings quality and 
asynchronicity changes signs from negative to positive for both measures of earnings quality and 
the coefficients become statistically significant also. The evidence in Table 5.4 suggests that the 
inclusion of beta resolves the inconsistency in findings when using idiosyncratic volatility and 
asynchronicity as alternative measures of firm-specific return volatility. The positive and 
significant coefficients indicate that the firm-specific return volatility captures noise in return, 
not firm-specific information being impounded into stock price. 
 
5.5.3 Empirical Test of the Relation between Firm-specific Return Volatility and Two 
Distinct Components of Earnings Quality 
 Testing the second hypothesis requires estimates of innate and discretionary component 
of earnings quality. The innate component of earnings quality is determined by operational 
uncertainty and business model whereas discretionary component is driven by management’s 
discretionary choices and judgments. Francis et al. (2005) suggested two methods to investigate 
the differential impact of innate versus discretionary component of earnings quality. Under the 
first method (Method 1), a measure of earnings quality is regressed on innate factors that prior 
researchers believe describe the firm’s business model and its operating environment. For this 
purpose, I use eight innate factors such as total assets (ASSET), cash flows volatility (VCFO), 
sales volatility (VSALES), length of operating cycle (OPCYCLE), incidence of negative 
earnings realizations (NEG), intangible intensity (INTAN), intangible dummy (INTANDUM) 
and capital intensity (CPITAL) as outlined in Francis et al. (2005) and Francis et al. (2004). The 
detailed measurement of each of these variables is given in Appendix B. Method 1 estimates the 
following equation annually: 
EQi,t = γ0 + γ1ASSETi,t + γ2VCFOi,t + γ3VSALESi,t + γ4OPCYCLEi,t + γ5NEGi,t + γ6INTANi,t + 
γ7INTANDUMi,t + γ8CAPITALi,t + μi,t       Eq. (5.8) 
The fitted values from equation (5.8) generate an estimate of the innate component of earnings 
quality and the residuals from equation (5.8) are the estimate of the discretionary component of 
earnings quality. This method yields distinct estimates for each of the two components of 
earnings quality and allows for direct comparison between these two components. 
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 In order to test my second hypothesis, I estimate the following regression of two proxies 
of firm-specific return volatility on two distinct components of both earnings quality measures 
after controlling for other determinants of firm-specific return volatility identified in Section 
5.3.3:  
VOLi,t = α0 + α1InnateEQi,t-1 + α2DiscEQi,t-1 + α3RET2i,t-1 + α4CFOi,t+1 + α5VCFOi,t-1 + α6ROEi,t-1 
+ α7SIZEi,t-1 + α8LEVi,t-1 + α9BMi,t-1 + α10RETi,t + α11LOSSi,t-1 + α12SKEWi,t +α13KURTi,t 
+ α14ln[β2]i,t + ζi,t          Eq. (5.9) 
where, VOL represents idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe2]) and asynchronicity (Ф) estimated using 
market model (CAPM). InnateEQ and DiscEQ are fitted values and residuals from equation (5.8) 
respectively. All other variables are described in Appendix B. According to my hypothesis, I 
conjecture that InnateEQ will have larger effect on firm-specific return volatility than DiscEQ. 
An evidence that α1 is significantly larger than α2 from equation (5.9) will support my second 
hypothesis. I include both components of earnings quality in the same model to ensure that the 
effect of one component on return volatility remains significant even after controlling for the 
effect of other.22 I also control beta in the regression because the results in Table 4 underscore 
the importance of controlling beta when asynchronicity is used as dependent variable.  
 Table 5.5, column Method 1, reports the result of the estimation of Eq. (5.9). The result 
shows that the coefficients on InnateEQ and DiscEQ for both measures of earnings quality are 
positive and significant at 1 percent level for idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that InnateEQ has larger impact on idiosyncratic volatility 
and asynchronicity than DiscEQ as the coefficient of InnateEQ is significantly greater than the 
coefficient of DiscEQ for both DDSTD and KZABS measure (F-stat is reported at the bottom of 
Table 5.5, column Method 1). Overall, the results suggest that firm-specific return volatility is 
higher for firms with poor earnings quality that is driven by innate factors relative to managerial 
discretion. 
   
                                                 
22 In an unreported result, I also include each component individually and find significant effect of each. 
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Table 5.5: Regression of Traditional CAPM Based Idiosyncratic Volatility and Asynchronicity on Innate and Discretionary 
Components of Earnings Quality after Controlling for Beta  
This table reports estimation of Eq. (5.9) and Eq. (5.10) 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1InnateEQi,t-1 + α2DiscEQi,t-1 + α3RET
2
i,t-1 + α4CFOi,t+1 + α5VCFOi,t-1 + α6ROEi,t-1 + α7SIZEi,t-1 + α8LEVi,t-1 + α9BMi,t-1 + α10RETi,t + 
α11LOSSi,t-1 + α12SKEWi,t +α13KURTi,t + α14ln[β
2]i,t + ζi,t           Eq. (5.9) 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET
2
i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 + α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + 
α12KURTi,t + α13VSALESi,t-1 + α14OPCYCLEi,t-1 + α15NEGi,t-1 + α16INTANi,t-1 + α17INTANDUMi,t-1 + α18CAPITALi,t-1 + α19ln[β
2]i,t + ζi,t  
                Eq. (5.10) 
where VOL represents idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe
2]) and asynchronicity (Ф) estimated using market model (CAPM).  InnateEQ is the fitted value from 
Eq. (5.8) and DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (5.8).  
EQi,t = γ0 + γ1ASSETi,t + γ2VCFOi,t + γ3VSALESi,t + γ4OPCYCLEi,t + γ5NEGi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7INTANDUMi,t + γ8CAPITALi,t + μi,t    Eq. (5.8) 
where EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and Kasznik version of modified 
Jones (1991) model. InnateEQ and DiscEQ are inverse measure of innate and discretionary earnings quality respectively. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. The sample period is 2003-2012 and consists of 12,284 observations for all models. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% 
levels. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
  Idiosyncratic Volatility (ln[σe2]) Asynchronicity (Ф) 
  EQ = DDSTD measure  EQ = KZABS measure EQ = DDSTD measure  EQ = KZABS measure 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Method 1 
Eq. (5.9) 
Method 2 
Eq. (5.10) 
Method 1 
Eq. (5.9) 
Method 2 
Eq. (5.10) 
Method 1 
Eq. (5.9) 
Method 2 
Eq. (5.10) 
Method 1 
Eq. (5.9) 
Method 2 
Eq. (5.10) 
InnateEQi,t-1 (+) 
10.574*** 
(4.33) 
 16.676*** 
(6.30) 
 7.653*** 
(3.72) 
 6.956*** 
(3.07) 
 
DiscEQi,t-1 (+) 
3.455*** 
(7.03) 
 1.314*** 
(5.15) 
 1.486*** 
(2.68) 
 0.840*** 
(3.08) 
 
EQi,t-1 (+) 
 3.458*** 
(6.11) 
 1.569*** 
(5.79) 
 0.785 
(1.33) 
 0.973*** 
(3.49) 
RET2i,t-1 (+) 
0.023 
(0.86) 
0.021 
(0.77) 
0.029 
(1.12) 
0.020 
(0.77) 
0.215*** 
(9.38) 
0.202*** 
(9.07) 
0.220*** 
(9.22) 
0.201*** 
(9.06) 
CFOi,t+1 (-) 
0.162 
(1.01) 
0.239 
(1.45) 
0.151 
(0.95) 
0.237 
(1.45) 
-0.294* 
(-1.73) 
-0.166 
(-1.05) 
-0.332* 
(-1.89) 
-0.167 
(-1.07) 
VCFOi,t-1 (+) 
0.153 
(0.95) 
0.953*** 
(3.65) 
-0.497 
(-1.05) 
1.264 
(5.26) 
1.416*** 
(4.19) 
1.909*** 
(7.28) 
1.463*** 
(3.85) 
1.824*** 
(7.69) 
ROEi,t-1 (-) 
0.061 
(0.75) 
0.057 
(0.71) 
0.122 
(1.48) 
0.072 
(0.88) 
-0.141** 
(-2.15) 
-0.129* 
(-1.94) 
-0.117* 
(-1.82) 
-0.112* 
(-1.71) 
SIZEi,t-1 (-) 
-0.189*** 
(-21.58) 
-0.192*** 
(-25.89) 
-0.182*** 
(-22.87) 
-0.194*** 
(-26.40) 
-0.240*** 
(-24.94) 
-0.239*** 
(-28.13) 
-0.243*** 
(-26.33) 
-0.239*** 
(-28.33) 
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LEVi,t-1 (+) 
0.790*** 
(14.02) 
0.794*** 
(15.92) 
0.850*** 
(15.09) 
0.797*** 
(15.93) 
0.493*** 
(8.02) 
0.386*** 
(7.11) 
0.511*** 
(8.21) 
0.388*** 
(7.09) 
BMi,t-1 (-) 
0.031 
(1.58) 
0.029 
(1.51) 
0.023 
(1.19) 
0.025 
(1.33) 
-0.047*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.055*** 
(-3.18) 
RETi,t (-) 
-0.145* 
(-1.96) 
-0.147** 
(-2.02) 
-0.138* 
(-1.86) 
-0.146** 
(-2.01) 
0.261*** 
(5.25) 
0.252*** 
(5.24) 
0.266*** 
(5.40) 
0.253*** 
(5.28) 
LOSSi,t-1 (+) 
0.192*** 
(6.00) 
0.185*** 
(5.87) 
0.163*** 
(6.51) 
0.175*** 
(5.67) 
0.119*** 
(3.28) 
0.050 
(1.64) 
0.124*** 
(4.12) 
0.046 
(1.52) 
SKEWi,t (+) 
0.214*** 
(14.49) 
0.213*** 
(15.00) 
0.215*** 
(14.69) 
0.213*** 
(14.93) 
0.215*** 
(11.15) 
0.208*** 
(11.16) 
0.216*** 
(11.20) 
0.208*** 
(11.15) 
KURTi,t (+) 
-0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.95) 
-0.002 
(-0.87) 
-0.002 
(-0.88) 
-0.002 
(-0.86) 
VSALESi,t-1 (+) 
 0.530*** 
(3.30) 
 0.587*** 
(3.63) 
 0.278* 
(1.67) 
 0.278* 
(1.67) 
OPCYCLEi,t-1 (+) 
 0.119** 
(2.33) 
 0.119** 
(2.36) 
 0.090* 
(1.94) 
 0.089* 
(1.93) 
NEGi,t-1 (+) 
 0.121** 
(2.17) 
 0.169*** 
(3.02) 
 0.384*** 
(7.62) 
 0.395*** 
(7.90) 
INTANi,t-1 (+) 
 -0.008 
(-0.11) 
 0.001 
(0.02) 
 0.090 
(1.04) 
 0.089 
(1.03) 
INTANDUMi,t-1 (+) 
 0.020 
(0.45) 
 0.013 
(0.30) 
 0.077* 
(1.69) 
 0.075 
(1.65) 
CAPITALi,t-1 (-) 
 -0.152 
(-1.39) 
 -0.165 
(-1.50) 
 -0.024 
(-0.28) 
 -0.023 
(-0.26) 
ln[β2] i,t (+/-) 
0.089*** 
(11.86) 
0.085*** 
(11.72) 
0.090*** 
(12.15) 
0.087*** 
(11.98) 
-0.756*** 
(-76.68) 
-0.761*** 
(-77.39) 
-0.755*** 
(-77.88) 
-0.761*** 
(-77.49) 
Intercept  
2.871*** 
(21.66) 
2.412*** 
(8.23) 
2.637 
(19.24) 
2.447*** 
(8.41) 
3.172*** 
(22.43) 
2.778*** 
(9.81) 
3.186*** 
(21.81) 
2.779*** 
(9.84) 
N  12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 
Adjusted R2  43.51% 43.98% 43.99% 43.94% 87.67% 87.82% 87.66% 87.83% 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: α1 = α2 
H1: α1 > α2 
8.24*** 
(0.000) 
 
35.88*** 
(0.000) 
 
8.37*** 
(0.000) 
 
7.53*** 
(0.000) 
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 Francis et al. (2005) suggest another method (Method 2) in which innate factors affecting 
earnings quality are included in the original volatility regression as additional explanatory 
variables. According to Method 2, the model appears like the following23: 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET2i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + 
α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 + α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + α12KURTi,t + 
α13VSALESi,t-1 + α14OPCYCLEi,t-1 + α15NEGi,t-1 + α16INTANi,t-1 + α17INTANDUMi,t-1 + 
α18CAPITALi,t-1 + α19ln[β2]i,t + ζi,t      Eq. (5.10) 
One difficulty with Method 2 is that it does not provide a distinct estimate of two components of 
earnings quality. Rather, in this extended regression, the coefficient on EQ (DDSTD and 
KZABS) captures the effect of discretionary component on firm-specific return volatility in 
addition to the effect captured by the innate factors.  
 Column Method 2 of Table 5.5 reports the result of estimating Eq. (5.10) when 
idiosyncratic volatility is the dependent variable. I continue to find positive and significant 
coefficient on EQ for both measures even after controlling for the innate factors. Placing these 
results with respect to those for total earnings quality (reported in Table 5.4), I find that the effect 
of discretionary earnings quality is less than the effect of total earnings quality which reflects 
both innate and discretionary effects. This finding is indicative of weaker effect of discretionary 
component relative to innate component of earnings quality. I re-estimate Eq. (5.10) using 
asynchronicity as the dependent variable. The results presented in Table 5.5 indicate that the 
coefficient on EQ for DDSTD measure is positive but not significant while the coefficient on EQ 
for KZABS measure is significantly positive. Both the coefficients are smaller in magnitude 
compared to their counterparts in Table 5.4. Thus, Method 2 provides indirect evidence that 
innate component of earnings quality has larger impact on firm-specific return volatility than 
discretionary component. 
 
5.5.4 Sensitivity Tests 
 I examine the sensitivity of the results using alternative asset pricing model to estimate 
the proxies for firm-specific return volatility. My primary results are based on idiosyncratic 
volatility and asynchronicity calculated from market model (CAPM) residuals and R2. An 
                                                 
23 Since firm size and cash flows volatility are already included in the original regression as determinants of firm-
specific return volatility, I do not include the innate factor ASSET which also captures size, in equation (5.10) to 
avoid duplication of the same construct, and include cash flows volatility once. 
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alternative asset pricing model is Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. Specifically, I 
estimate annual firm-specific regression of daily excess return on daily market excess return, 
SMB factor return and HML factor return and use the residuals and R2 to calculate idiosyncratic 
volatility and asynchronicity. I collect data on daily risk-free rate, daily stock return and market 
return, SMB factor return and HML factor return from Nikkei Portfolio Master (NPM) database. 
Table 5.6 reports coefficients and t-statistics from regression of Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
model based idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity on earnings quality and other control 
variables before and after controlling for beta. I include all control variables identified in section 
5.3.3 but do not report their coefficients for the sake of brevity. The result shows that when 
idiosyncratic volatility is used as dependent variable, the coefficient on earnings quality is 
positive and significant before and after controlling of beta. But when asynchronicity is used as 
dependent variable, the coefficient on earnings quality is negative before controlling beta and 
changes to positive (the coefficient on EQ for DDSTD measure is not significant) after 
controlling beta for both measures of earnings quality. This result reinforces that controlling for 
beta is important for asynchronicity because beta, as one of the components of asynchronicity, is 
strongly related with earnings quality which forces the coefficient on earnings quality to be 
negative. Table 5.7 reports coefficients and t-statistics from regression of Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model based idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity on two distinct components 
of earnings quality and other control variables including beta under two methods of separating 
innate and discretionary component of earnings quality. I only report coefficients of variable of 
interest for succinctness.  The results show that under Method 1, which yields distinct estimate of 
two components, innate earnings quality has significantly larger impact on return volatility than 
discretionary component for different measures of firm-specific return volatility and earnings 
quality. Under Method 2, the coefficient on earnings quality capturing discretionary effect is 
positive and smaller than the coefficient on total earnings quality (reported in Table 5.6). The 
results reported in Table 5.6 and 5.7 are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5.3, 5.4 
and 5.5 except for asynchronicity when DDSTD is a measure of earnings quality. Therefore, I 
conclude that the results from traditional CAPM consistent asset pricing model are not sensitive 
to the alternative firm-specific return volatility measures estimated from Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model. 
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Table 5.6: Regression of Fama-French 3-Factor Model Based Idiosyncratic Volatility and Asynchronicity on Earnings Quality 
and Other Control Variables before and after Controlling for Beta 
This table reports estimation of Eq. (5.4) and Eq. (5.7) 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET
2
i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 + α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + 
α12KURTi,t + ζi,t            Eq. (5.4) 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET
2
i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 + α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + 
α12KURTi,t + α13ln[β
2]i,t + ζi,t          Eq. (5.7) 
where VOL represents idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe
2]) and asynchronicity (Ф) calculated from Fama-French 3-factor model. EQ is a measure of inverse 
earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and Kasznik version of modified Jones (1991) model. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix B. The sample period is 2003-2012 and consists of 12,284 observations for all models. All variables are winsorized at 
the bottom and top 1% levels. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 
2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. For the sake of brevity, I 
report only the coefficients of variable of interest. 
 
  Idiosyncratic Volatility (ln[σe2]) Asynchronicity (Ф) 
  EQ = DDSTD measure  EQ = KZABS measure EQ = DDSTD measure  EQ = KZABS measure 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Before 
controlling 
beta  
Eq. (5.4) 
After 
controlling 
beta 
Eq. (5.7) 
Before 
controlling 
beta  
Eq. (5.4) 
After 
controlling 
beta 
Eq. (5.7) 
Before 
controlling 
beta  
Eq. (5.4) 
After 
controlling 
beta 
Eq. (5.7) 
Before 
controlling 
beta  
Eq. (5.4) 
After 
controlling 
beta 
Eq. (5.7) 
EQi,t-1 (+) 
6.135*** 
(8.92) 
4.551*** 
(6.92) 
2.105*** 
(6.48) 
1.835*** 
(6.00) 
-9.223*** 
(-7.64) 
0.878 
(1.37) 
-0.444 
(-0.78) 
1.225*** 
(4.42) 
Other Control 
Variables 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 
Adjusted R2  39.77% 43.16% 39.36% 42.99% 36.96% 80.22% 36.46% 80.24% 
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Table 5.7: Regression of Fama-French 3-Factor Model Based Idiosyncratic Volatility and Asynchronicity on Innate and 
Discretionary Components of Earnings Quality after Controlling for Beta  
This table reports estimation of Eq. (5.9) and Eq. (5.10) 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1InnateEQi,t-1 + α2DiscEQi,t-1 + α3RET
2
i,t-1 + α4CFOi,t+1 + α5VCFOi,t-1 + α6ROEi,t-1 + α7SIZEi,t-1 + α8LEVi,t-1 + α9BMi,t-1 + α10RETi,t + 
α11LOSSi,t-1 + α12SKEWi,t +α13KURTi,t + α14ln[β
2]i,t + ζi,t                       Eq. (5.9) 
VOLi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2RET
2
i,t-1 + α3CFOi,t+1 + α4VCFOi,t-1 + α5ROEi,t-1 + α6SIZEi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8BMi,t-1 + α9RETi,t + α10LOSSi,t-1 + α11SKEWi,t + 
α12KURTi,t + α13VSALESi,t-1 + α14OPCYCLEi,t-1 + α15NEGi,t-1 + α16INTANi,t-1 + α17INTANDUMi,t-1 + α18CAPITALi,t-1 + α19ln[β
2]i,t + ζi,t     
          Eq. (5.10) 
where VOL represents idiosyncratic volatility (ln[σe
2]) and asynchronicity (Ф) calculated from Fama-French 3-factor model. InnateEQ is the fitted value 
from Eq. (5.8) and DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (5.8).  
EQi,t = γ0 + γ1ASSETi,t + γ2VCFOi,t + γ3VSALESi,t + γ4OPCYCLEi,t + γ5NEGi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7INTANDUMi,t + γ8CAPITALi,t + μi,t             Eq.  (5.8) 
where EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and Kasznik version of modified 
Jones (1991) model. InnateEQ and DiscEQ are inverse measure of innate and discretionary earnings quality respectively. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. The sample period is 2003-2012 and consists of 12,284 observations for all models. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% 
levels. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. For the sake of brevity, I report only the coefficients 
of variable of interest. 
 
  Idiosyncratic Volatility (ln[σe2]) Asynchronicity (Ф) 
  EQ = DDSTD measure  EQ = KZABS measure EQ = DDSTD measure  EQ = KZABS measure 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Method 1 
Eq. (5.9) 
Method 2 
Eq. (5.10) 
Method 1 
Eq. (5.9) 
Method 2 
Eq. (5.10) 
Method 1 
Eq. (5.9) 
Method 2 
Eq. (5.10) 
Method 1 
Eq. (5.9) 
Method 2 
Eq. (5.10) 
InnateEQi,t-1 (+) 
12.530*** 
(6.96) 
 15.996*** 
(9.72) 
 6.769*** 
(4.13) 
 8.228*** 
(5.01) 
 
DiscEQi,t-1 (+) 
3.609*** 
(6.90) 
 1.219*** 
(4.80) 
 1.545*** 
(2.87) 
 1.207*** 
(5.41) 
 
EQi,t-1 (+) 
 3.406*** 
(5.70) 
 1.595*** 
(5.65) 
 0.174 
(0.28) 
 1.176*** 
(4.64) 
Other Control 
Variables 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 12,284 
Adjusted R2  43.29% 43.74% 43.85% 43.71% 80.16% 80.28% 80.24% 80.30% 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: α1 = α2 
H1: α1 > α2 
20.69*** 
(0.000) 
 
83.03*** 
(0.000) 
 
8.47*** 
(0.004) 
 
18.15*** 
(0.000) 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 This study investigates the cross-sectional relation between firm-specific return volatility 
and earnings quality of Japanese manufacturing firms for the period 2003-2012. Firm-specific 
return volatility has important implications for individual investors who cannot hold a well-
diversified portfolio due to wealth constraint or by choice and arbitrageurs who require 
substitutes for mispriced stock with lower idiosyncratic risk. There is a controversy in the 
literature over whether firm-specific return volatility captures firm-specific information or noise 
in stock returns. The proponents of information hypothesis argue that greater firm-specific return 
volatility implies more firm-specific information being impounded in stock prices whereas the 
advocates of noise hypothesis claim that greater firm-specific return volatility is associated with 
noisier stock prices. Using idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity as proxies for firm-specific 
return volatility, I document that firm-specific return volatility is systematically associated with 
circumstances in which stock prices are unlikely to be informative, including settings 
characterized by the presence of greater information asymmetry, higher illiquidity and liquidity 
risk, lower institutional shareholdings and more zero return day, consistent with noise based 
explanation. However, in an examination of the association between earnings quality and firm-
specific return volatility using multivariate regression analysis, I find contradictory results. When 
I use idiosyncratic volatility as dependent variable, I find significant negative association 
between idiosyncratic volatility and earnings quality implying that idiosyncratic volatility 
decreases with high earnings quality. This finding is consistent with firm-specific return 
volatility proxied by idiosyncratic volatility captures noise. When I use asynchronicity as 
dependent variable, I find significant positive association between asynchronicity and earnings 
quality implying that asynchronicity increases with high earnings quality. This is consistent with 
firm-specific return volatility proxied by asynchronicity captures firm-specific information. Li et 
al. (2014) contend that the positive association between asynchronicity and earnings quality can 
arise from an association between earnings quality and one of the three components of 
asynchronicity: idiosyncratic volatility, beta, and market return volatility. Following the 
suggestion of Li et al. (2014), I show that the contradiction arises because earnings quality is 
related to both the beta and idiosyncratic risk components of asynchronicity, with a stronger 
relation for beta. When I control for beta in the empirical specification, the contradiction is 
resolved and I find significant negative association between firm-specific return volatility and 
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earnings quality. I interpret my evidence as consistent with noise based explanation of firm-
specific return volatility as opposed to information based explanation. 
 Then, I provide new evidence on the relationship between firm-specific return volatility 
and two distinct components of earnings quality. Both innate and discretionary components of 
earnings quality are significantly associated with firm-specific return volatility with innate 
component having larger effect than discretionary component. This finding indicates that firm-
specific return volatility is likely to be higher for firms operating in an uncertain environment 
and for firms whose managers use their discretion over accruals opportunistically. The 
significantly larger effect of innate component is consistent with the conjecture that in a broad 
cross-section of firms, discretionary component may contain performance subcomponent, 
opportunistic subcomponent or noise confounding the net effect. My findings are insensitive to 
the firm-specific return volatility measures estimated from alternative Fama-French (1993) three-
factor asset pricing model. Overall, the results are consistent with the existence of a significant 
cross-sectional association between firm-specific return volatility and two accruals-based proxies 
of earnings quality and their components. 
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Chapter Six 
 Earnings Quality and Information Asymmetry 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 Information asymmetry is a fundamental concept in accounting literature because it 
drives the demand for financial disclosure. Information asymmetry exists when investors do not 
have equal access to the information, or they are differentially informed about a firm’s value. 
When one or more investors have private information about the firms’ value but other 
uninformed investors only have access to public information, investors with private information 
are likely to trade profitably at the expense of other uninformed investors. A large number of 
existing analytical and empirical research addresses the issue of whether information asymmetry 
affects the cost of capital. Analytical models (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) predict 
that the presence of information asymmetry creates an adverse selection risk for the liquidity 
providers in the market when privately informed investors trade on the basis of their private 
information. In response, liquidity traders demand a larger compensation and widen the spread 
between the bid and the ask prices resulting in constrained liquidity and increased cost of capital. 
Easely and O’Hara (2004) propose a model in which informed investors exploit their access to 
private information in a trade with uninformed investors and hold portfolios heavily weighted to 
stocks with good news and against stocks with bad news. This uneven distribution of information 
between informed and uninformed investors increases the risk to the uninformed investors, who 
cannot adjust their portfolios to account for private information. In equilibrium, information 
asymmetry is priced to reflect this information risk faced by uninformed investors. Recent 
analytical studies provide new insight on when information asymmetry affects the cost of capital 
(Lambert et al., 2011; Lambert and Verrecchia, 2010). In a perfectly competitive equity market, 
information asymmetry has no effect on the cost of capital. However, when the market is not 
characterized by perfect competition, information asymmetry can have a separate effect on the 
cost of capital.  Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Easley et 
al. (2002), Armstrong et al. (2011) and Akins et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence consistent 
with the prediction of theoretical studies. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that raw bid-ask 
spreads are positively related to expected returns. Using two measures of the variable and fixed 
costs of transacting, one of which includes the adverse selection component, Brennan and 
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Subrahmanyam (1996) find a significant return premium, controlling for the Fama-French three-
factor model, associated with the variable and fixed trading cost components. Easley et al. (2002) 
document an association between information asymmetry proxied by the probability of informed 
trade (PIN) and measures of expected returns. Both Armstrong et al. (2011) and Akins et al. 
(2012) examine the impact of investor competition over information on pricing of information 
asymmetry and find that information asymmetry affects the cost of capital, but the pricing of 
information asymmetry decreases when there is more competition among investors over 
information. These studies suggest that information asymmetry is important to the firms because 
it is positively related to the cost of equity capital especially when the competition in the equity 
market is imperfect.  
 Another body of literature examines the determinants of information asymmetry and 
finds that level of disclosure or disclosure quality is an important factor affecting information 
asymmetry. The key argument of this body of literature holds that if the ability of investors to 
process earnings-related information differs, then poor earnings quality can lead to differentially 
informed investors and thereby, aggravate the information asymmetry in the financial markets 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Bhattacharya et al., 2013). 
Economic theory (Diamond, 1985; Verrecchia, 2001) suggests that disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry through two channels: disclosure directly reduces the amount of private 
information compared to publicly available information, and it indirectly minimizes private 
information search incentives. Empirical evidence in Brown and Hillegeist (2007) provide 
support to this argument. Regulators and standard setters view the reduction in information 
asymmetry to be an important benefit of improved earnings quality (Levitt, 1998; FASB, 2001). 
They argue that more and better disclosure by firms leads to less information asymmetry among 
investors and ‘‘levels the playing field’’ so that the capital markets become more attractive to 
“ordinary” uninformed investors. All these studies suggest an association between earnings 
quality and information asymmetry. While many studies in U.S. setting confirm the existence of 
this association, the literature on this dimension in the Japanese context is limited. Ajward and 
Takehara (2011) is one study that investigates the relationship between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry but report mixed results. Moreover, Verrecchia and Wang (2011) 
suggest that the channel and level of communication of information between managers and 
shareholders of “Keiretsu” firms facilitate free flow of information between firm and its major 
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shareholders. Because of direct and private access to “insider information” by the major 
shareholders, the level of information asymmetry between different types of investors may be 
more pervasive in Japan. This unique institutional feature of Japanese firms presents an 
appealing setting to address issues relating to the determinants of information asymmetry. Given 
the scant empirical literature examining the association between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry in the Japanese context and the incongruent results reported by the sole study, this 
chapter presents a study that will explore the impact of providing high-quality earnings 
information to the investors on reducing information asymmetry among investors. In addition, I 
assess the differential impact of innate and discretionary components of earnings quality on 
information asymmetry.  
 
6.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 This section reviews prior theoretical and empirical literature on whether or how 
disclosure or earnings quality affects information asymmetry among investors and develops two 
testable hypotheses to be examined in this chapter. 
 
6.2.1 Review of Prior Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
 Theoretical papers explore several mechanisms through which disclosure quality affects 
information asymmetry. One such mechanism is to alter the trading behavior of uninformed 
traders by providing high-quality disclosures. Merton’s (1987) incomplete information model 
shows that investors are unaware of certain assets in the market and as a result, uninformed 
investors are more likely to invest and trade in firms that are well known in the market or that 
they judge favorably. For the less familiar firms, a higher level of disclosure will make them 
more visible to the uninformed investors and persuade uninformed investors to trade more in 
those firms’ stock. Thus, increased disclosures affect information asymmetry by altering the 
trading pattern of uninformed investors. Fishman and Hagerty (1989) describe a model in which 
more informative disclosures reduce the costs associated with processing and assimilating public 
information about the firm, resulting in more non-privately informed investors. As a result, 
greater disclosure induces more investing by uninformed liquidity traders. One possible 
explanation is that uninformed investors feel more confident while investing their funds in the 
firms that constantly disclose high-quality information, which reduces, ceteris paribus, the risk of 
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trading against a privately informed investor. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that under 
certain conditions, the amount of trading by large uninformed investors increases as the firm 
releases more information. While a higher intensity of publicly informed trading reduces the 
possibility of trading against a privately informed investor, prior research indicates that greater 
uninformed trading may attract more informed trading. Kyle (1985) demonstrates that increases 
in uninformed trading trigger more informed trading. When investors are risk neutral and are not 
constrained by capital, the amount of informed trading changes proportionately with the 
expected amount of uninformed trading. Thus, the relative amount of informed trading remains 
unchanged when the anticipated amount of uninformed trading changes. However, if the 
informed traders are risk averse and are constrained by capital requirement, then higher 
disclosure quality will lead to relatively less amount of informed trading, which in turn will 
reduce information asymmetry.  
 Disclosure quality can also affect information asymmetry by lowering the amount of 
private information available and/or by altering the incentives to search for private information. 
Verrecchia (1982) examines a setting where public information disclosed by the firm is a perfect 
substitute for private information and shows that increasing the publicly available information 
decreases the amount of costly private information that investors acquire on their own. Diamond 
(1985) also finds that disclosure of more public information reduces the incentives for investors 
to acquire private information. Both studies demonstrate that releasing public information not 
only reduces the incentives for the production of private information by the traders but also 
improves risk sharing among investors by making their beliefs more homogenous. 
Overall, theoretical studies suggest that public disclosure quality can lessen the level of 
information asymmetry by reducing the intensity of private information based trading relative to 
the amount of uninformed trading or by decreasing the frequency with which informed investors 
discover and trade on private information, or by reducing both informed trading and private 
information search incentives. 
 Prior empirical literature also suggests that earnings quality will be negatively related to 
information asymmetry. Welker (1995) is the first empirical study that reveals a significant 
negative relation between disclosure policy and information asymmetry measured using bid-ask 
spreads, even after controlling for the effects of return volatility, trading volume, and share price. 
The findings of this study suggest that a well-regarded disclosure policy reduces information 
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asymmetry and hence increases market liquidity. Healy et al. (1999) examine firms that achieved 
continuous improvements in disclosure quality (using AIMR scores) and document that these 
firms exhibit improvements in a number of variables, including improved liquidity measured by 
the bid-ask spread.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) document that firms that commit to either IAS 
or U.S. GAAP enjoy lower bid-ask spreads and higher share turnover than firms using German 
GAAP. They also investigate the bid-ask spreads and trading volume around the switch to 
international reporting standards and find similar results. Heflin et al. (2005) examine the 
relation between disclosure policy ratings and market liquidity employing bid-ask spreads and 
quoted depth. They find that effective spreads are negatively related to disclosure policy ratings. 
They also investigate the relation between disclosure policy ratings and quoted depths and find 
that firms with higher rated disclosures have lower quoted depths. With respect to disclosure 
ratings, their results do not support the simple intuitive notion that quoted depth “mirrors” bid-
ask spreads. Since a simple examination of effective spreads and quoted depths yields ambiguous 
inferences about the relation between disclosure policy and market liquidity, they condition their 
analyses of disclosure policy ratings and effective spreads on order size and find an inverse 
relation between depth-adjusted effective spreads and disclosure ratings for all order sizes. Thus, 
traders in shares of firms with higher rated disclosures pay lower trading costs, even on large 
orders, despite these firms’ lower quoted depths. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) document a 
negative relation between disclosure quality measured by AIMR scores and the probability of 
informed trade (PIN) measure. They also investigate the underlying reason of the relationship 
and indicate that disclosure quality primarily affects information asymmetry by reducing the 
likelihood that investors discover and trade on private information. Using an accruals-based 
measure of earnings quality (Dechow-Dichev accrual quality) and a market microstructure based 
measure of information asymmetry (adverse selection component of bid-ask spread), 
Bhattacharya et al. (2013) find that poor earnings quality is significantly and incrementally 
associated with higher information asymmetry. They also examine the impact of two key 
determinants of earnings quality (innate factors and discretionary factors) and document that the 
innate component has a significant incremental impact on information asymmetry. 
 The studies mentioned above focus on the relation between disclosure ratings or earnings 
quality and information asymmetry or market liquidity. A small number of studies also examine 
the linkage between various earnings attributes and the liquidity cost in financial markets. 
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Affleck-Graves et al. (2002) find that firms with higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (a 
measure of less predictable earnings) experience higher bid-ask spreads although forecast 
dispersion is not a direct measure of financial reporting quality. In another study, Jayaraman 
(2008) documents an association between accruals volatility and bid-ask spreads and PIN. 
Accrual is a key component of earnings, and thus, the quality of earnings is dependent on the 
volatility of accruals driven by managerial discretion. These studies suggest that managers can 
lessen the level of information asymmetry among investors by proving better quality earnings 
information.  
 The frequency of private information events and investors’ eagerness to search and trade 
on private information exacerbate information asymmetry. Some empirical literature suggests 
that voluntary disclosure of information and disclosure quality will be negatively related to the 
frequency of private information events, thereby narrowing the gap between informed and 
uninformed investors (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and 
Myers (2002) find that current stock returns are more informative about future earnings when 
disclosure quality is higher, implying that by revealing more information about future earnings 
that can be privately acquired, high-quality disclosures reduce the total amount of information 
available about a firm. Since there is less information available to be discovered, the frequency 
of private information events will be declining in disclosure quality. Coller and Yohn (1997) 
investigate whether the decision to voluntary issue a management earnings forecast is related to 
information asymmetry in the market for the firm’s stock and whether the forecasts reduce the 
information asymmetry. Although they find no significant differences in spreads between 
forecasters and non-forecasters during the nine days after the release of the management forecast, 
they report that spreads in the nine days after the forecast are significantly smaller than spreads 
in the nine days prior to the forecast for forecasting firms. This finding is consistent with the idea 
that issuance of management earnings forecast reduces investors’ incentive to search for private 
information about the forthcoming announcement, which in turn, reduces information asymmetry. 
Eleswarapu et al. (2004) study the impact of regulation fair disclosure on information asymmetry. 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) prohibits selective disclosure of material 
information to analysts and other investment professionals. The regulation was intended to 
ensure equal access to firm disclosures. The authors hypothesize that if equal access is improved, 
then the amount of asymmetric information would decline subsequent to regulatory adoption and 
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find that the adverse selection component of trading costs declines after the adoption of 
Regulation FD. These studies indicate that if high-quality earnings can reduce private 
information events or private information search incentives, information asymmetry is likely to 
improve. On the other hand, Brown et al. (2004) provide evidence on how voluntary disclosures, 
as measured by conference calls, change the trading pattern of informed and uninformed 
investors and reduce information asymmetry by lowering private information relative to publicly 
available information. Firms arrange conference calls for broadening the real-time access to 
information by the investors which is likely to narrow the information gap. Their cross-sectional 
tests indicate a highly significant and negative association between conference call frequency 
and the subsequent level of information asymmetry after controlling for potentially confounding 
factors. The underlying reason of this negative relation is that more conference calls reduce the 
relative amount of informed trading, and this effect more than overcomes the associated increase 
in the frequency of information events. 
 Several studies investigate the effect of more informative accounting methods on 
information asymmetry. For example, critics of immediate expensing of R&D assert that this 
method creates ambiguity among investors about the value of R&D, thus increasing the 
information gap between management and investors. Consistent with this logic, many studies 
demonstrate that R&D-intensive firms have higher information asymmetry and propose that 
capitalizing R&D will reduce information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Boone and 
Raman, 2001). In a similar line, Mohd (2005) investigates the impact of capitalization of 
software development costs on information asymmetry. He argues that when firms capitalize 
R&D, they convey information to the market about the success of these activities, which in turn 
affects investors' beliefs about R&D future payoffs, resulting in a reduction in information 
asymmetry. Consistent with his prediction, he finds that information asymmetry is low for 
software firms related to other high-tech firms and within software firms, capitalizers have lower 
information asymmetry than expensers. Bartov and Bodnar (1996) proposes an information 
asymmetry perspective which implies that managers maximizing firm value will choose 
accounting techniques, from the set, available, that reduce information asymmetry to the point 
where the expected benefit of additional disclosure is offset by the expected costs of making the 
disclosure. Their empirical findings support the predictions of the information asymmetry 
perspective. Specifically, measures of information asymmetry are positively related to the 
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likelihood of choosing the foreign currency as functional currency by the sample firms. Thus, the 
results are consistent with the prediction that firms with high information asymmetry attempt to 
reduce it through the adoption of more informative accounting procedures. The findings of these 
studies imply that accounting methods that provide more informative information to the investors 
reduce information asymmetry.  
 While most of the studies on the relation between disclosure quality and information 
asymmetry are conducted in the USA or international context, a survey of literature of 
contemporary research on this dimension in the Japanese context is seen as limited and 
inconclusive. Otogawa (2003) investigates the information asymmetry and liquidity around 
quarterly earnings announcements, measured by the percentage bid-ask spreads and quoted 
depths. The study finds that daily bid-ask spreads decrease significantly, and daily depths 
increase slightly during the period just after the quarterly earnings are announced. However, the 
study does not find strong evidence that the spreads are wider, and the depths are lower during 
the pre-announcement and announcement periods. The results suggest that more frequent public 
disclosure of information has a positive effect on the level of information asymmetry. Ebihara et 
al. (2014) compare liquidity and information asymmetry between family firms and non-family 
firms in Japan and find that family firms have lower market liquidity and higher information 
asymmetry. They suggest that more voluntary disclosure of information by family firms is 
required to increase market liquidity of traded stocks or to reduce the probability of private 
information based trades. Neither of these studies directly tests the association between earnings 
quality and information asymmetry. One study that investigates the relation between earnings 
quality and information asymmetry using Japanese data is Ajward and Takehara (2011) who 
report contradictory results employing two different proxies for earnings quality. They find a 
negative but insignificant relation (without controlling for alternative portfolio style) between 
absolute abnormal accruals (Kasznik) and the degree of information asymmetry but an 
unexpected positive and significant relation between accruals quality (Dechow-Dichev) and the 
degree of information asymmetry. The results, as a whole, are not very much compelling and 
also contrary to the hypothesis. The mixed findings reported in the Japanese context have kept 
the issue open for further investigation using alternative proxies for relevant variables or 
employing different methodologies. I exploit this opportunity to advance the literature of stock 
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market consequences of high-quality earnings by examining the impact of earnings quality on 
the level of information asymmetry among investors. 
 
6.2.2 Development of Testable Hypotheses 
6.2.2.1 Earnings Quality and Information Asymmetry 
 Several theoretical studies feature formal models of how earnings-related information 
might affect information asymmetry. Verrecchia (1982) was one of the first such studies. He 
concludes that increasing public information decreases the amount of costly private information 
search. Assuming public information as a substitute for private information, his model suggests 
that fewer traders will pay for costly private information when public information is available. In 
his model, the existence of earnings information leads to less information asymmetry in the stock 
market. Diamond (1985) also shows that the release of public information reduces the incentives 
for investors to acquire private information. He concludes that public information makes traders 
belief more homogeneous and reduces informed traders’ speculative positions. Some research 
has modeled how the anticipation and release of earnings news affect information asymmetry in 
the days immediately around the announcement. McNicholes and Trueman (1994) and Demski 
and Feltham (1994) show that the anticipation of earnings announcements may increase 
information asymmetry prior to the announcement. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) model 
information asymmetry on the day earnings are announced. Their model predicts an increase in 
information asymmetry immediately after the release of the earnings news. Empirical researchers 
have also examined how earnings announcement and other information events affect information 
asymmetry in the market. For example, Otogawa (2003) finds evidence of a significant decrease 
in daily bid-ask spreads and slight increase in daily depths during the period just after the release 
of quarterly earnings but doesn’t find any strong evidence that the spreads are wider and depths 
are lower during the pre-announcement and announcement period for a sample of firms listed in 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. It should be noted that all these studies are devoted to examining how 
disclosure of public information may reduce information asymmetry in the stock market or how 
information asymmetry may change in the days surrounding an information event. The focal 
point of these research studies, however, relates to general public disclosure of information or 
financial analysts’ rating of the overall level of disclosure rather than concentrating on specific 
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measures of the quality of such disclosure.24 Bhattacharya et al. (2013) is a recent study that 
examines directly the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry during 
non-earnings announcement period. Drawing on the arguments provided by Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994) and empirical evidence in Sloan (1996) that the marginal investors fail to incorporate 
fully the mean-reverting property of the accruals of firms with large accruals, Bhattacharya et al. 
(2013) infer inverse relation between accrual-based earnings quality and information asymmetry. 
They argue that if investors have different ability to process earnings-related information, some 
investors who are capable of generating a precise signal from noisy public disclosure because of 
their superior information processing ability gain information advantage compared to their less 
sophisticated counterparts. Thus, poor earnings quality can result in differentially informed 
investors and contribute to worsening information asymmetry among market participants. 
Accordingly, I expect that the level of information asymmetry will be higher for firms with poor 
earnings quality. I formalize my expectation in the form of following alternative hypothesis: 
H5: Earnings quality is negatively associated with information asymmetry 
 
6.2.2.2 Innate versus Discretionary Component of Earnings Quality and Information 
Asymmetry 
 Many earnings quality researchers who employed accruals-based measures of earnings 
quality explicitly or implicitly assume that earnings quality is mainly determined by managerial 
discretionary choices. One implication of this assumption is that managers have absolute control 
over earnings quality. However, recent research, starting from Francis et al. (2004, 2005), has 
recognized that earnings quality is not only driven by managers’ reporting choices and judgment 
but also affected by operational uncertainty and business model. Drawing on this idea, Francis et 
al. (2005) disentangle earnings quality effects stemming from the firm fundamentals (innate 
earnings quality) from earnings quality effects due to managerial incentives (discretionary 
earnings quality). This distinction is important because managers may not have adequate control 
over the firm fundamentals and the economic environment in which the firms operate, at least in 
                                                 
24 Lev (1989) is the first research paper that discusses about the notion of earnings quality and its consequences. 
According to Lev (1989), when a firm’s financial information disclosure is more “equitable” and “broadly 
informative”, the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders is lower. Therefore, a more 
equitable disclosure policy would result in lower bid-ask spreads. Other things being equal, information asymmetry 
increases as the amount or quality of public information decreases. Therefore, firms with high quality public 
information should have lower bid-ask spreads. Greenstein and Sami (1994) imply that by improving the quality and 
content of accounting information, accountants may be able to help improve the transactional efficiency of stock 
markets. 
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the short run.25 Despite the absence of any theoretical study that distinguishes between innate 
and discretionary component of earnings quality and predicts the effect of each component on 
information asymmetry, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) empirically investigates the contribution of 
innate and discretionary earnings quality to information asymmetry. They find that both innate 
and discretionary components of earnings quality have a negative and significant impact on 
information asymmetry consistent with their ex-ante expectation of an inverse and linear 
relationship. On the contrary, the non-linear specification suggests that the form of relationship is 
different for discretionary component. In particular, they find a U-shaped relation between 
discretionary earnings quality and information asymmetry wherein large discretionary accruals 
(both positive and negative) are associated with higher information asymmetry. However, they 
do not investigate the differential impact of innate and discretionary component of earnings 
quality on information asymmetry. 
 Although theoretical models do not predict any difference between the effect of innate 
and discretionary earnings quality, research on accounting choice and earnings management 
suggests a potential distinction between the effects of the innate and discretionary components of 
earnings quality. Prior literature on the intent of managerial discretionary behavior offers 
competing views (Holthausen, 1990). According to these views, discretionary accounting 
choices are made to communicate managers’ private information or to conceal the true 
underlying economic performance of the firm in an attempt to enhance managers’ welfare at the 
expense of investors or to minimize contracting costs amongst the various contracting parties to 
the firm which, in turn, maximizes firm value. In a similar note, Guay et al. (1996) recognize that 
the discretionary component of earnings quality combines three separate effects. The first one is 
performance effect which captures management’s attempts to transmit relevant and reliable 
information about firm performance. The performance effect is expected to improve earnings 
quality. In contrast, the second effect reflects managerial opportunism and the third effect 
represents pure noise, both of which are expected to reduce earnings quality. In a broad cross-
section of firms covering long time periods, there will be observations where managerial 
                                                 
25 Innate earnings quality can also be related with discretionary earnings quality because the underlying assumption 
that managerial discretion is not related to firm fundamentals may be incorrect. The innate features of the firms’ 
economic environment may create earnings management incentives or provide the flexibility required to engage in 
earnings management activities. For example, firms with longer operating cycle have more flexibility in using 
working capital accruals to manage earnings. 
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discretion is used to reap opportunistic gains as well as to signal private information making 
empirical identification of the managers’ intention difficult except in some specific settings 
where incentives play a key role. Recognizing this possibility, Francis et al. (2006) conclude that, 
the net earnings quality effect of management’s implementation decisions could be positive, 
negative or neutral. If discretionary earnings quality reﬂects a combination of performance 
improvement and opportunism plus noise, its overall impact on information asymmetry is likely 
to be smaller than the impact of innate earnings quality. Therefore, I formulate following 
hypothesis asserted in alternative form on the basis of the prediction of differential effects 
between innate and discretionary component of earnings quality: 
H6: The innate component of earnings quality has larger impact on information 
asymmetry than discretionary component of earnings quality 
 
6.3 Variable Measurement 
 In this section, I explain measurement of the relative bid-ask spread, the proxy for 
information asymmetry, two proxies for earnings quality (accruals quality and absolute abnormal 
accruals) and other control variables known to be the determinants of information asymmetry. 
Appendix C summarizes the measurement of each of these variables.  
 
6.3.1 Bid-Ask Spread 
 Information asymmetry is not directly observable, but recent advances in market 
microstructure studies suggest that bid-ask spread, an observable measure of market liquidity, 
can be used as a reasonable surrogate for information asymmetry facing uninformed traders in 
the equity market. The bid-ask spread is set by the specialists for a firm’s stock. For example, in 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), exchange-designated specialists offer simultaneous 
quotes to both buy and sell in order to fulfill their affirmative obligations to provide continuous 
liquidity to the market. Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) develop 
theoretical models that link information flows to bid-ask spread. These papers are based on the 
notion that a subset of traders has more information about the value of the stock than the 
specialists. These models suggest that specialists set the bid-ask spread so that the expected gains 
from uninformed traders cover the expected losses to informed traders. For example, Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) posit that a market specialist charges higher ask price and lower bid price when 
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he anticipates that some investors are better informed or have private information. Therefore, the 
difference between the ask price and the bid price, commonly known as bid-ask spread, can be 
used to measure the extent of information asymmetry among market participants. This is one of 
the most frequently examined measures of information asymmetry since the difference between 
the quotes represents the round-trip cost of immediately reversing a trade position (Lehman and 
Modest, 1994). 
 For the purpose of this study, SPREAD is measured as the average of daily closing bid-
ask spread for a firm in a fiscal year.26 The average is taken over a period of twelve months 
starting from the fourth month after the beginning of a fiscal year in order to maintain 
consistency with the estimation period of earnings quality measure. 27  The daily spread is 
calculated as the difference between daily closing quoted ask price and closing quoted bid price, 
divided by the average of the ask and bid prices. This measure is also known as percentage 
spread or relative spread. I use the percentage or relative spread to facilitate cross-sectional 
comparability. I drop those days for which either ask price or bid price is missing from my 
calculation of spread measure. Finally, I require at least 150 days of non-zero ask and bid price 
for bid-ask spread calculation. I use natural log of spread measure in empirical analysis.28 
 The extant market microstructure literature demonstrates that the quoted bid-ask spread 
consists of three cost components incurred by the market-maker: inventory holding, order 
processing, and adverse selection costs. The inventory holding costs reflect the market maker's 
cost of not maintaining optimal levels of inventories while order processing costs represent the 
market maker's fixed costs such as clearing and settlement costs. The adverse selection cost of 
the spread is directly related to the perceived level of information asymmetry in the capital 
market as an uninformed market-maker will increase the spread to compensate for expected 
losses to privately informed traders (Glosten and Harris, 1988). In the absence of any exchange 
                                                 
26 Prior research usually uses the closing bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry.  One difficulty of 
using this measure is that adverse selection costs change at different time periods within a day.  In TSE, the spread is 
U-shaped over the course of the trading day for firms in all size-decile categories (Lehman and Modest 1994).  This 
U-shaped pattern is consistent with the inter-temporal variation in spread and is almost common in all market-
microstructure studies. Although prior evidence suggests a temporal variation in spread, there is substantial cross-
sectional variation in spread in all time periods within a day, which is sufficient to draw valid inference in a cross-
sectional study. 
27 Since estimation of earning quality requires fiscal year-end data contained in annual reports which become 
publicly available to the market participants three months after the end of a fiscal year, I assume that investors are 
aware of earnings quality three months after the end of that fiscal year. 
28 Welker (1995) uses the natural log of relative spreads in empirical tests to control for heteroskedasticity. 
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designated specialists or market makers on the TSE, stock brokerage firms charge a commission 
for providing trading services, and order processing costs are not likely to be recovered by the 
bid-ask spreads. In addition, since all traders are able to post limit orders, no one should be 
forced to maintain an excess inventory position (Otogawa, 2003). Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) 
suggest that other spread components unrelated to information asymmetry are presumably less 
important in the order-driven market. As the TSE is an order driven market, I assume that quoted 
spread reasonably proxies for the adverse selection or information asymmetry component of the 
spread in the Japanese stock market. 
 
6.3.2 Earnings Quality 
 I use two measures of earnings quality: Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality 
(DDSTD) and Kasznik (1999) version of modified Jones (1991) absolute abnormal accruals 
(KZABS). These measures are described in greater detail below. 
 
6.3.2.1 Accrual Quality (DDSTD) Measure Based on Dechow and Dichev (2002) Model 
 My first measure of earnings quality, DDSTD, is based on an approach proposed by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and implemented by Francis et al. (2005). The underlying premise of 
this approach is that earnings quality is primarily dependent on the quality of accruals because 
accounting earnings are the sum of operating cash flows and accruals. Operating cash flows are 
designated as hard measure and are more objectively determinable and verifiable than accruals. 
In contrast, accruals portion is subject to considerable managerial discretion and implementation 
decisions that make it extremely vulnerable to managerial incentives of earnings manipulation. 
One of the basic functions of accounting accruals is to anticipate future operating cash flows or 
to reflect current cash flows or reversals of past cash flows. As a result, any measurement error 
in estimating accruals could significantly impair the ability of accruals to assess future cash 
flows or to recognize the past and current cash flows. Such measurement error could be the result 
of either intentional errors arising from managerial incentives to manipulate earnings, or 
unintentional errors stemming from operational uncertainty and management lapses. The main 
idea behind Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality model is to determine the magnitude of 
this measurement error resulting from poor mapping of current accruals into last-period, current-
period and next-period cash flows from operation. The use of Dechow-Dichev accruals quality as 
116 
 
a measure of earnings quality suggests that earnings that map more precisely into cash flows are 
of better quality. Dechow and Dichev (2002) model the mapping of accruals into cash flows as 
follows: 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + νi,t   Eq. (6.1) 
where TCA is the total current accruals computed as ∆CA – ∆CL – ∆Cash + ∆STDEBT, ∆CA is 
the change in current assets, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, ∆Cash is the change in cash, 
∆STDEBT is the change in short-term debt included in current liabilities. CFO is the cash flows 
from operations calculated as NI-TCA+DEP, where NI is the net income, TCA is the total 
current accruals and DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense. Subscripts i and t are the 
firm and time subscripts, respectively. 
 McNichols (2002) suggests that the earnings quality measure derived from equation (6.1) 
can be improved by including two important determinants of accruals, that is, changes in 
revenues and the level of property, plant, and equipment. So, I augment equation (6.1) as follows 
(all variables excluding the intercept are scaled by average total assets): 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + φ4ΔREVi,t + φ5PPEi,t + νi,t     Eq. (6.1a) 
where ΔREV is the change in revenues and PPE is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment. I estimate equation (6.1a) for every industry-year in each of 15 Nikkei two-digit 
industry groups in which I require at least 10 firms in each year.29 The industry-specific cross-
sectional regressions in a given year generate firm-specific residuals for that year.  
 Under equation (6.1a), higher accruals quality indicates that accruals can explain most of 
the variation in past, contemporaneous and future cash flows and, as a consequence, the firm-
specific residuals, νi,t, from equation (6.1a) form the basis of my first earnings quality proxy used 
in this study. Specifically, the earnings quality (DDSTDi,t) is the standard deviation of firm i’s 
residuals, calculated over years t-4 through t, i.e., DDSTDi,t = σ(υi,t-4,t). Larger standard deviation 
of residuals indicates poor accruals and earnings quality. 
 
3.2.2 Absolute Abnormal Accruals (KZABS) Based on Kasznik (1999) Version of Modified 
Jones (1991) Model 
 Abnormal accrual is another widely used measure of earnings quality. The use of 
abnormal accrual as a measure of earnings quality rests on the view that accruals, which are not 
                                                 
29 Consistent with Francis et al. (2005), I winsorize the extreme values of the distribution of the dependent and 
independent variables to the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
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well explained by accounting fundamentals, are an inverse measure of earnings quality. If a 
firm’s total accruals deviate significantly from the normal level of accruals as determined by firm 
fundamentals, then such deviations are considered abnormal accruals. High level of abnormal 
accruals indicates manipulation of earnings by the management through opportunistic use of 
discretionary reporting choices. Thus, abnormal accruals distort the ability of earnings to reflect 
the real economic performance of the firms and are assumed to reduce the quality of accruals and 
earnings.  
 The abnormal accruals measure is typically estimated using some variants of the Jones 
(1991) approach. To determine abnormal accruals, I apply Kasznik version of modified Jones 
(1991) model and estimate the following regression for every industry-year in each of 15 Nikkei 
two-digit industry groups with at least 10 firms in each year (all variables excluding the intercept 
are scaled by average total assets)30: 
 
TAi,t = δ0 + δ1(ΔREVi,t - ΔARi,t) + δ2PPEi,t + δ3∆CFOi,t + ηi,t   Eq. (6.2) 
 
where TA is the firm i’s total accruals, computed as TCA-DEP, TCA is the total current accruals, 
DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense, ΔREV is the change in revenues, ΔAR is the 
change in accounts receivable, PPE is the gross value of property, plant and equipment and 
∆CFO is the change in cash flows from operation. Equation (6.2) is a modified and extended 
version of Jones (1991) model, which describes total accruals as a function of the changes in 
sales revenue and the level of property, plant, and equipment. Dechow et al. (1995) relax Jones’s 
assumption that revenues are non-discretionary. Since discretion could be exercised over 
revenues by changing the timing of sales shipment, following the suggestion of Dechow et al. 
(1995), Kasznik adjusts the sales revenue variable for the change in accounts receivable. Kasznik 
also includes the change in operating cash flows as an explanatory variable based on Dechow’s 
(1994) finding that cash flow from operation is significantly negatively correlated with total 
accruals. I prefer Kasznik version over modified Jones version because the former version 
considers significant correlation between cash flow from operation and total accruals in addition 
to two fundamental accounting variables used by the latter version. The explanatory power of 
Kasznik version is also higher than that of modified Jones version as reflected in higher R2.  
                                                 
30 Consistent with accrual quality measure, I also winsorize the extreme values of the distribution of the dependent 
and indepensdent variables to the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
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 I treat the residual, ηi,t, from equation (6.2) as abnormal accruals and use the absolute 
value of abnormal accruals, i.e., KZABSi,t = |ηi,t| as my second proxy for earnings quality 
because firms with very large positive and negative abnormal accrual values are considered to 
have poor quality earnings. Consequently, I interpret higher (lower) values of KZABS as 
measures of lower (higher) earnings quality.  
 
6.3.3 Control Variables 
 Based on a review of past literature, I expect several variables to be associated with the 
bid-ask spread. Previous theoretical studies suggest numerous determinants of bid-ask spread 
that should be controlled for in the empirical analysis and empirical studies identify significant 
associations of bid-ask spread with those determinants. The general findings are that relative 
spreads are negatively related to share price, trading volume and firm size, and positively related 
to stock return volatility and the adverse selection problem confronting specialists (Stoll, 2000; 
Welker, 1995). Building on extant literature, I control for the effects of share price, trading 
volume, return volatility, and firm size in the empirical specification of the relation between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry. In addition to these variables, I also include 
market-to-book ratio, leverage, institutional ownership and analysts following as additional 
control variables because these firm characteristics are found to be systematically associated with 
various measures of information asymmetry (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 
2013). The detailed description and measurement of the control variables are discussed in this 
section along with their predicted relation with the bid-ask spread. 
 Stoll (1978) noted an inverse relation between relative spreads and stock prices, and 
suggested that stock price may serve as an inverse proxy for inventory holding risk, or stock 
price may capture the effect of order processing cost of the market-making activity.31 In an 
empirical study, Lehman and Modest (1994) finds that stocks with higher prices tend to have 
lower percentage bid-ask spreads in TSE. I measure stock price (PRICE) as the average of daily 
closing stock price for a firm in a given year and use the logarithmic transformation of this 
                                                 
31 Bhattacharya et al. (2013) also use stock price to control for the effect of higher risk associated with low priced 
stocks and the discreteness in the pricing grid. In all of their specifications, they find statistically significant negative 
coefficient on stock price. 
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variable.32 I require at least 150 days price data to calculate this measure. I expect a negative 
relation between relative spread and share price. 
 Previous cross-sectional studies of the determinants of spread suggest that spread is 
positively related to specialists’ inventory holding period, and trading volume serves as an 
inverse proxy for inventory holding period. On the other hand, some studies (e.g., Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000) use trading volume based measure such as share turnover as less explicit 
proxy for information asymmetry on the ground that trading volume captures investors’ 
willingness to transact a firm’s shares and this willingness to trade should be negatively related 
to the existence of information asymmetries. Leuz and Verreecchia (2000) find that commitment 
to increased level of disclosure reduces the possibility of information asymmetry as measured by 
share turnover. For this reason, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) use “orthogonalized volume” as a 
control variable. Trading volume (VOLUME) is measured as the average of daily share trading 
volume expressed in number of shares for a firm in a year.33 I require at least 150 days volume 
data for a firm in any given year to calculate this measure, and this variable is also transformed 
into logarithmic form. Following Bhattacharya et al. (2013), I run an annual regression of trading 
volume on earnings quality measures and use the residuals as orthogonalized volume.34 The 
residuals provide the component of trading volume unrelated to earnings quality measures. I 
expect a negative coefficient on trading volume. 
 I use the variance of daily stock return of a firm as the measure of stock return volatility 
(VOLATILITY).35 I use natural log of volatility measure in empirical models.  I include return 
volatility as an explanatory variable because prior studies suggest that return volatility captures 
the price risk the specialist faces on his/her inventory of the stocks (Welker, 1995) or the 
possibility that informed traders are more active in stocks with higher uncertainty (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2013). Based on the findings that poor earnings quality is associated with higher return 
                                                 
32 Alternatively, I use fiscal year end closing price and find qualitatively similar results. 
33 All reported results are qualitatively similar if dollar trading volume instead of share trading volume is used. 
Dollar trading volume of a firm in a year is measured as the average of daily dollar trading volume whereas daily 
dollar trading volume is the number of shares traded in a day times closing share price on that day.  I also use 
average of daily share turnover, defined as the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding,  
to control for the liquidity of the firm’s share as an alternative to average daily trading volume. This alternative 
measure exhibits high correlations with my chosen proxy, and do not change the result. 
34  The results are not materially affected if I use unorthogonalized volume as a control variable. 
35 I also define stock return volatility as the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted return where market-
adjusted return is calculated as the daily return of a firm minus return for the market index and find similar results. 
Use of idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for stock return volatility produces qualitatively similar results. 
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volatility (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2011), Bhattacharya et al. (2013) suggest researchers to 
be cautious while controlling for the effect of return volatility in examining the relation between 
earnings quality and a spread based measure of information asymmetry. 36  Following 
Bhattacharya et al. (2013), I include “orthogonalized volatility” as a control variable in all 
regression specifications. Specifically, I regress return volatility on earnings quality measures 
annually and consider the residuals that are independent of the earnings quality effects as 
orthogonalized volatility.37 I expect a positive coefficient on stock return volatility. 
 Firms with long operating history and functioning in a richer information environment 
are expected to have low information asymmetry since information is easily and freely available 
to the investors about the current and future prospect of these firms. Lehman and Modest (1994) 
examine the liquidity characteristics of equities on the TSE and document that the bid-ask spread 
is a monotonic function of firm size with the highest spread recorded for the smallest firms and 
vice-versa. Firm size also proxies for the amount of prior information available about a firm and 
controls at least partially for the firm’s information environment. I measure firm size (SIZE) as 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year. Market capitalization 
is calculated as the closing stock price times the number of stocks outstanding at the end of the 
fiscal year. I predict a negative coefficient on size. 
 Leverage (LEV) is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s interest-
bearing debt to market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year.38 The possibility of yielding 
extra profit from trading based on private information induces investors to spend resources on 
private information acquisition activities and the expected profit from trading on private 
information in the equity market increases with the firm’s leverage, which implies a positive 
association between leverage and information asymmetry (Boot and Thakor, 1993). On the other 
hand, the Pecking Order theory of capital structure suggests a negative association between 
leverage and information asymmetry. Because of two different directions of relation as suggested 
by existing theories, I do not predict any explicit sign of the coefficient on leverage. 
                                                 
36 Moreover, some empirical papers use return volatility as a proxy of information asymmetry. For example, Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000) focus on several proxies for the information asymmetry component. One such proxy is share 
price/return volatility. They assume that smooth transitions in share prices reflect absence of asymmetry in 
information possession between the firm and shareholders or among investors.  
37 I also use unorthogonalized return volatility as an explanatory variable and find that the conclusions do not change.  
38 I also use book value of total assets in place of market value of equity to calculate leverage and find similar result. 
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 Firms with high amount of unrecorded intangibles such as R&D intensive firms and firms 
with high growth opportunities typically have greater information asymmetries. The mandated 
accounting rule of expensing R&D investments creates ambiguity among investors about the 
value of R&D, thus increasing the information gap between management and investors (Mohd, 
2005). Consistent with this logic, many studies demonstrate that R&D intensive firms have 
higher information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Barth and Kasznik, 1999; Barth et al., 
2001; Boone and Raman, 2001). The findings of these studies imply that the incentives to 
generate private information about firms are increasing in the level of information asymmetry 
between firm and investors and in how much uncertainty there is about firm value among 
investors. Firms with high intangibles and growth opportunities are in general characterized by 
higher market-to-book ratio. Accordingly, I expect that firms with high market-to-book ratio will 
have greater information asymmetry. I calculate market-to-book (MB) ratio of a firm as the 
natural log of the market value of equity (closing stock price multiplied by the number of stock 
outstanding at fiscal year-end) divided by the book value of equity at the end of fiscal year. I 
predict a positive coefficient on market-to-book ratio. 
 Prior studies predict that spreads will be wider for firms whose securities are more 
actively traded by informed investors (Welker, 1995) and certain institutional investors (transient 
institutional investors) systematically trade on private information (Bollen and Busse, 2005). 
Institutional investors are deemed to have information advantage over uninformed investors 
because they devote substantial resources to private information acquisition and exploit their 
superior information processing ability.39 To the extent that institutional ownership reasonably 
proxies for the trading interest of privately informed traders, firms with greater institutions in 
their ownership structure will have higher information asymmetry. On the other hand, 
institutional investors typically follow large firms about which information is abundant and 
freely available. This implies that the information advantage of informed traders will be lower in 
firms operating in richer information environment. Moreover, some types of institutional 
investors (dedicated institutional investors) are likely to hold their investment for a longer 
horizon and unlikely to trade on private information. To the extent that institutional investors are 
not privately informed or do not trade on private information, I expect that institutional 
                                                 
39 Welker (1995) provides another explanation for information based trading by institutional investors. He argues 
that institutional investors enjoy economies of scale from information production activities which apparently make 
information acquisition less costly for them. 
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ownership will be negatively related to information asymmetry. Fehle (2004) examines the 
relation between bid-ask spreads and institutional ownership and finds that spreads are on 
average negatively related to the institutional shares of total equity outstanding due to some 
institutions being restricted in their trading. This relationship, however, reverses for certain types 
of institutions, namely banks and investment managers. Since the relationship between relative 
spreads and institutional ownership depends on the type of institutions, I do not make any 
directional prediction. I measure institutional ownership (INSTITUTE) as the proportion of 
outstanding shares held by institutional investors for a firm in a given year. Institutional investors 
include foreign investors, annuity trust account, investment trust account and life insurance 
companies’ special accounts. 
 Previous studies find contradictory results on the relation between analyst activity and 
information asymmetry. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that higher analyst following is 
associated with more firm-specific information available about a firm and more private 
information based trading. This finding is consistent with the idea that analysts following proxies 
for privately informed trade or signals information asymmetry. Contrary to this evidence, 
Roulstone (2003) finds that analyst following is positively associated with market liquidity 
implying that analysts provide more public information to the financial markets. Frankel and Li 
(2004) also provide evidence that increased analyst following is associated with reduced 
information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread and insider trading profits. The former 
study suggests that analyst following is positively associated with information asymmetry while 
the later studies suggest the opposite. Thus, I do not make any directional prediction since the 
expected association between information asymmetry and analyst activity appears to be 
complicated. Number of analysts following the firm is a widely-used proxy for analyst activity in 
the accounting literature. So, I use the maximum number of individual analysts providing one-
year-ahead forecasts for a firm in a given year as a proxy for analyst activity. 
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6.4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 I discuss sample selection criteria and the summary statistics for all the variables in this 
section. 
 
6.4.1 Sample Selection Procedure 
 The sample period for this study spans the time period 2002-2012. My sample consists of 
only manufacturing companies listed in any one of the Japanese Stock Exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, 
Nagoya, JASDAQ, etc.) and primarily covers all firms from 15 industries based on Nikkei two-
digit industrial codes. I do not include financial institutions, insurance companies, and firms in 
service industries since earnings quality empirical models used in this study do not reflect their 
activities. Data for the dependent variable, variable of interest and control variables come from a 
variety of sources. I obtain the trades and quotes data from the Nikkei Tick by Tick Data 
provided by the Nikkei Digital Media Inc. in order to compute bid-ask spread. The trade and 
quotes data are available only for firms listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange. Accounting data come 
from Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest Database, and stock price and return data come from 
Nikkei Portfolio Master Return Database.40 I obtain institutional ownership data for the period 
2004-2012 from Nikkei NEEDS CGES Database and analyst following data from IFIS 
Consensus Dataset. As the estimation of parameters for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
requires lead and lag values of cash flows from operation, and measures of earnings quality 
require five annual residuals, I collect necessary data for the 18-year period (1996-2013) initially 
to compute earnings quality measures.  After restricting my sample to firms with complete data 
for earnings quality measure by eliminating firm-years due to missing information on any of the 
required variables, I end up with 15,640 firm-year observations with earnings quality measures. I 
am able to calculate bid-ask spread for 10,620 firm-year observations after imposing a 
requirement of at least 150 days of non-zero ask and bid price. The final sample size varies 
across different specifications depending on particular variables used in the regression. 
 
6.4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 6.1 presents summary distributional characteristics of regression variables used in 
tests of the association between information asymmetry and earnings quality. I winsorize all the 
                                                 
40 Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest Database and Nikkei Portfolio Master Return Database in Japan correspond to 
Compustat and CRSP in the U.S., respectively. 
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variables at the 1 and 99 percent levels to avoid the effects of influential outliers. Panel A of 
Table 6.1 shows that the mean (median) spread is 1% (0.6%) for a typical firm in a year with an 
inter-quartile range of 0.4% to 1.2%. Panel B provides descriptive information on two earnings 
quality measures and their components. Earnings quality measure based on Kasznik’s absolute 
abnormal accrual model shows greater variability than earnings quality measure based on 
Dechow-Dichev accrual quality model. The correlation in Table 6.2 between the two proxies of 
earnings quality is 0.475 over the sample period. The correlation is not high enough to make one 
of these proxies redundant. Therefore, I consider both proxies in empirical analysis. Panel C lists 
summary statistics for eight innate determinants. The sample mean values for the first five 
variables are 10.605 for ASSET (log of total assets), 0.057 for VCFO, 0.109 for VSALES, 5.054 
for OPCYCLE (or 156 days) and 20 percent for negative earnings (NEG). The mean value for 
INTANDUM suggests that only 4 percent of the sample firm-years report zero expenditure on 
R&D and advertising. For all sample firm-years (including those with INTAN = 0), the mean 
value of intangible intensity (INTAN) is 4.4 percent. Finally, the mean value of capital intensity 
(CAPITAL) is 32 percent. 
 Panel D presents descriptive statistics on firm characteristics and trading activity. The 
securities included in the sample have mean (median) price of around 6,304 (529) Yen and mean 
(median) trading volume of 533,222 (38,996) shares. As expected, the stock price and trading 
volume are highly skewed as the mean is much larger than the median. The average firm has a 
market capitalization of 128,434 million yen (untabulated), a market-to-book ratio of about 1.181, 
and 74.7% interest-bearing debt of market value of equity. I also find that about 16% shares are 
hold by institutional investors on average, and a firm is followed by five analysts.  
  Table 6.2 presents univariate Pearson correlations (Spearman rank correlations) below 
(above) the diagonal for the sample. The correlations between SPREAD and earnings quality 
measures are significantly positive, although somewhat moderate in magnitude. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between SPREAD and DDSTD is 0.174, and between SPREAD and 
KZABS is 0.109. Note that since higher value of earnings quality measures denotes lower quality 
of earnings, the positive correlation coefficients indicate inverse relation between information 
asymmetry and earnings quality. This simple correlation provides preliminary evidence in favor 
of my hypothesis. Additionally, SPREAD is negatively correlated with PRICE, VOLUME, SIZE, 
INSTITUTE and ANALYST while positively correlated with VOLATILITY, MB, and LEV. All 
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the coefficients are statistically significant and indicate that information asymmetry is higher for 
firms with lower share price, lower trading volume, smaller size, lower institutional holdings, 
lower analyst following, higher return volatility, higher market-to-book ratio, and higher 
leverage. An examination of the correlations among the determinants of SPREAD reveals quite 
large correlation among some variables. For example, SIZE is highly positively correlated with 
VOLUME, INSTITUTE, and ANALYST. This implies that large firms have higher trading 
volume, higher institutional ownership, and greater analyst coverage. VOLUME is highly 
correlated with INSTITUTE and ANALYST, and there is also large correlation between 
INSTITUTE and ANALYST. The high (but not perfect) correlation among explanatory variables 
raises concern about multicollinearity problem. In order to test the robustness of the results in the 
presence of multicollinearity, I drop one of the highly correlated variables from regression 
models in several cases where I suspect that multicollinearity may be a concern. In all regression 
models, I am interested in the coefficient of earnings quality. So, high correlations among control 
variables do not make it more difficult to determine the effect of earnings quality on information 
asymmetry. A cursory review of above the diagonal values of Table 6.2 suggests that the 
Spearman rank correlation is qualitatively similar to Pearson correlation except some 
insignificant coefficients. Overall, the univariate correlation between SPREAD and each 
explanatory variable is significant, consistent with the findings of previous literature. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables used for this study. All variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels. For the 
variables used in the regressions, the number of observations varies from 7,262 to 15,640 for the sample period 2002-2012. Only institutional ownership 
data is available for the period 2004-2012. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 10% Q1 Median Q3 90% 
Panel A: Information asymmetry measures 
Quoted bid-ask spread  SPREAD 10,620 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.012 0.023 
Panel B: Earnings quality measures 
Dechow-Dichev accrual quality DDSTD 15,640 0.024 0.019 0.008 0.013 0.019 0.030 0.045 
Innate component InnateEQ 15,640 0.024 0.011 0.014 0.018 0.022 0.028 0.035 
Discretionary component DiscEQ 15,640 -0.000 0.015 -0.013 -0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.016 
Kasznik absolute abnormal accrual KZABS 15,640 0.029 0.029 0.004 0.009 0.020 0.038 0.062 
Innate component InnateEQ 15,640 0.028 0.012 0.018 0.022 0.026 0.032 0.039 
Discretionary component DiscEQ 15,640 -0.000 0.026 -0.023 -0.016 -0.006 0.010 0.031 
Panel C: EQ determinants 
Total assets (in log) ASSET 15,640 10.605 1.580 8.786 9.516 10.409 11.521 12.742 
Cash flows volatility VCFO 15,640 0.057 0.068 0.019 0.027 0.041 0.063 0.102 
Sales volatility VSALES 15,640 0.109 0.180 0.027 0.042 0.070 0.119 0.203 
Operating Cycle (in log) OPCYCLE 15,640 5.054 0.442 4.490 4.813 5.087 5.333 5.551 
Incidence of negative earnings NEG 15,640 0.203 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 
Intangible intensity INTAN 15,640 0.044 0.241 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.405 0.081 
Absence of reported intangible INTANDUM 15,640 0.040 0.196      
Capital intensity CAPITAL 15,640 0.316 0.137 0.149 0.220 0.309 0.405 0.495 
Panel D: Control variables 
Stock price (in Yen) PRICE 15,190 6,304 34,167 146 267 529 1,170 2,658 
Trading volume (in shares) VOLUME 15,190 533,222 1,453,554 1,439 5,672 38,996 300,849 1,372,156 
Stock return volatility VOLATILITY 15,190 8.501 7.993 2.112 3.438 5.930 10.447 17.999 
Firm size (in log) SIZE 15,190 9.832 1.783 7.719 8.510 9.597 10.916 12.328 
Market-to-book ratio MB 15,160 1.181 0.911 0.431 0.620 0.923 1.417 2.180 
Leverage LEV 15,148 0.747 1.021 0.001 0.079 0.368 0.971 1.984 
Institutional ownership  INSTITUTE 12,517 16.012 16.073 0.110 1.990 10.630 26.420 40.740 
Number of analyst following ANALYST 7,262 4.957 4.729 1 1 3 7 13 
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Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix 
This table provides Pearson correlation coefficients (Spearman rank correlation coefficients) below (above) the diagonal. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
Variable SPREAD DDSTD KZABS PRICE VOLUME VOLATILITY SIZE MB LEV INSTITUTE ANALYST 
SPREAD  0.174*** 0.084*** -0.530*** -0.603*** 0.307*** -0.821*** 0.389*** 0.312*** -0.718*** -0.540*** 
DDSTD 0.174***  0.365*** 0.065*** -0.086*** 0.294*** -0.206*** 0.071*** -0.029*** -0.164*** -0.098*** 
KZABS 0.109*** 0.475***  0.006 -0.059*** 0.177*** -0.103*** 0.034*** -0.018** -0.070*** -0.032*** 
PRICE -0.375*** 0.073*** 0.076***  -0.039*** -0.293*** 0.498*** 0.389*** -0.577*** 0.451*** 0.264*** 
VOLUME -0.588*** -0.104*** -0.080*** -0.229***  0.033*** 0.722*** 0.383*** 0.053*** 0.655*** 0.641*** 
VOLATILITY 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.217*** -0.118*** 0.040***  -0.291*** 0.008 0.310*** -0.154*** -0.088*** 
SIZE -0.779*** -0.198*** -0.114*** 0.352*** 0.717*** -0.266***  0.480*** -0.310*** 0.818*** 0.780*** 
MB 0.351*** 0.121*** 0.070*** 0.388*** 0.324*** 0.050*** 0.459***  -0.185*** 0.326*** 0.320*** 
LEV 0.169*** -0.043*** -0.055*** -0.380*** 0.154*** 0.203*** -0.135*** -0.089***  -0.257*** -0.014 
INSTITUTE -0.653*** -0.164*** -0.080*** 0.296*** 0.613*** -0.124*** 0.794*** 0.321*** -0.099***  0.657*** 
ANALYST -0.468*** -0.083*** -0.027** 0.124*** 0.602*** -0.088*** 0.785*** 0.253*** 0.027*** 0.629***  
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6.5 Empirical Results 
6.5.1 Preliminary Analysis of Information Asymmetry by Earnings Quality Groups and 
Size Groups 
 The first set of analysis of the detailed empirical investigation of my primary hypothesis 
deals with the univariate and bivariate analysis of the relation between information asymmetry 
and earnings quality. Table 6.3 reports the result of elementary univariate analysis of information 
asymmetry by earnings quality groups, and bivariate analysis of information asymmetry by size 
groups and earnings quality groups within each size groups. At first, I form quintile portfolios of 
sample firms each year for two measures of earnings quality. Since the values of earnings quality 
measures are inversely related to the quality of earnings, firms placed in first group have best 
quality earnings and firms placed in fifth group have worst quality earnings. As I move from first 
group of earnings quality to last group of earnings quality, the quality of earnings deteriorates 
gradually, and consequently, I expect a steady increase in information asymmetry as proxied by 
relative bid-ask spread to be consistent with my primary hypothesis. Then I create five indicator 
variables, EQ1 through EQ5, based on the quintile ranking of each earnings quality groups. For 
example, the indicator variable EQ1 takes the value of one for all firms placed in first earnings 
quality groups and zero otherwise, while the indicator variable EQ5 takes the value of one for all 
firms placed in fifth earnings quality group and zero otherwise. For bivariate analysis, the sample 
firms are firstly grouped into quintile portfolios each year on the basis of firm size measured as 
the natural log of market capitalization, and secondly into earnings quality quintiles created 
within each size group each year on the basis of the magnitude of earnings quality measures. The 
first size quintile S1 includes smallest firms and fifth size quintile S5 comprises largest firms. 
Lehman and Modest (1994) examine the characteristic of spread across different size-decile 
groups in the TSE and find that largest firms have lowest spread. Consistent with this evidence, 
the correlation matrix presented in Table 6.2 shows that both Pearson and Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients between spread and size are highly negative and statistically significant. 
Moreover, large firms are supposed to have rich information environment, and information 
advantage of privately informed investors appears to be low in larger firms compared to smaller 
firms. The significantly high negative correlation between spread and size motivates me to 
conduct a bivariate analysis of the association between information asymmetry and earnings 
quality conditioned on firm size. Firm size also serves as a reasonable proxy for a firm’s 
129 
 
information environment. Theoretical studies predict that the adverse impact of poor earnings 
quality on information asymmetry may be more severe for small firms with seemingly poor 
information environment compared to large firms deemed to have rich information environment. 
Table 6.3 reports the results of univariate and bivariate analysis of the association between 
information asymmetry and earnings quality. Panel A and B reports the results of univariate 
analysis while Panel C and D reports the results of the bivariate analysis.  
 Panel A presents the coefficients from a regression of relative quoted bid-ask spread on 
DDSTD earnings quality indicator variables. The result shows a monotonic increase in the 
spread from 0.008 (0.8%) in highest earnings quality group EQ1 to 0.013 (1.3%) in lowest 
earnings quality group EQ5, which is consistent with primary hypothesis predicting a negative 
relation between information asymmetry and earnings quality. The result also shows that the 
difference in spread for firms in all the lower earnings quality groups as compared to the firms in 
EQ1 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Panel B presents similar analysis from a 
regression of relative quoted bid-ask spread on KZABS earning quality indicator variables. 
Consistent with my primary hypothesis, I find that the spread increases from 0.009 (0.9%) in 
highest earnings quality group EQ1 to 0.012 (1.2%) in lowest earnings quality group EQ5 though 
the increase is not monotonic. I also find that the spread is more pronounced for firms in lower 
EQ groups as compared to the spread for firms in EQ1 group. For example, the difference in 
spread for firms in EQ2 and EQ3 as compared to the firms in EQ1 is not statistically significant 
but the difference in spread for firms in EQ4 and EQ5 as compared to the firms in EQ1 is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Together, the results in Panel A and B suggest that 
the level of information asymmetry is inversely related to both measures of earnings quality. 
 Panel C presents the results of bivariate analysis where quintiles are formed for the 
sample firms on the basis of firm size and the magnitude of DDSTD earnings quality measure.41 
This panel provides the mean of relative bid-ask spread for each size group across different 
earnings quality quintiles formed within each size group. Specifically, Panel C shows how 
average spread varies across earnings quality groups after controlling for size. Consistent with 
my prediction, I observe that after controlling for size, the difference in mean spread between 
                                                 
41Alternatively all the sample firms are sorted each year independently on the basis of the magnitude of earnings 
quality measures and size measures. The firms are next placed in earnings quality quintiles (EQ1 through EQ5) and 
size quintiles (S1 through S5). Then I compute mean spread for all firms placed in each intersection of five earnings 
quality groups and five size quintiles (5X5=25 EQ-Size intersection) and redo similar analysis like Panel C. This 
two-way independent sort produces materially similar results.  
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best (EQ1) and worst (EQ5) earnings quality group is statistically significant at 1% level. 
However, the increase in mean spread is monotonic only for firms in smallest size group (S1). 
For firms in largest size group (S5), the mean spread is same for first three earnings quality 
groups representing best to moderate earnings quality. The difference in mean spread between 
best and worst earnings quality groups also decreases gradually as I move from S1 to S5. This 
pattern clearly suggests that the association between information asymmetry and earnings quality 
is more pronounced for small firms relative to large firms. On the other hand, I observe that 
average spread decreases gradually from S1 (smallest size group) to S5 (largest size group) for 
each earnings quality group, and the difference in mean spread between smallest size group and 
largest size group are statistically significant at 1 percent level. For example, the difference in 
mean spread between largest and smallest firms in both best earnings quality group (EQ1) and 
worst earnings quality group (EQ5) in absolute value are 0.016 (1.6%) and 0.024 (2.4%) 
respectively. Moreover, as I move from best earnings quality group to worst earnings quality 
group, the difference in mean spread in absolute value between largest and smallest firms 
increases monotonically. Panel D presents similar bivariate analysis for KZABS earnings quality 
measures and shows similar results. For example, the difference in mean spread between S1 
(smallest firms) and S5 (largest firms) for each earnings quality group is statistically significant 
at 1 percent level and the difference in spread between EQ1 (best earnings quality) and EQ5 
(worst earnings quality) after controlling for size is either significant at 1 percent level or 
marginally significant at 10 percent level (for largest size group).42 Collectively, the results in 
Panel C and D suggest that earnings quality has larger impact on the level of information 
asymmetry for a subsample of small firms in comparison with large firms. I explore the issue 
further in the next section of regression analysis. 
 In sum, the results reported in Table 6.3 suggest that information asymmetry as proxied 
by the relative bid-ask spread is increasing with deteriorating earnings quality and the effect of 
earnings quality on information asymmetry is more pronounced for small firms presumed to 
have poor information environment relative to larger firms supposed to have rich information 
environment. Overall, both univariate and bivariate analysis provide preliminary evidence 
consistent with my primary hypothesis. 
                                                 
42 The mean spread increases gradually from best earnings quality group to worst earnings quality group only for 
smallest firm group (S1). For the largest firm group (S5), the mean spread is same for first four earnings quality 
groups and only differs from worst earnings quality group (EQ5).  
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Table 6.3: Univariate and Bivariate Analysis of the Association between Information 
Asymmetry and Earnings Quality 
Panel A and B report the coefficients of regression of information asymmetry variable on earnings quality 
indicator variables formed on the basis of quintile ranking of two measures of earnings quality for the period 
2002-2012. Quintile portfolios are formed each fiscal year separately for the two measures of earnings quality 
(DDSTD and KZABS) and indicator variables, EQ1 through EQ5, are defined for each quintile group. The 
indicator variable EQ1 equals one for all firms in Quintile 1 and equals zero otherwise while EQ5 equals one 
for firms in Quintile 5 and equals zero otherwise. Panel C and D provide the mean difference of information 
asymmetry variable in Quintile 1 to Quintile 5 portfolios of two earnings quality measures across different size 
quintiles. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, 
and .10 level, respectively. 
Panel A: Regression coefficients of relative bid-ask spread on earnings quality indicator variables created 
based on the quintile ranking of Dechow-Dichev (2002) earnings quality measure (DDSTD) 
Variable 
Quintiles based on DDSTD 
(EQ1) (EQ2) (EQ3) (EQ4) (EQ5) 
 Best EQ    Worst EQ  
SPREAD 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.013 
Diff. from EQ1  0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
(t-statistic)  (3.45) (6.45) (8.15) (13.75) 
Panel B: Regression coefficients of relative bid-ask spread on earnings quality indicator variables created 
based on the quintile ranking of Kasznik version of modified Jones (1991) earnings quality measure (KZABS) 
Variable 
Quintiles based on KZABS 
(EQ1) (EQ2) (EQ3) (EQ4) (EQ5) 
 Best EQ    Worst EQ 
SPREAD 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.012 
Diff. from EQ1  0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.003*** 
(t-statistic)  (1.14) (1.46) (3.68) (7.83) 
Panel C: Mean of relative bid-ask spread for Quintile 1 to Quintile 5 portfolios of Dechow-Dichev (2002) 
earnings quality measure (DDSTD) across size quintiles. 
Panel D: Mean of relative bid-ask spread for Quintile 1 to Quintile 5 portfolios of Kasznik version of modified 
Jones (1991) earnings quality measure (KZABS) across size quintiles. 
 EQ Quintiles (EQ = KZABS) Mean diff. 
(EQ5) – (EQ1) 
(t-
statistic) Size Quintiles (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(S1) 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.005*** (5.31) 
(S2) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.004*** (6.88) 
(S3) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.003*** (5.24) 
(S4) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.001*** (4.64) 
(S5) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001* (1.46) 
Mean diff. 
(S5) – (S1) 
-0.018*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.022***   
(t-statistic) (-28.93) (-27.94) (-27.31) (-29.07) (-29.75)   
 EQ Quintiles (EQ = DDSTD) Mean diff. 
(EQ5) – (EQ1) 
(t-
statistic) Size Quintiles (EQ1) (EQ2) (EQ3) (EQ4) (EQ5) 
(S1) 0.019 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.028 0.009*** (9.67) 
(S2) 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.007*** (10.27) 
(S3) 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.004*** (10.40) 
(S4) 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.002*** (9.98) 
(S5) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.001*** (6.21) 
Mean diff. 
(S5) – (S1) 
-0.016*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.024***   
(t-statistic) (-28.22) (-27.53) (-29.85) (-29.89) (-28.84)   
132 
 
6.5.2 Regression Analysis of Information Asymmetry on Earnings Quality  
 In this section, I examine the relation between information asymmetry and earnings 
quality after controlling for firm characteristics known to be systematically associated with the 
bid-ask spread. Specifically, I control for the effects of share price, trading volume, stock return 
volatility, firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, institutional ownership, and analyst 
following. I begin multivariate regression analysis with the regression of relative bid-ask spread 
on several economic determinants of spread. Table 6.4 reports the results of the base version of 
the regression where the determinants of spread appear both individually and jointly. The 
predicted sign for each coefficient is indicated adjacent to the variable name. Column 1 to 6 
presents the coefficients on PRICE, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, SIZE, MB, and LEV 
individually.43In Column 7 the coefficients of all six variables are presented together. The 
coefficients on INSTITUTE and ANALYST are presented in Column 8 and 9 respectively. 
Finally, Column 10 presents the coefficients of all identified determinants of spread together. All 
variables are defined in Appendix C, and all variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% 
levels of their respective distribution. The sample period and the number of observation vary 
across Columns depending on particular variables used in the regression.44  
 In empirical accounting research for which panel data are frequently used, cross-sectional 
and time-series dependence are likely in many applications. In such settings, calculating well-
specified standard errors or test statistics that correct for cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence is essential for drawing valid inference because relying on methods that is robust to 
only one form of dependence may produce misspecified test statistic with spurious inference. 
Gow et al. (2010) suggest that two-way cluster-robust standard errors produce well-specified test 
statistics that are robust to both cross-sectional and time-series dependence in the variables of 
interest in a variety of accounting research settings. This finding is different from Petersen 
(2009) who concludes that clustering standard errors by both firm and time appear unnecessary 
in two finance applications he examined. The difference in findings of these two studies is likely 
to arise from the fact that accounting variables exhibit greater dependence both over time and in 
                                                 
43 I use unorthogonalized volume and volatility in the base version because earnings quality variable is not included 
here. The result is same even if I use orthogonalized volume and volatility measure. 
44  Institutional ownership data is available for the period 2004-2012 from Nikkei NEEDS CGES database. 
Accordingly, the sample period is 2004-2012 for all models where institutional ownership variable is included. 
When I include both institutional ownership and analyst following variable, the sample size drops to almost half of 
initial sample because of small number of firms for which analyst following data is available. 
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cross-section than finance variables (Gow et al., 2010). Therefore, I calculate t-statistics on the 
basis of two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard errors and present in parentheses. 
The results shown in Column 1 to 6 where PRICE, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, SIZE, MB, and 
LEV appear individually suggest that spread is significantly lower for firms with higher stock 
price, higher trading volume, larger size, lower return volatility, lower market-to-book ratio and 
lower leverage. All the coefficients are consistent with predicted sign and statistically significant 
at 1 percent level. Column 7 includes all these variables and shows that all the variables retain 
their predicted sign with SIZE losing its significance45 and MB is marginally significant at 10 
percent level. The adjusted R2 is very high at 70.39% implying that these variables explain a 
significant portion of the variability of SPREAD. From Column 8 and 9, I find that the 
coefficients on INSTITUTE and ANALYST are significantly negative. The negative coefficient 
on INSTITUTE is inconsistent with the popular notion that all institutions are sophisticated 
investors who frequently trade on the basis of private information.46 The negative coefficient on 
ANALYST is consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (2004) who find that analyst coverage 
is negatively related to information based trading.47 Finally in Column 10, I regress SPREAD on 
all eight determinants and find that all the variables are at least marginally significant with 
expected sign except ANALYST, which changes sign from negative to positive. One possible 
explanation for this may be very high correlation between SIZE and ANALYST. 48  In an 
untabulated analysis, I find that when size is excluded from the regression, there is a strong 
negative relation between SPREAD and ANALYST. The decrease in adjusted R2 in Column 10 
may be due to small sample size compared to Column 7. Overall, the results reported in Table 
6.4 suggest that all the determinants of SPREAD that has been identified based on a review of 
prior literature have significant relationship with SPREAD and explain a significant portion of 
cross-sectional variation in SPREAD. 
                                                 
45 The Pearson correlation coefficient (Spearman rank correlation coefficient) between VOLUME and SIZE is 0.717 
(0.722). Because of this high correlation, the effect of size may be subsumed by the effect of trading volume. 
46 Brown and Hillegeist (2007) and Bhattacharya et al. (2013) find significant negative relation between information 
asymmetry and institutional ownership. 
47 Bhattacharya et al. (2013) find significant negative coefficient on analyst following in all specifications while 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) report negative but insignificant coefficient on analyst following. Brown and Hillegeist 
(2007) cite (footnote 19, p-460) very high correlation between analyst following and size, and the resulting multi-
collinearity as the possible reason for the lack of significance for analysts. 
48 Correlation matrix in Table 6.2 suggests that SIZE, INSTITUTE and ANALYST are highly correlated with each 
other.  This is expected because prior studies document that institutional shareholders and analysts typically follow 
large firms. This multi-collinearity could be responsible for the change of the sign of coefficient on ANALYST.  
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Table 6.4: Regression of Quoted Bid-Ask Spread on Several Economic Determinants of Spread 
This table reports the results of the base version of the regression of relative bid-ask spread on several economic determinants of spread entered the 
regression both individually and jointly. The predicted sign for each coefficient is indicated adjacent to the variable name. Column 1 to 6 presents the 
coefficients on PRICE, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, SIZE, MB, and LEV individually and Column 7 presents the coefficients of all six variables together. 
The coefficients on INSTITUTE and ANALYST are presented in Column 8 and 9 respectively. Finally, Column 10 presents the coefficients of all 
identified determinants of information asymmetry together. All variables are defined in Appendix C. The sample period is 2002-2012 (for Column 1-7 
and 9) and 2004-2012 (for Column 8 and 10). The number of observation varies across Columns depending on particular variables used in the regression. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels of their respective distribution. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year 
and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PRICE (-) 
-0.221*** 
(-5.98) 
     
-0.284*** 
(-8.27) 
  
-0.211*** 
(-5.32) 
VOLUME (-)  
-0.204*** 
(-21.25) 
    
-0.248*** 
(-8.98) 
  
-0.193*** 
(-6.39) 
VOLATILITY (+)   
0.310*** 
(4.91) 
   
0.250*** 
(3.65) 
  
0.147* 
(1.79) 
SIZE (-)    
-0.385*** 
(-24.20) 
  
-0.023 
(-0.50) 
  
-0.082* 
(-1.89) 
MB (+)     
0.483*** 
(10.17) 
 
0.069* 
(1.70) 
  
0.098* 
(1.85) 
LEV (+/-)      
0.042*** 
(5.72) 
0.011*** 
(3.31) 
  
0.015*** 
(4.11) 
INSTITUTE (+/-)        
-0.033*** 
(-15.82) 
 
-0.003** 
(-2.36) 
ANALYST (+/-)         
-0.061*** 
(-14.00) 
0.024*** 
(8.16) 
Intercept  
-3.509*** 
(-13.59) 
-2.579*** 
(-15.95) 
-5.482*** 
(-53.17) 
-0.917*** 
(-5.01) 
-4.924*** 
(-67.30) 
-4.857*** 
(-56.45) 
-0.393 
(-1.43) 
-4.361*** 
(-52.15) 
-5.005*** 
(-55.50) 
-0.866*** 
(-2.90) 
N  10,517 10,517 10,517 10,517 10,502 10,490 10,490 8,701 6,132 5,702 
Adjusted R2  14.06% 34.53% 9.48% 60.73% 12.30% 2.85% 70.39% 42.65% 21.88% 49.68% 
135 
 
 Since institutional ownership data is available for the sample period 2004-2012 and 
analyst following data is available for few firms, the number of observations in Column 8 to 10 
is low compared to Column 1 to 7. The inclusion of all eight determinants reduces sample size 
drastically. For this reason, in the subsequent analyses, I present two sets of results of regression 
analysis; one set controls for the effect of PRICE, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, SIZE, MB and 
LEV while other set controls for all eight determinants. 
 Table 6.5 and 6.6 report the results of regression analysis that investigate how earnings 
quality is related to the level of information asymmetry. Specifically, I estimate the following 
regression model which includes the magnitude of earnings quality measures as a variable of 
interest and other determinants of spread as control variables. In the model specification, I lag 
explanatory variables by one year relative to SPREAD to avoid picking up a mere 
contemporaneous association between information asymmetry and earnings quality.49 
SPREADi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2PRICEi,t-1 + α3VOLUMEi,t-1 + α4VOLATILITYi,t-1 + α5SIZEi,t-1  
  + α6MBi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8INSTITUTEi,t-1 + α9ANALYSTi,t-1 + μi,t         Eq. (6.3) 
Here, SPREAD represents relative bid-ask spread, the proxy for information asymmetry. EQ is a 
measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model (DDSTD) and Kasznik version of modified Jones (1991) model (KZABS). All other 
control variables are defined in Appendix C. I calculate t-statistics on the basis of two-way (year 
and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and present in 
parentheses.  
 The intuition for applying lead-lag research design runs as follows. This approach 
ensures that for the vast majority of sample firms, investors can estimate earnings quality 
measures by using publicly available information prior to making investment decision. Japanese 
financial reporting system suggests that stock exchanges require firms to broadcast a summary of 
important financial statement items, such as earnings, dividends, and management forecast of 
next year’s earnings within 45 days after the end of the fiscal year. However, this summary 
report is unaudited and doesn’t contain detailed information required by the market participants 
to measure earnings quality at that point in time. After the announcement of this summary report, 
firms are required to publish audited annual financial statements within three months (90 days) 
                                                 
49 In an alternative research design I lag only variable of interest (earnings quality) by one year and measure other 
determinants of spread over the same measurement period of spread to maintain consistency between spread and its 
determinants, and find that all the results remain unchanged. 
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from the end of the fiscal year. Investors can access these statements on firm’s websites or on the 
Electronic Disclosure for Investors’ NETweork (EDINET) system and precisely estimate 
earnings quality using audited financial statement information for a fiscal year three months after 
the end of that fiscal year. Since firms having March fiscal year-end comprise more than 75% of 
listed firms in Japan, I assume that investors become aware of the quality of annual earnings at 
the end  of June for most firms. So, in light of the Japanese financial reporting system, my spread 
calculation begins at the start of July, three months after the fiscal year end. The following 
example will clarify my research design: the bid-ask spread of year 2001 which is calculated 
over twelve months period (from July 2000 to June 2001) is paired with earnings quality 
measure of year 2000 which is calculated using financial statement information of year 2000 
(accounting or financial statement period ends in March 2000)50 and is assumed to be known by 
the investors at the end of June 2000. 
 Column 1 to 4 of Table 6.5 report the results of the regression of spread on DDSTD 
earnings quality measure after controlling for determinants of spread. The predicted sign for each 
coefficient is indicated adjacent to the variable name. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that 
the coefficient on earnings quality is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
irrespective of the varying number of control variables in each specification. The finding 
suggests that earnings quality is significantly and inversely associated with information 
asymmetry. The number of observation varies across specifications because of different sample 
period. The adjusted R2 ranges between 49.66% and 70.48%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 This is a simple illustration of the research design. In reality, I need at least six prior years information to estimate 
DDSTD earnings quality measure in any year. 
137 
 
Table 6.5: Regression of Quoted Bid-Ask Spread on DDSTD and Several Control Variables Shown to be Associated with 
Spread  
This table reports estimation of Eq. (6.3) 
SPREADi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2PRICEi,t-1 + α3VOLUMEi,t-1 + α4VOLATILITYi,t-1 + α5SIZEi,t-1 + α6MBi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8INSTITUTEi,t-1 + 
 α9ANALYSTi,t-1 + μi,t              Eq. (6.3)  
where SPREAD represents relative bid-ask spread. EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. Column 1 to 4 of this table reports the results of the regression of relative spread on DDSTD earnings quality measure after controlling for the 
effects of several determinants of spread. Column 5 to 10 presents the results of the effect of information environment on the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry where I interact earnings quality measures with a dummy variable (HIED) representing firms with high 
information environment. HIED takes the value of one for firms above the median value of firm size, institutional ownership and analyst following, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. The predicted sign for each coefficient is indicated adjacent to the variable name. All variables are defined in Appendix 
C. The sample period and the number of observation vary across Columns depending on particular variables used in the regression. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels of their respective distribution. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) 
clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
    Firm Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Analyst Following 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EQ (+) 
9.705*** 
(8.80) 
8.984*** 
(9.77) 
8.861*** 
(5.50) 
6.257*** 
(5.26) 
13.040*** 
(10.13) 
12.125*** 
(9.18) 
11.976*** 
(10.25) 
10.956*** 
(6.85) 
11.212*** 
(7.12) 
9.059*** 
(6.67) 
EQ*HIED (-)   
 
 
-6.638*** 
(-5.51) 
-7.792*** 
(-4.63) 
-6.630*** 
(-5.35) 
-6.280*** 
(-3.80) 
-5.737*** 
(-3.93) 
-6.590*** 
(-4.50) 
PRICE (-) 
-0.291*** 
(-8.44) 
-0.273*** 
(-7.79) 
-0.282*** 
(-5.61) 
-0.215*** 
(-5.48) 
-0.291*** 
(-8.48) 
-0.215*** 
(-5.76) 
-0.267*** 
(-7.81) 
-0.219 
(-5.41) 
-0.282*** 
(-5.58) 
-0.215*** 
(-5.65) 
VOLUME (-) 
-0.251*** 
(-9.41) 
-0.226*** 
(-8.98) 
-0.267*** 
(-6.25) 
-0.197*** 
(-6.47) 
-0.250*** 
(-9.30) 
-0.190*** 
(-6.08) 
-0.223*** 
(-8.64) 
-0.194*** 
(-6.02) 
-0.264*** 
(-6.03) 
-0.194*** 
(-6.34) 
VOLATILITY (+) 
0.236*** 
(3.36) 
0.205*** 
(2.68) 
0.200** 
(2.16) 
0.141* 
(1.67) 
0.232*** 
(3.30) 
0.139* 
(1.66) 
0.197** 
(2.58) 
0.135 
(1.59) 
0.196** 
(2.14) 
0.136 
(1.65) 
SIZE (-) 
-0.014 
(-0.32) 
-0.038 
(-0.97) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.074* 
(-1.77) 
0.016 
(0.37) 
-0.046 
(-1.23) 
-0.034 
(-0.89) 
-0.068 
(-1.60) 
0.007 
(0.12) 
-0.072* 
(-1.72) 
MB (+) 
0.061 
(1.56) 
0.078* 
(1.79) 
0.078 
(1.51) 
0.093* 
(1.81) 
0.063* 
(1.67) 
0.095* 
(1.96) 
0.060 
(1.43) 
0.084* 
(1.69) 
0.079 
(1.55) 
0.096* 
(1.89) 
LEV (+/-) 
0.013*** 
(3.57) 
0.011*** 
(3.55) 
0.019*** 
(4.47) 
0.016*** 
(4.16) 
0.011*** 
(3.03) 
0.014*** 
(4.16) 
0.010*** 
(3.42) 
0.015*** 
(4.11) 
0.019*** 
(4.58) 
0.016*** 
(4.55) 
INSTITUTE (+/-)  
-0.002** 
(-2.14) 
 -0.003** 
(-2.17) 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.20) 
0.000 
(0.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.73) 
 
-0.002* 
(-1.95) 
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ANALYST (+/-)   
0.022*** 
(7.55) 
0.023*** 
(7.32) 
 
0.017*** 
(4.88) 
 
0.021*** 
(6.71) 
0.030*** 
(9.48) 
0.031*** 
(10.88) 
Intercept  
-2.847*** 
(-8.50) 
-2.710*** 
(-8.77) 
-3.186*** 
(-8.41) 
-2.843*** 
(-7.85) 
-3.151*** 
(-9.78) 
-3.146*** 
(-10.15) 
-2.826*** 
(-9.41) 
-2.920*** 
(-8.16) 
-3.282*** 
(-8.72) 
-2.934*** 
(-8.81) 
N  10,425 8,631 6,085 5,043 10,425 5,043 8,631 5,043 6,085 5,043 
Adjusted R2  70.48% 68.64% 54.49% 49.66% 71.27% 50.82% 69.41% 50.49% 55.22% 50.68% 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: EQ + EQ*HIED = 0 
H1: EQ + EQ*HIED ≠ 0 
  
 
 
24.61*** 
(0.000) 
9.30*** 
(0.003) 
21.45*** 
(0.000) 
12.22*** 
(0.001) 
7.14*** 
(0.008) 
3.39* 
(0.068) 
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Table 6.6: Regression of Quoted Bid-Ask Spread on KZABS and Several Control Variables Shown to be Associated with 
Spread 
This table reports estimation of Eq. (6.3)  
SPREADi,t = α0 + α1EQi,t-1 + α2PRICEi,t-1 + α3VOLUMEi,t-1 + α4VOLATILITYi,t-1 + α5SIZEi,t-1 + α6MBi,t-1 + α7LEVi,t-1 +α8INSTITUTEi,t-1 + 
 α9ANALYSTi,t-1 + μi,t              Eq. (6.3)  
where SPREAD represents relative bid-ask spread. EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from Kasznik version of modified Jones (1991) 
model. Column 1 to 4 of this table reports the results of the regression of relative spread on KZABS earnings quality measure after controlling for the 
effects of several determinants of spread. Column 5 to 10 presents the results of the effect of information environment on the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry where I interact earnings quality measure with a dummy variable (HIED) representing firms with high 
information environment. HIED takes the value of one for firms above the median value of firm size, institutional ownership and analyst following, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. The predicted sign for each coefficient is indicated adjacent to the variable name. All variables are defined in Appendix 
C. The sample period and the number of observation vary across Columns depending on particular variables used in the regression. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels of their respective distribution. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) 
clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
    Firm Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Analyst Following 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EQ (+) 
4.750*** 
(6.34) 
4.149*** 
(6.34) 
4.264*** 
(4.21) 
2.915*** 
(3.92) 
7.048*** 
(8.82) 
6.986*** 
(6.86) 
6.365*** 
(9.38) 
6.345*** 
(7.17) 
5.786*** 
(6.46) 
4.770*** 
(5.46) 
EQ*HIED (-)     
-4.269*** 
(-4.95) 
-5.141*** 
(-4.11) 
-4.119*** 
(-5.51) 
-4.301*** 
(-4.01) 
-3.367*** 
(-3.94) 
-3.967*** 
(-3.76) 
PRICE (-) 
-0.287*** 
(-8.22) 
-0.267*** 
(-7.23) 
-0.278*** 
(-5.45) 
-0.210*** 
(-5.21) 
-0.287*** 
(-8.23) 
-0.212*** 
(-5.11) 
-0.262*** 
(-7.18) 
-0.213*** 
(-5.05) 
-0.278*** 
(-5.40) 
-0.211*** 
(-5.14) 
VOLUME (-) 
-0.249*** 
(-9.00) 
-0.222*** 
(-7.99) 
-0.263*** 
(-6.12) 
-0.193*** 
(-6.12) 
-0.248*** 
(-8.87) 
-0.188*** 
(-5.58) 
-0.219*** 
(-7.68) 
-0.190*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.262*** 
(-5.92) 
-0.190*** 
(-5.81) 
VOLATILITY (+) 
0.241*** 
(3.47) 
0.210*** 
(2.75) 
0.201** 
(2.18) 
0.141* 
(1.66) 
0.238*** 
(3.42) 
0.139 
(1.65) 
0.205*** 
(2.67) 
0.136 
(1.59) 
0.200** 
(2.17) 
0.138 
(1.65) 
SIZE (-) 
-0.021 
(-0.44) 
-0.046 
(-1.08) 
-0.006 
(-0.11) 
-0.082* 
(-1.83) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
-0.057 
(-1.36) 
-0.043 
(-1.01) 
-0.075 
(-1.65) 
-0.003 
(-0.05) 
-0.080* 
(-1.79) 
MB (+) 
0.066 
(1.60) 
0.083* 
(1.88) 
0.082 
(1.55) 
0.096* 
(1.83) 
0.066 
(1.64) 
0.096* 
(1.91) 
0.068 
(1.61) 
0.086* 
(1.71) 
0.084 
(1.55) 
0.098* 
(1.85) 
LEV (+/-) 
0.012*** 
(3.56) 
0.010*** 
(3.58) 
0.019*** 
(4.50) 
0.015*** 
(4.27) 
0.011*** 
(3.17) 
0.013*** 
(4.19) 
0.010*** 
(3.42) 
0.015*** 
(4.22) 
0.019*** 
(4.54) 
0.015*** 
(4.55) 
INSTITUTE (+/-)  
-0.003** 
(-2.18) 
 
-0.003** 
(-2.30) 
 
-0.003** 
(-2.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.66) 
-0.001 
(-1.16) 
 
-0.003** 
(-2.13) 
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ANALYST (+/-)   
0.022*** 
(7.62) 
0.023*** 
(7.66) 
 
0.019*** 
(5.42) 
 
0.021*** 
(6.67) 
0.028*** 
(8.82) 
0.030*** 
(9.64) 
Intercept  
-2.707*** 
(-7.93) 
-2.567*** 
(-8.09) 
-3.043*** 
(-8.02) 
-2.738*** 
(-7.59) 
-2.948*** 
(-8.98) 
-2.995*** 
(-9.23) 
-2.666*** 
(-8.65) 
-2.824*** 
(-8.12) 
-3.111*** 
(-8.36) 
-2.801*** 
(-8.00) 
N  10,425 8,631 6,085 5,043 10,425 5,043 8,631 5,043 6,085 5,043 
Adjusted R2  70.52% 68.57% 54.39% 49.59% 71.12% 50.57% 69.11% 50.29% 54.94% 50.37% 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: EQ + EQ*HIED = 0 
H1: EQ + EQ*HIED ≠ 0 
    
8.00*** 
(0.005) 
3.91** 
(0.050) 
7.61*** 
(0.007) 
5.80** 
(0.017) 
3.74* 
(0.055) 
0.80 
(0.378) 
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 Previous studies suggest that the benefit of acquiring private information is greater for 
firms operating in poor information environment. Botosan (1997) does not find an association 
between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital for firms with rich information 
environments. 51  In contrast, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) find that poor earnings quality is 
associated with higher information asymmetry for firms operating in both richer and poorer 
information environment, but the effect of earnings quality on information asymmetry is less 
pronounced for firms with high information environment. Larger firms, firms with high 
institutional ownership and firms with high analyst following are associated with more 
information production and higher sophisticated user participation. Thus, these firm 
characteristics serve as reasonable proxies for the firm’s information environment. In order to 
test the prediction that the impact of earnings quality on information asymmetry may differ 
between firms with high information environment and firms with poor information environment, 
I interact earnings quality measures with a dummy variable (HIED) representing firms with high 
information environment. HIED takes the value of one for firms above the median value of firm 
size, institutional ownership and analyst following, respectively, and zero otherwise.52 Column 5 
to 10 of Table 6.5 presents the results of this additional analysis where the coefficient on 
earnings quality captures the magnitude of the association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry for a subsample of firms with poor information environment and the 
coefficient on interaction term implies the difference in the magnitude of the association between 
earnings quality and information asymmetry between firms with poor and high information 
environment. The sum of the coefficients on earnings quality and interaction term captures the 
magnitude of the effect of earnings quality on information asymmetry for a subsample of firms 
with high information environment. From Column 5 where I use firm size as a reasonable proxy 
for firm’s information environment, I find that the coefficient on EQ is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that poor earnings quality is related with higher 
information asymmetry for the subsample of small firms. I also find that the impact of earnings 
quality on information asymmetry differs between small and large firms. The coefficient on the 
interaction term between EQ and size is significantly negative, implying that the association 
                                                 
51 Botosan (1997) finds that there is no association between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital overall. 
However, greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital for firms that attract a low analyst 
following. 
52 When I use the information environment dummy to proxy for the main effect of information environment instead 
of the continuous variable, I find negative and significant coefficient on information environment dummy. 
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between earnings quality and information asymmetry is less pronounced for larger firms. The 
sum of the coefficients on earnings quality and interaction term, which reflects the earnings 
quality coefficient estimate for large firms, is positive and significant according to F-statistics 
presented at the bottom of Column 5. Consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (2013), this result 
suggests that poor earnings quality is related to higher information asymmetry for the subsample 
of large firms. The results from Column 7 and 9 where I use institutional ownership and analyst 
following respectively to proxy for the information environment generally confirm my earlier 
findings. In Columns 6, 8 and 10, I use all possible determinants of information asymmetry as 
control variables for three proxies of the information environment and find similar results. Table 
6.6 presents a similar analysis for KZABS earnings quality measure and report qualitatively 
similar results. The sign of the coefficients on earnings quality and interaction terms is consistent 
with my prediction developed earlier and the results reported in Table 6.5 for DDSTD earnings 
quality measure although the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller. The only exception is 
insignificant coefficient for a subsample of high analyst following firm when the effects of all 
possible determinants of spread are accounted for. Overall, the results suggest that the 
association between earnings quality and information asymmetry is affected by the firm’s 
information environment and that the impact of poor earnings quality is more pronounced for 
smaller firms and those with low institutional ownership and analyst following.  This finding 
contrasts with that of Ajward and Takehara (2011) who find a negative but insignificant relation 
(without controlling for alternative portfolio style) between absolute abnormal accruals 
(Kasznik) and the degree of information asymmetry but an unexpected positive and significant 
relation between accruals quality (Dechow-Dichev) and the degree of information asymmetry, 
where they use probability of information-based trading as a proxy for information asymmetry. 
The use of different proxies for information asymmetry, different sample period or different 
research design may cause the differences in results. 
 Although previous empirical studies assume a linear relation between information 
asymmetry and earnings quality, the theoretical studies do not spell out any specific functional 
form. For this reason, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) implement a non-linear specification 
considering the possibility that information asymmetry may be low for extremely poor quality 
earnings because even most informed investors may not produce a precise signal for extremely 
poor quality earnings which may thwart them from informed trading. The possibility of less 
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informed trading by informed traders may result in lower information asymmetry among 
investors, ceteris paribus. Conditional on this dominant effect, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) expect 
a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between information asymmetry and earnings 
quality. In order to test the validity of this argument, I implement the following non-linear 
specification consistent with Bhattacharya et al. (2013) which includes earnings quality quintile 
indicator variables in place of the magnitude of earnings quality measures: 
SPREADi,t = α0 + α1EQ2i,t-1 + α2EQ3i,t-1 + α3EQ4i,t-1 + α4EQ5i,t-1 + α5PRICEi,t-1 + α6VOLUMEi,t-1 
 + α7VOLATILITYi,t-1 + α8SIZEi,t-1 + α9MBi,t-1 + α10LEVi,t-1 +α11INSTITUTEi,t-1  
 + α12ANALYSTi,t-1 + μi,t      Eq. (6.4) 
Here, SPREAD represents relative bid-ask spread, the proxy for information asymmetry. EQ(.) 
represents earnings quality quintile indicator variables (i.e., EQ2 to EQ5) for both measures of 
earnings quality and all other variables are same as previously defined. I use two-dimensional 
(year and industry) cluster robust standard errors to calculate t-statistics (Gow et al., 2010; 
Petersen, 2009) which are presented in parentheses.  
 Table 6.7 presents the results of non-linear specification of the relation between 
information asymmetry and earnings quality quintile indicator variables after controlling for the 
effects of determinants of information asymmetry. Column 1 to 5 reports the results for DDSTD 
earnings quality measure and Column 6 to 10 reports the results for KZABS earnings quality 
measure. For the purpose of this analysis, I define five indicator variables, EQ1 through EQ5, 
based on the quintile ranking of each earnings quality groups for both measures. For example, 
the indicator variable EQ1 takes the value of one for all firms placed in Quintile 1 and zero 
otherwise, while the indicator variable EQ5 takes the value of one for all firms placed in Quintile 
5 and zero otherwise. In non-linear specification, the model intercept captures the spread 
estimated for the benchmark portfolio with the highest earnings quality (EQ1). From Column 1 
and 2, I observe that relative to EQ1, the coefficients on each of the quintile indicator variables 
(i.e., EQ2 to EQ5) are positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level.53 It is noteworthy 
that the coefficients display a monotonic increase in magnitude from EQ2 to EQ5. 54  This 
                                                 
53 In all specifications, the intercept representing the coefficient of the benchmark quintile is negative because of the 
use of log transformed value of spread. 
54 I conduct some additional tests, the results of which are stated at the bottom of Table 6.7. I reject the null 
hypothesis that all of the quintile coefficients are jointly equal to zero (i.e., joint test of EQ2=EQ3=EQ4=EQ5=0) at 
the 1 percent level. I also reject the null of a joint test that all the coefficients are equal (i.e., joint test of 
EQ2=EQ3=EQ4=EQ5) at the 1 percent level.  
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suggests that lower earnings quality is associated with higher information asymmetry, consistent 
with the inference drawn from the linear specification. Column 3, 4 and 5 show the results of the 
effect of firm’s information environment on the relation between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry. Same as before I continue to use firm size, institutional ownership, and 
analyst following as reasonable proxy for firm’s information environment. I define a dummy 
variable (HIED) representing firms with high information environment where HIED takes the 
value of one for firms above the median value of firm size, institutional ownership and analyst 
following, respectively, and zero otherwise. I interact this dummy variable with earnings quality 
quintile indicator variables to examine whether the association between earnings quality and 
information asymmetry differs between rich and poor information environment firms. From 
Column 3 to 5, I find that the coefficients of earnings quality quintile indicator variables are 
positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level. It is important to note that the coefficients 
increase gradually from EQ2 to EQ5 (relative to EQ1). Moreover, the negative and significant 
coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that for each of the EQ quintile, the association 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry is less severe for high information 
environment firms.55 I conduct similar analyses for KZABS earnings quality measures for which 
I create quintile indicator variables based on the magnitude of KZABS. The results reported in 
Column 6 to 10 for KZABS are materially similar to those for DDSTD except that the coefficient 
on EQ2 (Column 6 and 7) is not significant at conventional level although the increase in the 
magnitude of the coefficients relative to EQ1 is monotonic across earnings quality quintiles. 
Taken as a whole, the results of the non-linear specification are similar to the results of the linear 
specification suggesting that poor earnings quality is associated with higher information 
asymmetry and the adverse consequences of poor earnings quality on information asymmetry 
depend on the information environment of the firms. 
 
 
                                                 
55 Unreported result shows that the coefficients of earnings quality for high information environment firms are 
significantly positive (at least at 10 percent level) only for quintiles EQ4 and EQ5. 
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Table 6.7: Regression of Quoted Bid-Ask Spread on Earnings Quality Quintile Indicator Variables and Several Control Variables Shown to be 
Associated with Spread (Non-Linear Specification) 
This table reports estimation of Eq. (6.4)  
SPREADi,t = α0 + α1EQ2i,t-1 + α2EQ3i,t-1 + α3EQ4i,t-1 + α4EQ5i,t-1 + α5PRICEi,t-1 + α6VOLUMEi,t-1 + α7VOLATILITYi,t-1 + α8SIZEi,t-1 + α9MBi,t-1 + 
 α10LEVi,t-1 + α11INSTITUTEi,t-1 + α12ANALYSTi,t-1 + μi,t         Eq. (6.4) 
where SPREAD represents relative bid-ask spread. EQ(.) represents earnings quality quintile indicator variables (i.e., EQ2 to EQ5) for DDSTD and 
KZABS earnings quality measures. I define five indicator variables, EQ1 through EQ5, based on the quintile ranking of each earnings quality groups for 
both measures. For example, the indicator variable EQ1 takes the value of one for all firms placed in Quintile 1 and zero otherwise, while the indicator 
variable EQ5 takes the value of one for all firms placed in Quintile 5 and zero otherwise. Column 1 to 5 reports the results for DDSTD earnings quality 
measure and Column 6 to 10 reports the results for KZABS earnings quality measure. Column 1, 2, 6 and 7 of this table reports the regression 
coefficients of spread on earnings quality quintile indicator variables and control variables. Column 3-5 and 8-10 presents the results of the effect of 
information environment on the association between earnings quality and information asymmetry where I interact quintile indicator variables with a 
dummy variable (HIED) representing firms with high information environment. HIED takes the value of one for firms above the median value of firm 
size, institutional ownership and analyst following, respectively, and zero otherwise. The expected sign for each coefficient is indicated adjacent to the 
variable name. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. The sample period and the number of observation vary across Columns depending on 
particular variables used in the regression. All continuous variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels of their respective distribution. t-
statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered robust standard errors (Gow et al. 2010; Petersen 2009) and presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
EQ=DDSTD EQ=KZABS 
  Firm Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Analyst 
Following 
  Firm Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Analyst 
Following 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EQ2  
0.055*** 
(5.59) 
0.058*** 
(5.95) 
0.258*** 
(5.77) 
0.182*** 
(4.37) 
0.124*** 
(4.66) 
0.020 
(1.08) 
0.014 
(0.68) 
0.202*** 
(3.60) 
0.148*** 
(2.82) 
0.100*** 
(4.39) 
EQ2*HIED (-)   
-0.269*** 
(-5.47) 
-0.184*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.124*** 
(-2.74) 
  
-0.260*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.204*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.171*** 
(-5.63) 
EQ3  
0.113*** 
(5.39) 
0.090*** 
(3.50) 
0.330*** 
(5.94) 
0.270*** 
(6.22) 
0.165*** 
(6.33) 
0.064*** 
(3.62) 
0.061*** 
(2.97) 
0.240*** 
(6.57) 
0.196*** 
(5.03) 
0.154*** 
(5.10) 
EQ3*HIED (-)   
-0.298*** 
(-4.50) 
-0.235*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.140*** 
(-3.32) 
  
-0.257*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.214*** 
(-4.14) 
-0.189*** 
(-4.73) 
EQ4  
0.182*** 
(7.89) 
0.167*** 
(6.73) 
0.385*** 
(7.44) 
0.327*** 
(6.95) 
0.272*** 
(6.65) 
0.149*** 
(7.21) 
0.107*** 
(4.21) 
0.342*** 
(7.54) 
0.284*** 
(5.88) 
0.210*** 
(5.54) 
EQ4*HIED (-)   
-0.286*** 
(-4.81) 
-0.225*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.199*** 
(-3.41) 
  
-0.285*** 
(-5.34) 
-0.230*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.209*** 
(-5.60) 
EQ5  
0.398*** 
(8.03) 
0.307*** 
(6.36) 
0.588*** 
(7.10) 
0.569*** 
(7.15) 
0.428*** 
(7.93) 
0.307*** 
(7.66) 
0.224*** 
(5.11) 
0.498*** 
(8.06) 
0.429*** 
(7.82) 
0.327*** 
(4.87) 
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EQ5*HIED (-)   
-0.287*** 
(-3.49) 
-0.308*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.256*** 
(-3.57) 
  
-0.302*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.258*** 
(-3.96) 
-0.221*** 
(-2.70) 
PRICE (-) 
-0.276*** 
(-7.94) 
-0.214*** 
(-5.62) 
-0.273*** 
(-7.82) 
-0.253*** 
(-7.56) 
-0.212*** 
(-5.71) 
-0.280*** 
(-8.23) 
-0.211*** 
(-5.73) 
-0.277*** 
(-8.08) 
-0.251*** 
(-7.20) 
-0.207*** 
(-5.71) 
VOLUME (-) 
-0.237*** 
(-9.15) 
-0.197*** 
(-6.87) 
-0.233*** 
(-8.85) 
-0.211*** 
(-8.52) 
-0.194*** 
(-6.62) 
-0.243*** 
(-9.38) 
-0.193*** 
(-7.24) 
-0.239*** 
(-9.07) 
-0.211*** 
(-8.24) 
-0.188*** 
(-6.81) 
VOLATILITY (+) 
0.224*** 
(3.33) 
0.142* 
(1.69) 
0.219*** 
(3.24) 
0.190*** 
(2.61) 
0.138* 
(1.67) 
0.242*** 
(3.73) 
0.146* 
(1.81) 
0.235*** 
(3.61) 
0.204*** 
(2.89) 
0.143* 
(1.80) 
SIZE (-) 
-0.038 
(-0.90) 
-0.075** 
(-1.99) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
-0.050 
(-1.41) 
-0.073* 
(-1.90) 
-0.030 
(-0.72) 
-0.082** 
(-2.25) 
0.010 
(0.24) 
-0.052 
(-1.46) 
-0.082** 
(-2.21) 
MB (+) 
0.063* 
(1.74) 
0.086* 
(1.72) 
0.064* 
(1.80) 
0.057 
(1.41) 
0.089* 
(1.81) 
0.064 
(1.63) 
0.093* 
(1.79) 
0.065* 
(1.67) 
0.063 
(1.47) 
0.097* 
(1.83) 
LEV (+/-) 
0.012*** 
(3.33) 
0.016*** 
(3.98) 
0.010*** 
(2.64) 
0.010*** 
(3.08) 
0.016*** 
(4.36) 
0.012*** 
(3.41) 
0.015*** 
(4.12) 
0.009** 
(2.75) 
0.010*** 
(3.22) 
0.016*** 
(4.61) 
INSTITUTE (+/-)  
-0.003** 
(-2.27) 
 
0.001 
(1.03) 
-0.002* 
(-1.97) 
 
-0.003** 
(-2.40) 
 
0.000 
(0.61) 
-0.003** 
(-2.26) 
ANALYST (+/-)  
0.023*** 
(7.27) 
  
0.031*** 
(10.72) 
 
0.024*** 
(7.58) 
  
0.034*** 
(12.68) 
Intercept  
-2.625*** 
(-8.33) 
-2.821*** 
(-8.63) 
-3.108*** 
(-9.94) 
-2.731*** 
(-9.15) 
-2.925*** 
(-9.02) 
-2.634*** 
(-8.57) 
-2.731*** 
(-8.42) 
-3.084*** 
(-10.29) 
-2.670*** 
(-9.75) 
-2.831*** 
(-8.81) 
N  10,425 5,043 10,425 8,631 5,043 10,425 5,043 10,425 8,631 5,043 
Adjusted R2  70.05% 50.13% 71.24% 69.28% 51.03% 70.25% 49.87% 71.36% 69.31% 50.87% 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: EQ2=EQ3=EQ4=EQ5=0 
H1:EQ2=EQ3=EQ4=EQ5≠0 
35.89*** 
(0.000) 
13.82*** 
(0.000) 
25.00*** 
(0.000) 
16.21*** 
(0.000) 
17.09*** 
(0.000) 
33.14*** 
(0.000) 
10.37*** 
(0.000) 
27.96*** 
(0.000) 
47.53*** 
(0.000) 
11.68*** 
(0.000) 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: EQ2=EQ3=EQ4=EQ5 
H1: EQ2≠EQ3≠EQ4≠EQ5 
29.40*** 
(0.000) 
17.09*** 
(0.000) 
24.41*** 
(0.000) 
17.09*** 
(0.000) 
15.35*** 
(0.000) 
43.22*** 
(0.000) 
15.34*** 
(0.000) 
31.80*** 
(0.000 
60.41*** 
(0.000) 
8.13*** 
(0.000) 
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6.5.3 Regression Analysis of Information Asymmetry on Two Distinct Components of 
Earnings Quality 
 To decompose earnings quality into an innate component and a discretionary component, 
I follow the approach outlined in Francis et al. (2005).  According to this approach, I regress a 
measure of earnings quality on innate factors that prior researchers believe describe the firm’s 
business model and its operating environment. For example, Francis et al. (2005) implement this 
approach using DD model of earnings quality and innate factors. For this purpose, I use the five 
innate factors considered by Dechow and Dichev (2002) as explaining accrual quality such as 
firm size (ASSET), cash flow variability (VCFO), sales variability (VSALES), length of 
operating cycle (OPCYCLE), and incidence of negative earnings realizations (NEG). Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) posit and find that accrual quality is inversely associated with firm size, and 
positively associated with cash flow variability, sales variability, operating cycle and incidence 
of losses. Building on Dechow-Dichev (2002), Francis et al. (2004) use measures of intangible 
intensity (INTAN), intangible dummy (INTANDUM) and capital intensity (CAPITAL) as 
additional factors capturing business model. I also include these three factors. Finally, I estimate 
the following equation annually to estimate the components of earnings quality: 
EQi,t = γ0 + γ1ASSETi,t + γ2VCFOi,t + γ3VSALESi,t + γ4OPCYCLEi,t + γ5NEGi,t + γ6INTANi,t  
 + γ7INTANDUMi,t + γ8CAPITALi,t + μi,t       Eq. (6.5) 
where, the predicted values from equation (6.5) yield an estimate of the innate portion of firm i’s 
earnings quality in year t, and the residual from equation (6.5) is the estimate of the discretionary 
component of firm i’s earnings quality. This approach yields distinct estimates for each of the 
two components of earnings quality.56 
 Table 6.8 presents the results of the regression of spread on two components of both 
measures of earnings quality - innate component and discretionary component - entered into 
regression model both individually and jointly. The inclusion of innate and discretionary 
components in the regression model together enables me to assess the differential impact of each 
component. Column 1 to 5 reports results for DDSTD and Column 6 to 10 reports results for 
KZABS earnings quality measures. I examine both linear and non-linear specification of the 
                                                 
56 In unreported test, I use second approach of Francis et al. (2005) in which I include all the innate factors as right 
hand side variables with earnings quality and other control variables. The coefficients of earnings quality of this 
regression is interpreted as capturing the effect of discretionary earnings quality on information asymmetry.  
Comparing this coefficient with that of total earnings quality from Table 6.5 and 6.6 indicate that innate component 
has larger impact than discretionary component. 
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relation between information asymmetry and individual component of earnings quality for both 
measures. In linear specification, I use magnitude of innate and discretionary component of 
earnings quality measures while in non-linear specification, I keep on using quintile indicator 
variables for each component of earnings quality. In all of these specifications, I use PRICE, 
VOLUME, VOLATILITY, SIZE, MB and LEV as control variables.57  
 For DDSTD earnings quality measure, the innate component shows significantly positive 
coefficient in the linear specification reported in Column 1. In the non-linear specification 
reported in Column 2, the model intercept captures the spread estimated for the benchmark group 
with the highest innate component of earnings quality (InnateEQ1). The result shows that the 
coefficient on InnateEQ2 is negative but insignificant relative to InnateEQ1 suggesting an 
insignificant decrease in spread relative to benchmark group. After that, the coefficient increases 
gradually from InnateEQ3 to InnateEQ5 indicating a higher level of information asymmetry in 
firms characterized by turbulent and uncertain operating environments. The effect of innate 
component of earnings quality on the spread is more evident in quintiles with relatively low 
innate earnings quality compared to quintiles with relatively high innate earnings quality because 
the coefficients on InnateEQ4 and InnateEQ5 are significantly positive but the coefficient on 
InnateEQ3 is positive but not significant. Column 3 and 4 report the results of discretionary 
component of earnings quality for linear and non-linear specification respectively. Since earnings 
quality measures are estimated using industry-level regressions and defined in such a way that 
lower value denotes higher earnings quality, I expect that negative discretionary accruals will 
ameliorate earnings quality, and positive discretionary accruals will deteriorate earnings quality 
relative to other firms in the same industry. The result demonstrates that the coefficient on 
discretionary component of earnings quality is positive and statistically significant at the 1 
percent level in the linear specification. The result for the non-linear specification of 
discretionary component exhibits analogous pattern consistent with its innate component 
counterpart. Specifically, the negative coefficient on DiscEQ2 and positive coefficient on 
DiscEQ3 are insignificant relative to DiscEQ1, the benchmark portfolio with the highest 
                                                 
57 I do not control for the effect of institutional ownership (INSTOWN) and analyst following (ANALYST) in order 
to avoid the sample size being drastically small. In unreported result, I find that controlling for the effect of 
institutional ownership does not cause any material change in the reported results. However, taking into account the 
effect of analyst following changes the significance level of some coefficients but the basic tenor of the results 
remains unaffected.  One reason for this might be multicollinearity problem induced by very high correlation among 
analyst following, size and volume. As a test of this intuition, if I keep only analyst following and drop size and 
volume from the model, I find that the original results hold. 
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discretionary component of earnings quality, while the coefficients on DiscEQ4 and DiscEQ5 
are positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This evidence suggests that spread doesn’t 
fluctuate significantly among comparatively high discretionary earnings quality quintiles, which 
essentially contain negative discretionary accruals quality and spread is significantly higher in 
relatively low discretionary earnings quality quintiles consisting of positive discretionary 
accruals quality. Thus, it appears that investors do not react uniformly to negative and positive 
discretionary accruals quality.58 The result of non-linear specification indicates that the evidence 
from linear specification should be interpreted with caution for both components of earnings 
quality because non-linear specification implies that the empirical relation between information 
asymmetry and two distinct components of earnings quality may not be linear. In Column 5, I 
include innate and discretionary components together and find that both are significantly 
positively associated with the spread. However, the F-statistic reported in the bottom of Column 
5 suggests that the effect of innate and discretionary component on information asymmetry is not 
significantly different.  
 The results for KZABS earnings quality measures (presented in Column 6 to 10) imitate 
my earlier results for DDSTD earnings quality measures. In the linear specifications (Column 6 
and 8 respectively), the coefficient on innate and discretionary earnings quality is significantly 
positive. In the non-linear specification (Column 7 and 9 respectively), I find that the effect of 
innate and discretionary earnings quality is more pronounced in quintiles representing firms with 
poor earnings quality. When I include innate and discretionary components together in the 
regression model (Column 10), I find that both are positive and significant, but innate component 
has marginally larger impact on information asymmetry than discretionary component since F-
test of no difference in the coefficients of innate and discretionary component rejects the null at 
10 percent level.  
                                                 
58 As an additional test to validate this pattern of relationship between the two constructs, I examine separately the 
impact of positive and negative discretionary accruals quality on information asymmetry. In untabulated result, I 
find that the coefficient on negative discretionary accruals quality is positive but insignificant suggesting no 
significant impact on information asymmetry. On the other hand, the coefficient on positive discretionary accruals 
quality is significantly positive suggestive of higher level of information asymmetry. This finding contrasts with 
Bhattacharya et al. (2013) who find that both extreme positive discretionary accruals quality and extreme negative 
discretionary accruals quality are associated with higher information asymmetry resulting into a U-shaped 
association between discretionary accruals quality and information asymmetry. They interpret this evidence as 
indicative of managers discretionary reporting choices that cause large deviation in the mapping of accruals into 
cash flows can baffle investors and increase information asymmetry. 
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Table 6.8: Regression of Quoted Bid-Ask Spread on Earnings Quality Components and Several Control Variables Shown to be Associated with 
Spread 
This table presents the results of the regression of relative spread on two components of both measures of earnings quality - innate component and 
discretionary component - entered the regression model both individually and jointly. InnateEQ is the fitted value from Eq. (6.5) and DiscEQ is the 
residual from Eq. (6.5):  
EQi,t = γ0 + γ1ASSETi,t + γ2VCFOi,t + γ3VSALESi,t + γ4OPCYCLEi,t + γ5NEGi,t + γ6INTANi,t + γ7INTANDUMi,t + γ8CAPITALi,t + μi,t         Eq. (6.5) 
where EQ is a measure of inverse earnings quality calculated from the modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and Kasznik version of modified 
Jones (1991) model. InnateEQ and DiscEQ are inverse measures of innate and discretionary earnings quality respectively. Column 1 to 5 report results 
for DDSTD and Column 6 to 10 report results for KZABS earnings quality measures. I examine both linear (Column 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10) and non-linear 
(Column 2, 4, 7, 9) specification of the relation between information asymmetry and individual component of earnings quality for both measures. In 
linear specification, I use magnitude of innate and discretionary component of earnings quality measures while in non-linear specification, I use quintile 
indicator variables for each component of earnings quality. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. The expected sign for each coefficient is 
indicated adjacent to the variable name. The sample period is 2002-2012 and consists of 10,425 observations for all models. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels of their respective distribution. t-statistics are calculated based on two-way (year and industry) clustered 
robust standard errors (Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, 
and .10 level, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
EQ=DDSTD EQ=KZABS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
InnateEQ (+) 
12.327*** 
(4.56) 
   
12.374*** 
(4.64) 
10.050*** 
(3.27) 
 
 
 
9.153*** 
(3.02) 
DiscEQ (+)   
8.723*** 
(5.94) 
 
8.747*** 
(6.21) 
 
 
4.417*** 
(6.70) 
 
4.192*** 
(6.97) 
InnateEQ2   
-0.007 
(-0.20) 
   
 -0.018 
(-0.55) 
 
 
 
InnateEQ3   
0.072 
(1.50) 
   
 0.049 
(1.11) 
 
 
 
InnateEQ4   
0.133*** 
(3.01) 
   
 0.115*** 
(2.94) 
 
 
 
InnateEQ5   
0.315*** 
(5.17) 
   
 0.265*** 
(4.79) 
 
 
 
DiscEQ2     
-0.026 
(-1.14) 
 
 
 
 -0.006 
(-0.53) 
 
DiscEQ3     
0.022 
(0.70) 
 
 
 
 0.022 
(1.58) 
 
DiscEQ4     
0.082*** 
(2.61) 
 
 
 
 0.089*** 
(6.34) 
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DiscEQ5     
0.249*** 
(5.23) 
 
 
 
 0.231*** 
(6.31) 
 
PRICE (-) 
-0.259*** 
(-7.84) 
-0.254*** 
(-7.67) 
-0.259*** 
(-7.58) 
-0.253*** 
(-7.52) 
-0.294*** 
(-8.49) 
-0.263*** 
(-7.68) 
-0.265*** 
(4.79) 
-0.274*** 
(-8.00) 
-0.268*** 
(-7.97) 
-0.292*** 
(-8.16) 
VOLUME (-) 
-0.217*** 
(-8.74) 
-0.217*** 
(-8.84) 
-0.224*** 
(-8.71) 
-0.217*** 
(-8.69) 
-0.252*** 
(-9.41) 
-0.222*** 
(-8.79) 
-0.228*** 
(-9.49) 
-0.240*** 
(-9.07) 
-0.234*** 
(-9.12) 
-0.249*** 
(-9.02) 
VOLATILITY (+) 
0.187*** 
(2.94) 
0.190*** 
(3.06) 
0.234*** 
(3.24) 
0.220*** 
(3.19) 
0.230*** 
(3.20) 
0.188*** 
(3.06) 
0.206*** 
(3.41) 
0.249*** 
(3.64) 
0.240*** 
(3.62) 
0.225*** 
(3.32) 
SIZE (-) 
-0.055 
(-1.30) 
-0.058 
(-1.41) 
-0.076* 
(-1.86) 
-0.084** 
(-2.14) 
-0.006 
(-0.13) 
-0.046 
(-0.98) 
-0.037 
(-0.95) 
-0.044 
(-1.01) 
-0.052 
(-1.25) 
-0.010 
(-0.19) 
MB (+) 
0.070** 
(2.01) 
0.063* 
(1.94) 
0.077** 
(2.05) 
0.079** 
(2.18) 
0.059 
(1.54) 
0.060 
(1.56) 
0.051 
(1.46) 
0.072* 
(1.78) 
0.071* 
(1.80) 
0.061 
(1.45) 
LEV (+/-) 
0.012*** 
(2.97) 
0.011*** 
(2.79) 
0.010*** 
(2.73) 
0.010*** 
(2.76) 
0.013*** 
(3.46) 
0.013*** 
(3.41) 
0.013*** 
(3.34) 
0.010*** 
(3.00) 
0.010 
(2.89) 
0.014*** 
(3.67) 
Intercept  
-2.727*** 
(-7.80) 
-2.535*** 
(-7.88) 
-2.226*** 
(-7.41) 
-2.248*** 
(-7.63) 
-2.969*** 
(-8.31) 
-2.766*** 
(-6.98) 
-2.637*** 
(-8.99) 
-2.440*** 
(-7.87) 
-2.467*** 
(-7.99) 
-2.906*** 
(-7.03) 
N  10,425 10,425 10,425 10,425 10,425 10,425 10,425 10,425 10,425 10,425 
Adjusted R2  69.04% 69.27% 69.44% 69.23% 70.49% 69.51% 69.77% 70.03% 69.77% 70.66% 
F-stat (p value) 
H0: InnateEQ = DiscEQ 
H1: InnateEQ ≠ DiscEQ 
    
1.23 
(0.269) 
    
2.99* 
(0.086) 
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 The empirical evidence presented so far implies that poor earnings quality is significantly 
associated with higher level of information asymmetry as manifested in bid-ask spread after 
controlling for the determinants of spread. The adverse impact of poor earnings quality is 
affected by the firm’s information environment and is more pronounced for firms operating in 
poor disclosure environment. Since earnings quality is affected not only by managers’ 
discretionary reporting choices but also by firms’ economic environment and business model, I 
partition the earnings quality measures into an innate component and a discretionary component 
in order to assess the impact of each component on information asymmetry. The result shows 
that both innate and discretionary components of earnings quality have a significant impact on 
information asymmetry. The impact of innate earnings quality on information asymmetry is 
marginally higher than discretionary component for KZABS earnings quality measure. 
 
6.5.4 Robustness Tests 
 In this section, I examine and report whether my initial results are robust to new 
estimation period for spread, other proxies of information asymmetry, different variable 
specification for earnings quality measures and alternative estimation procedure.  
 
6.5.4.1 Non-announcement Period Spread 
 Many prior studies have investigated the behavior of information asymmetry surrounding 
an information event, mainly quarterly or annual earnings announcement. For example, Otogawa 
(2003) investigates the changes in information asymmetry around quarterly earnings 
announcement for a sample of firms listed on TSE. Some studies have shifted the focus from 
changes in information asymmetry around earnings announcement to non-announcement period 
information asymmetry measured by bid-ask spread (Welker, 1995) or price impact of trade 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2013). Instead, I examine and report how the quality of reported earnings 
affects the average level of information asymmetry throughout a year including both 
announcement and non-announcement period as the main results of the study. I measure average 
level of information asymmetry over a year by taking the average of daily relative bid-ask spread 
in a year. Since there is evidence of temporal variation in spread during different time periods of 
a year, taking average of daily spread neutralizes this temporal oscillation in spread. Therefore, I 
check the robustness of the main result by examining the relationship between earnings quality 
and information asymmetry in the non-announcement period. 
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 According to the requirement of the stock exchanges, Japanese firms have to announce a 
summary of important items like annual earnings and dividends within 45 days and publish 
annual reports containing audited financial statements within 90 days from the end of a fiscal 
year. It is found that almost 80% of the Japanese firms announce their annual earnings within 45 
days, and all firms announce annual earnings and publish financial statements within 90 days. 
Japanese quarterly reporting system requires all listed firms disclose quarterly earnings reports 
along with other important items soon after the end of a quarter. Prior research finds that 
approximately 80% of the listed firms announce their quarterly earnings from 30 days to 45 days 
from the end of a quarter. Accordingly, I define non-announcement period as 30 days period 
starting from 91 days from the end of fiscal year and ending on 15 days prior to the end of 
quarterly earnings announcement period and estimate information asymmetry for the non-
announcement period as the average of daily relative bid-ask spread for this 30 days period. It 
can be observed from Figure 6.1 that the non-announcement period corresponds to the most 
immediate period after the publication of annual financial statement when investors can measure 
earnings quality precisely. So any effect of earnings quality on information asymmetry is likely 
to be more evident in this period.  
Figure 6.1: Non-announcement period for a typical Japanese firm having March fiscal year end. 
Fiscal year end 
Announcement 
of summary 
items like 
earnings and 
dividends 
Publication of 
annual financial 
statements / End 
of first quarter 
Non-earnings 
announcement 
period 
Quarterly 
earnings 
announcement 
period 
March 31 May 15 June 30 July 1 - July 30 August 1 to 15 
Fiscal year end 
(0 days) 
45 days from the 
end of fiscal year 
90 days from the 
end of fiscal year 
First quarter end 
(0 days) 
30 days period 30 - 45 days 
from the end of 
first quarter 
  
 Panel A of Table 6.9 presents the result of this robustness check for both measures of 
earnings quality. Column 1 to 5 reports results for DDSTD and Column 6 to 10 reports results 
for KZABS earnings quality measure. The results (reported in Column 1, 2, 6 and 7) show that 
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the coefficient on earnings quality is positive and significant suggesting that lower quality 
earnings increases information asymmetry in the market. I also test whether the impact of poor 
earnings quality differs between firms with rich information environment and firms with poor 
information environment. I use firm size, institutional ownership, and analyst following to proxy 
for firm’s information environment and define high information environment dummy as before. 
The results (shown in Column 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10) show that the coefficient of the interaction 
term between earnings quality and high information environment dummy is negative and 
significant (except coefficient in Column 3) implying that poor earnings quality has more 
pronounced effect on low information environment firms than high information environment 
firms. 
 
6.5.4.2 Amihud (2002) Illiquidity Measure 
 Prior research has used different measures of market illiquidity as empirical proxies for 
unobservable information asymmetry such as quoted or effective bid-ask spread, transaction 
price impact of trade or the probability of information-based trading. One difficulty is that these 
measures require detailed and finer market-microstructure data that are not readily available in 
many stock markets. To overcome the paucity of data, Amihud (2002) developed a new measure 
of illiquidity that require only periodic stock return and volume data that can be easily obtained 
for many stocks and for a longer time-period. In order to confirm the robustness of my result to 
the alternative measures of information asymmetry, I use Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, 
which is defined as the ratio of a stock absolute daily return to its daily yen volume, averaged 
over a year.   
 The intuition behind Amihud’s illiquidity measure is as follows. Liquidity is generally 
defined as the ability to trade large volume of securities quickly, at a low cost of transaction, and 
without much price fluctuations. If this characterization of liquidity holds, a stock is deemed to 
be liquid if its price changes are largely unaffected by the number of shares traded. Amihud’s 
illiquidity measure, computed as the ratio of daily absolute returns to daily yen trading volume, 
attempts to capture an aspect of illiquidity associated with temporary price movement induced by 
trade volume. This measure is also interpreted as a rough measure of the price impact of trade. 
According to this measure, a stock is considered illiquid if its price moves a lot in response to a 
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little change in volume. Thus, higher value of this measure indicates greater price movement 
driven by trading volume and more illiquid stocks. 
 Following Amihud (2002), I compute the daily price impact of trade as 
|Return|/(Price×Volume), where Return is the daily stock return, Price is the daily closing price 
of the stock and Volume is the daily trading volume. For ease of exposition, I multiply the 
derived value by 100000 and take its log-transformed value. I also control for the effect of the 
same set of factors as used for the spread. The results of the relation between Amihud (2002) 
measure of illiquidity and two earnings quality proxies are presented in Panel B of Table 6.9. I 
find that the result (Column 1, 2, 6 and 7) is consistent with the idea that poor earnings quality is 
significantly associated with higher level of illiquidity as reflected in positive coefficients. I also 
find that firm’s information environment significantly affects the relationship between earnings 
quality and market illiquidity as demonstrated in the negative coefficients on the interaction term 
(Column 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10). 
 
6.5.4.3 Quoted Depth 
 Quoted depth, another important component of market liquidity, is highly related to 
quoted bid-ask spread. Lee et al. (1993) contend that market makers protect themselves from the 
risk of trading with informed investors not only by widening the quoted bid-ask spread but also 
by narrowing the quoted depths associated with quoted prices. If poor earnings quality increases 
the possibility that some traders will acquire and trade on private information, the argument put 
forward by Lee et al. (1993) suggests that firms with poorer earnings quality will have higher 
spread and lower depth causing spread and depth move in opposite direction. This type of model 
expects quoted depths to be the “mirror image” of spreads. In contrast to this simple intuitive 
notion, drawing upon the argument in Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) that better disclosures can 
reduce the reward to market making, motivating some liquidity providers to withdraw their 
services, and empirical evidence that quoted depth declines as market making reward falls, 
Heflin et al. (2005) uncover a negative relation between analysts’ ratings of firms’ disclosures 
and quoted depth. Therefore, I also focus on the quoted depth to test the robustness of my main 
result since one cannot draw unambiguous inference about the relation between earnings quality 
and information asymmetry relying solely on bid-ask spread. I define quoted depth as the sum of 
daily quoted depth at closing bid and ask price divided by the number of shares outstanding each 
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day, averaged over a year. To be consistent with spread measure calculation, I require at least 
150 days quoted depth data, and I transform this measure into logarithmic form. 
 Figure 6.2 shows the average relative spread (multiplied by 10), quoted depth and 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity for the sample firms over the period 2002-2012. It can be observed 
from the figure that average spread and depth move in opposite direction. Specifically average 
spread tends to decline in the initial periods of my sample while average depth shows a rising 
trend. When average spread starts to rise in 2008-2009 period and slips down afterward, average 
depth falls in 2008 and climbs up gradually thereafter. This pattern of behavior of average spread 
and average depth is a clear indication of market participants simultaneously manipulating both 
quoted spread and quoted depth in order to get rid of the risk of asymmetric information. Like 
average spread, average Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure demonstrates analogous pattern of 
movement over time. Therefore, I expect a positive relation between depth and earnings quality. 
Since prior research doesn’t prescribe specific factors that might affect depth, and as it is unclear 
how depth varies across firm or over time due to the dearth of studies on depth, I continue to use 
the same set of control variables for depth measure like bid-ask spread. 
 
 
  
 The results of the association between depth measure and two proxies of earnings quality 
are reported in Panel C of Table 6.9. The result (Column 1, 2, 6 and 7) shows that the coefficient 
on earnings quality is negative and significant, implying that quoted depth falls as earnings 
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quality deteriorates, consistent with the arguments in Lee et al. (1993). When I include an 
interaction term between earnings quality and high information environment dummy (Column 3, 
4, 5, 8, 9 and 10) aiming at exploring the impact of a firm’s information environment on the 
expected relationship between depth and earnings quality, I find that the coefficient on the 
interaction term is significantly negative. This finding suggests that the magnitude of the relation 
between depth and earnings quality differs significantly between high and low information 
environment firms. However, the coefficient on earnings quality is negative but not significant 
for all proxies of information environment (the coefficient is significant only when analyst 
following is used as a proxy for firm’s information environment). This result should be 
interpreted with caution because if I use unorthogonalized volume in place of orthogonalized 
volume as a control variable, the coefficient on earnings quality turns out to be positive 
complicating the relationship between quoted depth and earnings quality. Hence, I recognize that 
the use of depth as a proxy for information asymmetry may produce ambiguous inference, 
thereby, requiring further research to resolve this discrepancy. 
 
6.5.4.4 Alternative Variable Specification for Earnings Quality Measure 
 In the main analysis part of my study, I use raw values of earnings quality such as 
standard deviation of residuals for DDSTD and absolute value of residuals for KZABS measure. 
With respect to the variable specification, I repeat my test replacing the raw values of earnings 
quality measures with the quintile rank values of earnings quality measures. The lowest rank 
denotes highest quality earnings and vice-versa. The use of quintile ranks is suggested to control 
for outliers and non-linearities. The results of the quintile rank values regressions (reported in 
Panel D of Table 6.9) suggest that this respective set of analyses produce results substantively 
the same as those reported earlier. Specifically, firms with poor earnings quality experience 
higher information asymmetry and this relationship is less manifested in high information 
environment firms.  
 
6.5.4.5 Fama-MacBeth (1973) Estimation Procedure 
 In the main analysis, I estimate the coefficients of the regression using OLS but adjust the 
standard errors for possible correlation within a cluster. I report two-dimensional (industry and 
year) clustered-robust standard errors for drawing inferences as recommended by  
Gow et al. (2010). The selection of a correct estimation method hinges on the form of 
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dependence in the residuals which cannot be known precisely very often. Therefore, estimating 
the coefficients and standard errors using multiple methods can be an effective robustness check 
of my original results. In a survey of recently published finance paper, Petersen (2009) finds that 
a large number of papers (34 percent of the papers that reported adjusting the standard errors for 
possible dependence in the residuals) estimated both the coefficients and the standard errors 
using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure, a method commonly used by the researchers. 
Moreover, he concludes that clustering standard errors on multiple dimensions appears 
unnecessary in empirical finance applications he examined. So, I reestimate the coefficients and 
the standard errors according to Fama-MacBeth procedure to check the sensitivity of the results 
to alternative estimation methodology. In this approach, I run annual cross-sectional regression 
and report the mean of yearly coefficients. The t-statistics are calculated based on the time-series 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients. This alternative methodology yields substantially 
similar results (reported in Panel E of Table 6.9) supporting my primary hypothesis that earnings 
quality is inversely related to the level of information asymmetry. The results also show the 
impact of earnings quality on information asymmetry is less pronounced for firms operating in 
high information environment. I also estimate standard errors clustered only by firm or by year 
or both by firm and year and come to similar conclusions (results not reported).   
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Table 6.9: Robustness Tests 
This table presents the results for non-announcement period spread in Panel A, for Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure in Panel B, for quoted depth 
measure in Panel C, for quintile rank values of earnings quality in Panel D, and for Fama-MacBeth regression in Panel E. Column 1 to 5 reports the 
results for DDSTD earnings quality measure and Column 6 to 10 reports the results for KZABS earnings quality measure. Column 1, 2, 6 and 7 of this 
table reports the coefficients from the regression of different proxies of information asymmetry on earnings quality variables and several control variables. 
Column 3-5 and 8-10 presents the results of the effect of information environment on the association between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry where I interact earnings quality variables with a dummy variable (HIED) representing firms with high information environment. HIED takes 
the value of one for firms above the median value of firm size, institutional ownership and analyst following, respectively, and zero otherwise. The 
expected sign for each coefficient is indicated adjacent to the variable name. The sample period and the number of observation vary across Columns 
depending on particular variables used in the regression. All continuous variables are winsorized at the bottom and top 1% levels of their respective 
distribution. The values in the parentheses indicate t-statistics calculated using appropriate method. For Panel A to D, I use two-way (year and industry) 
clustered robust standard errors while for Panel E, I use time-series standard errors of annual coefficients in order to calculate t-statistics. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. I include the same set of control variables as before but do not report the 
coefficients due to the limitation of space. 
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
EQ=DDSTD EQ=KZABS 
  Firm Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Analyst 
Following 
  Firm Size 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Analyst 
Following 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Non-announcement Period Spread 
EQ (+) 
14.245*** 
(7.91) 
15.733*** 
(2.70) 
15.786*** 
(8.01) 
18.061*** 
(5.63) 
17.920*** 
(3.83) 
6.120*** 
(5.82) 
6.654*** 
(2.76) 
7.902*** 
(5.99) 
8.537*** 
(5.63) 
8.395*** 
(4.42) 
EQ*HIED (-)   
-3.076 
(-0.87) 
-6.209*** 
(-5.06) 
-5.112* 
(-1.89) 
  
-3.299*** 
(-2.72) 
-4.121*** 
(-4.42) 
-3.708*** 
(-2.74) 
Control 
Variables 
 Included  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  10,347 5,008 10,347 8,578 5,008 10,347 5,008 10,347 8,578 5,008 
Adjusted R2  36.30% 21.68% 36.73% 34.14% 21.84% 36.18% 21.45% 36.34% 33.88% 21.64% 
Panel B: Amihud (2002) Illiquidity 
EQ (+) 
11.654*** 
(4.75) 
10.211*** 
(3.45) 
14.268*** 
(5.77) 
13.655*** 
(6.32) 
12.510*** 
(4.29) 
6.633*** 
(6.31) 
6.023*** 
(4.04) 
7.990*** 
(8.54) 
7.625*** 
(7.57) 
7.228*** 
(5.93) 
EQ*HIED (-)   
-6.866*** 
(-6.30) 
-3.500*** 
(-2.79) 
-6.539** 
(-2.50) 
  
-3.463*** 
(-3.98) 
-1.869*** 
(-2.66) 
-3.188** 
(-2.47) 
Control 
Variables 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  15,062 5,923 15,062 12,422 5,923 15,062 5,923 15,062 12,422 5,923 
Adjusted R2  92.52% 91.88% 92.59% 92.95% 91.94% 92.54% 91.84% 92.58% 92.95% 91.87% 
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Panel C: Quoted Depth 
EQ (-) 
-2.737** 
(-2.07) 
-7.387*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.692 
(-0.46) 
-1.083 
(-0.71) 
-5.848** 
(-2.24) 
-2.000*** 
(-3.41) 
-4.263*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.233 
(-0.28) 
-0.584 
(-0.84) 
-2.946*** 
(-3.23) 
EQ*HIED (+)   
-4.071*** 
(-3.01) 
-5.515*** 
(-5.33) 
-3.620** 
(-2.09) 
  
-3.281*** 
(-3.75) 
-3.544*** 
(-4.86) 
-2.817*** 
(-2.64) 
Control 
Variables 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  10,425 5,043 10,425 8,631 5,043 10,425 5,043 10,425 8,631 5,043 
Adjusted R2  51.13% 39.70% 51.42% 51.09% 39.89% 51.01% 39.75% 51.44% 50.94% 40.01% 
Panel D: Quintile Rank of Earnings Quality 
EQ (+) 
0.088*** 
(8.70) 
0.067*** 
(6.93) 
0.138*** 
(8.19) 
0.127*** 
(8.20) 
0.096*** 
(8.14) 
0.071*** 
(8.00) 
0.051*** 
(5.04) 
0.122*** 
(8.86) 
0.105*** 
(8.34) 
0.078*** 
(5.56) 
EQ*HIED (-)   
-0.082*** 
(-5.09) 
-0.074*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.060*** 
(-4.57) 
  
-0.081*** 
(-5.63) 
-0.068*** 
(-4.97) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.40) 
Control 
Variables 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  10,425 5,043 10,425 8,631 5,043 10,425 5,043 10,425 8,631 5,043 
Adjusted R2  69.77% 49.96% 71.11% 69.22% 51.08% 70.04% 49.71 71.32% 69.27% 50.76% 
Panel E: Alternative Estimation Procedure (Fama-MacBeth Regression) 
EQ (+) 
11.649*** 
(13.26) 
10.729*** 
(8.32) 
14.671*** 
(15.67) 
15.082*** 
(15.23) 
12.769*** 
(9.86) 
5.582*** 
(15.46) 
4.776*** 
(10.62) 
7.890*** 
(15.94) 
7.891*** 
(14.35) 
6.203*** 
(10.42) 
EQ*HIED (-)   
-6.148*** 
(-11.48) 
-6.256* 
(-8.85) 
-4.849*** 
(-6.72) 
  
-4.247*** 
(-12.62) 
-3.930*** 
(-9.19) 
-2.992*** 
(-4.31) 
Control 
Variables 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of years  11 9 11 9 9 11 9 11 9 9 
Average 
Adjusted R2 
 69.84% 46.54% 70.64% 68.15% 47.69% 69.81% 46.47% 70.43% 67.73% 47.34% 
Column 1, 3, 6 and 8 include PRICE, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, SIZE, MB and LEV as control variables. 
Column 4 and 9 include PRICE, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, SIZE, MB, LEV and INSTITUTE as control variables. 
Column 2, 5, 7 and 10 include PRICE, VOLUME, VOLATILITY, SIZE, MB, LEV, INSTITUTE and ANALYST as control variables. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
 This study investigates the association between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry for a large sample of Japanese manufacturing firms over the period 2002-2012. My 
earnings quality proxies are based on modified Dechow-Dichev accrual quality model and 
Kasznik version of Modified Jones abnormal accruals model. I use relative bid-ask spread as a 
proxy for unobservable information asymmetry.  
 I summarize my results as follows: I begin the empirical examination of the relation 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry with univariate and bivariate analyses, the 
results of which suggest that information asymmetry increases as earnings quality deteriorates. 
Then I conduct multivariate regression of relative bid-ask spread on earnings quality proxies and 
a set of factors known to be systematically associated with the bid-ask spread. I find that poor 
earnings quality is significantly associated with higher level of information asymmetry, 
consistent with my primary hypothesis. I further investigate whether a firm’s information 
environment affects the relationship between earnings quality and information asymmetry. I find 
that the impact of earnings quality on information asymmetry is more pronounced for smaller 
firms and those with low institutional shareholding and analyst coverage. Motivated by the 
findings of prior research that earnings quality is determined by both management 
implementation decisions and economic fundamentals, I separate earnings quality measures into 
two components - an innate component and a discretionary component. Then I examine the 
impact of each component on information asymmetry and find that both components are 
significantly associated with information asymmetry. The innate component has marginally 
higher impact on information asymmetry than discretionary component for KZABS earnings 
quality measure. Additionally, I perform several robustness tests and find that my findings are 
robust to alternative spread measurement period, different proxies of information asymmetry (the 
result is ambiguous for quoted depth), alternate variable specification for earnings quality, and 
alternative estimation procedure. On the whole, this study provides empirical support to the 
theoretical underpinning that disclosure of high-quality information reduces information 
asymmetry in the capital market. The reported findings underscore the positive impact of 
improved earnings quality in the capital market in terms of reducing information asymmetry 
among market participants. 
162 
 
 These findings have a number of implications for the constituents of capital market such 
as corporate managers, general investors, regulators and standard setters. My finding of inverse 
relation between earnings quality and information asymmetry suggests that corporate managers 
seeking to reduce information asymmetry among investors and access to capital market for 
raising fund at a lower cost should provide high-quality information. My findings also suggest 
that general investors need not to spend time and resources on private information search 
activities when firms disseminate high-quality value relevant earnings information. Private 
information acquisition activities involve substantial costs and the expected benefits from trading 
on that information are reduced when firms disclose more high-quality public information. One 
of the prime goals of the regulators is to make the capital market more liquid and vibrant to 
general investors by reducing information inequalities. Corporation’s timely disclosures of high-
quality value relevant information can reduce information asymmetry by limiting the ability of 
informed traders to trade profitably based on private information (Frankel and Li, 2004). 
Therefore, the findings of this chapter are important for the regulators who seek to make the 
capital market more attractive to the general investors by enhancing liquidity through 
implementing a timely and transparent disclosure regime. An important benefit of high-quality 
accounting standards is enhanced liquidity in the stock market (Levitt, 1998). The evidence of 
higher liquidity for firms with higher earnings quality reported in this study has important policy 
implication for the standard setters in Japan. After the stock market crash in the 90s, Japanese 
government initiated several reforms of Japanese financial reporting systems including 
development of new accounting standards which are in line with IFRSs that are presumed to be 
of high quality and voluntary adoption of IFRSs. Thus, standard setters can play a key role in 
reducing information asymmetry by promulgating high-quality accounting standards resulting in 
improved earnings quality. 
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Chapter Seven 
 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary 
 The aim of this chapter is to summarize and discuss the findings and to conclude the 
study. The discussion presented here are the synthesis of the findings from chapter four, five, and 
six that deal with the three individual indicators of stock market outcomes of earnings quality. At 
first, findings are discussed with the relevant literature. Then the contributions and limitations of 
the study are cited before explaining the areas for further study. 
 
7.2 Findings of the Study 
 This study was undertaken to demonstrate empirically the stock market outcomes of 
earnings quality in Japanese equity market. In this thesis, I concentrate on three specific stock 
market outcomes namely cost of equity capital, firm-specific return volatility and information 
asymmetry among investors, and show that the quality of reported earnings of a broad cross-
section of manufacturing firms has a significant positive impact on those outcomes. Further, I 
break down earnings quality measures into innate and discretionary components to examine their 
differential impact on those outcomes. The overall evidence supports the predominance of innate 
components over discretionary components in influencing the cost of equity capital, firm-specific 
return volatility, and information asymmetry. The specific findings for each indicator of stock 
market outcomes are summarized below. 
 Firstly, I investigate the impact of two accruals-based earnings quality measures on two 
proxies for implied cost of equity for a large sample of Japanese manufacturing firms covering 
the period 2002-2012. This investigation has been motivated by the theoretical models predicting 
an association between earnings quality and cost of equity capital. Specifically, I analyze the 
extent to which high-quality earnings are associated with benefits in the form of a lower cost of 
equity capital which is used as an indicator of investors’ resource allocation decisions. The result 
shows that firms with poorer earnings quality exhibit higher cost of equity after controlling for 
other variables known to affect the cost of equity capital. This result is generally robust to a 
battery of sensitivity test, including different estimation procedures, variable specification and 
alternative measures of earnings quality. I also investigate whether the cost of equity effect of 
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earnings quality differs depending on the source of earnings quality. To understand this issue, it 
is important to recognize that earnings quality is affected not only by the discretionary reporting 
choices made by the managers (discretionary factors) but also by the firm’s operating 
environment and its business model (innate factors). This distinction is important because 
managers have little control over the innate factors, at least in the short run. To assess the relative 
contribution of each of the above factors to the cost of equity, I decompose earnings quality into 
an innate component and a discretionary component following the approach outlined in Francis 
et al. (2005). The result shows that innate component of earnings quality has larger cost of equity 
effect than discretionary component. An implication of this finding is that earnings quality has 
larger pricing effect when it is driven by firm-specific operating and environmental uncertainty 
than when it is associated with management discretionary choices. 
 Secondly, I investigate the firm-specific return volatility effect of two accruals-based 
earnings quality measures for a sample of Japanese manufacturing firms for the period 2003-
2012. There is a controversy in the literature over whether firm-specific return volatility captures 
firm-specific information or noise in stock returns. The proponents of information hypothesis 
argue that greater firm-specific return volatility implies more firm-specific information being 
impounded in stock prices whereas the advocates of noise hypothesis claim that greater firm-
specific return volatility is associated with noisier stock prices. I use two different proxies for 
firm-specific return volatility: (1) idiosyncratic volatility based on the variance of the residual 
from the market model, and (2) asynchronicity or lack of synchronicity based on the coefficient 
of determination (R2) from market model. Building on Li et al. (2014) argument, I posit that if 
firm-specific return variation represents firm-specific information, then it should be associated 
with proxies for better information environment. On the other hand, if firm-specific return 
variation captures noise, then it should be associated with proxies for poor information 
environment. I use bid-ask spread, Amihud (2002) illiquidity, liquidity risk, institutional 
ownership and zero return days as suitable surrogates for information environment. Specifically, 
I assume that better information environments are represented by lower bid-ask spreads, lower 
levels of illiquidity and liquidity risk, higher proportion of institutional holding, less zero return 
days and vice-versa. The result shows that both measures of firm-specific return volatility are 
higher in firms with poorer information environment, i.e., higher volatility is correlated with 
higher bid-ask spreads, higher level of illiquidity and liquidity risk, lower institutional ownership, 
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and more zero return days. Therefore, the evidence is more consistent with noise hypothesis. 
However, in an examination of the association between earnings quality and firm-specific return 
volatility using multivariate regression analysis, I find contradictory results. I use two different 
proxies for earnings quality both of which are inverse measures of earnings quality in that higher 
value implies lower quality: (1) accrual quality based on Dechow-Dichev (2002) model, and (2) 
absolute abnormal accruals based on Kasznik (1999) version of modified Jones (1991) model to 
test my hypotheses. Consistent with prior literature, I find a negative relation between 
idiosyncratic volatility and earnings quality supporting noise hypothesis but positive relation 
between asynchronicity and earnings quality supporting information hypothesis. Li et al. (2014) 
show that, although these two measures of firm-specific return volatility are intended to capture 
the same underlying construct, the presumed equivalence between these ostensibly comparable 
dependent variables is problematic. They show that researchers obtain contradictory findings 
when they use idiosyncratic volatility (σe2) versus asynchronicity (Φ) as the dependent variable. 
To address this issue, they analyze the individual components of return asynchronicity, Φ and 
show that a firm’s return asynchronicity is additively increasing in idiosyncratic return volatility, 
σe2, but decreasing in both the inter-temporal variation in the market returns, σrm2, and the stock’s 
β, the individual stock return’s comovement with the market return. Therefore, contradictory 
results could be obtained from the use of Φ versus σe2 as the dependent variable in empirical tests 
if σrm2and β, the two components of Φ, are also strongly related to the independent variable of 
interest. Based on the prediction from decomposition of asynchronicity, Li et al. (2014) suggest 
that controlling for firm-specific beta is important in a cross-sectional setting when 
asynchronicity is the preferred dependent variable. Following Li et al. (2014), I find that earnings 
quality is negatively related to beta and the positive relation between asynchronicity and earnings 
quality is primarily driven by the dominant impact of earnings quality on beta relative to the 
impact of earnings quality on idiosyncratic volatility. This finding emphasizes controlling of beta 
when asynchronicity is the dependent variable. After controlling beta in the idiosyncratic 
volatility and asynchronicity regression, I find that coefficients on both earnings quality measure 
are positive and statistically significant implying that high-quality earnings reduce firm-specific 
return volatility. Thus, my empirical analysis suggests that firm-specific return volatility 
resembles noise, and high earnings quality mitigates noise. I extend these analyses by 
investigating whether the firm-specific return volatility effect differs depending on the 
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component of earnings quality. Following Francis et al. (2005), I use two methods to isolate the 
components of earnings quality. The first method regresses earnings quality on several summary 
indicators of the firm’s operating environment or business model and uses the fitted values from 
annual regression as the innate component of earnings quality and the residual as the 
discretionary component of earnings quality. The second method includes these summary 
indicators as additional control variables in the firm-specific return volatility tests. Regardless of 
the method used to distinguish the components of earnings quality, I find that innate component 
has significantly larger effect on firm-specific return volatility than discretionary component. 
This finding is consistent with earnings quality having larger effect when it is driven by firm-
specific operating and environmental characteristics than when it is associated with discretionary 
decisions. Finally, I examine the sensitivity of the result to alternative asset pricing model. I 
measure idiosyncratic volatility and asynchronicity based on the variance of residuals and R2 
from Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and show that the results from traditional CAPM 
consistent asset pricing model are not sensitive to the alternative firm-specific return volatility 
measures estimated from Fama-French (1993) three-factor model. 
 Thirdly, I investigate the impact of earnings quality on information asymmetry among 
investors in the stock market for a broad cross-section of Japanese manufacturing firms over the 
period 2002-2012. My earnings quality proxies are based on modified Dechow-Dichev accrual 
quality model and Kasznik version of Modified Jones abnormal accruals model. I use relative 
bid-ask spread as a proxy for unobservable information asymmetry. I begin the empirical 
examination of the relation between earnings quality and information asymmetry with univariate 
and bivariate analyses, the results of which suggest that information asymmetry increases as 
earnings quality deteriorates. Then I conduct multivariate regression of relative bid-ask spread on 
earnings quality proxies and a set of factors known to be systematically associated with the bid-
ask spread. I find that poor earnings quality is significantly associated with higher level of 
information asymmetry, consistent with my primary hypothesis. I further investigate whether a 
firm’s information environment affects the relationship between earnings quality and information 
asymmetry. I find that the impact of earnings quality on information asymmetry is more 
pronounced for smaller firms and those with low institutional shareholding and analyst coverage. 
Motivated by the findings of prior research that earnings quality is determined by both 
management implementation decisions and economic fundamentals, I separate earnings quality 
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measures into two components - an innate component and a discretionary component. Then I 
examine the impact of each component on information asymmetry and find that both 
components are significantly associated with information asymmetry. The innate component has 
marginally higher impact on information asymmetry than discretionary component for KZABS 
earnings quality measure. Additionally, I perform several robustness tests and find that my 
findings are robust to alternative spread measurement period, different proxies of information 
asymmetry, alternate variable specification for earnings quality, and alternative estimation 
procedure.  
 Overall, the thesis provides empirical evidence in favor of capital market benefits of 
high-quality earnings. The results confirm that firms that disclose high-quality earnings 
information enjoy greater stock market benefits in terms of lower cost of equity capital, lower 
firm-specific return volatility and less information asymmetry among investors, all of which 
have significant implications for increasing resource allocation efficiency of the stock market. 
 
7.3 Contributions of the Study 
 This study contributes to the extant literature that implicitly or explicitly links earnings 
quality with different capital market outcomes in the following ways.  
 First, there has been tremendous growth in the research on the determinants and 
consequences of earnings quality in last two decades considering the pervasive use of earnings or 
earnings-based metrics in numerous decision contexts. While most of the research is conducted 
in the U.S. context, the number of studies on the capital market consequences undertaken in the 
Japanese market is very limited. Japan has one of the best-developed equity markets in the world 
with sophisticated financial reporting system and distinct institutional arrangement. Following 
the stock market crash in the 1990s, Japanese government introduces reforms of Japanese 
financial systems including reforms of financial reporting and corporate governance. These 
reforms are known as “Big-Bang” accounting reforms in Japan. Most of the reforms were the 
adoption of Western-style financial reporting and governance model that is presumed to be 
superior. For example, in 2000, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) which is analogous to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States was created. Regulators set up 
Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) following the model of Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) of U.S., promulgate new accounting standards that are in line with 
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IFRSs or SFASs, and allow voluntary adoption of IFRSs. All these reforms indicate that 
Japanese financial system is moving from a bank-oriented system to a market-oriented system 
where the quality of reported earnings is going to be a significant issue to the constituents of the 
financial reporting process. Given the second largest equity market in the world in terms of 
market capitalization and number of listed companies, providing evidence from Japan on the 
stock market consequences of earnings quality is important on its own merit. Moreover, the 
evidence from Japan will enhance the robustness, and assess the external validity of the results 
found in the U.S. markets.  
 Second, the study provides empirical evidence supporting the perspective that the quality 
of financial reporting information as captured by two accruals-based measures of earnings 
quality affects rational investors’ capital allocation decisions in the Japanese economy by 
influencing the cost of equity capital. The finding indicates that earnings quality is an important 
factor investors consider in pricing securities. This finding is important for corporate managers 
who want to raise money at a cheaper cost from the capital market.  
 Third, this study contributes to the literature on the firm-specific return volatility 
consequences of earnings quality. The study highlights on the empirical linkage between firm-
specific return volatility and earnings quality and shows that firms with poor earnings quality 
experience high firm-specific return volatility that causes trading of arbitrageurs and option 
traders difficult, complicates the pricing of managerial compensation policies tied to stock 
options and more importantly, makes portfolio diversification tricky for individual investors. 
While some studies attempt to explore the association between firm-specific return volatility and 
earnings quality, they provide inconsistent findings that limit our understanding of the true 
relation between firm-specific return volatility and earnings quality. By providing strong 
evidence on the negative relation between firm-specific return volatility and earnings quality of a 
firm, this study sheds light on the debate on whether greater firm-specific return volatility 
captures value-relevant firm-specific information or noise. The result lends credibility to noise 
based explanation of firm-specific return volatility.  
 Fourth, this study provides reliable empirical evidence that an adverse consequence of 
poor earnings quality is higher information asymmetry as measured by relative bid-ask spread. 
This finding is different from that of Ajward and Takehara (2011) who find a negative but 
insignificant relation (without controlling for alternative portfolio style) between absolute 
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abnormal accruals (Kasznik) and the degree of information asymmetry but an unexpected 
positive and significant relation between accruals quality (Dechow-Dichev) and the degree of 
information asymmetry, where they use probability of information-based trading as a proxy for 
information asymmetry. The differences in results could arise from using different proxies for 
information asymmetry or from different sample period or from applying different research 
design. 
 Fifth, in addition to documenting the impact of total earnings quality, this study attempts 
to distinguish the sources of earnings quality and to investigate the effect of two components of 
earnings quality on the cost of equity capital, firm-specific return volatility and information 
asymmetry among investors. Although there is no cohesive theory that differentiates the impact 
of two components of earnings quality, based on prior research on discretionary accounting 
choices, I hypothesize and find that innate component of earnings quality has a stronger effect on 
the cost of equity capital, firm-specific return volatility, and information asymmetry than 
discretionary component of earnings quality. The result suggests that the impact of earnings 
quality is largely driven by innate features of firms’ operating environment and business models 
rather than management’s short-term reporting choices and implementation decisions. 
 Finally, the research dealing with stock market outcomes of earnings quality is very 
sparse in Japan. Moreover, prior literature provides little guidance on the exact nature of the 
relationship between earnings quality and different indicators of market outcomes. Therefore, 
this study extends the very limited research on the consequences of earnings quality in the 
Japanese setting and adds to a growing body of research that examine the effect of earnings 
quality on the cost of equity capital, firm-specific return volatility and information asymmetry 
among investors. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
 This study suffers from following limitations: 
 First, the study covers a large sample of firms from manufacturing industries only 
because earnings quality proxies employed in the study are believed to better reflect the 
operations of manufacturing firms. Although manufacturing firms account for a sizeable chunk 
of the Japanese stock market, considering manufacturing industries only limits the 
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generalizability of the results to the firms operating in other industries and to the market as a 
whole.  
 Second, the study uses accruals-based earnings quality measures. Inferences relating to 
earnings quality depend on the researchers’ ability to accurately measure earnings quality. In a 
recent review of earnings quality literature, Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that earnings quality 
proxies available in the literature lack convergent validity since all the earnings quality proxies 
are not equally affected by the same determinant, or all proxies do not have similar consequences. 
This also implies that different proxies of earnings quality measure different constructs calling 
into question the construct validity of the proxies. The capital market perspective of earnings 
quality focuses on the precision of earnings with respect to a valuation relevant construct 
(Francis et al. 2006). If the proxies used in this study fail to capture the desired precision, the 
validity of the results will be put into question.   
 Third, in this study, I distinguish total earnings quality into innate and discretionary 
components following the approach outlined in Francis et al. (2005). This approach takes 
advantage of the innate factors describing firms’ operating environment and business model in 
separating innate component from discretionary component. Thus, the accuracy of the estimates 
of two components is dependent on the ability of the innate factors to comprehensively reflect 
firms’ business model and economic environment. Moreover, every earnings quality proxy is 
measured with error that is neither related to innate factors nor associated with reporting choices. 
One limitation of this approach is that it provides a separate measure of innate component and 
discretionary component but cannot parse out the noise. Since the residual from a regression of 
total earnings quality on innate factors is defined as discretionary component, it 
methodologically combines the effect of discretionary reporting choices and pure noise, which 
may confound the effect of discretionary component.  
 
7.5 Direction for Future Research 
 The following are some of the issues worthy of future research that could stem directly 
from this research: 
 First, researchers have identified a variety of indicators of market outcomes in the context 
of earnings quality research that has established a link between earnings quality and capital 
market effects. In this thesis, I investigate the effect of earnings quality on the cost of equity 
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capital, on firm-specific return volatility, and on information asymmetry. Future research on the 
market outcomes of earnings quality could consider other indicators of market outcomes such as 
the behavior of abnormal returns or the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts as measured by 
accuracy and dispersion. 
 Second, while the study documents a significant negative association between earnings 
quality and cost of equity in the sense that firms with poor earnings quality experience higher 
cost of equity, this study does not attempt to specify any linkage through which earnings quality 
affects the cost of equity. Since there is no consensus among underlying mechanisms that relate 
earnings quality with cost of capital, future research should be directed to explore possible 
channels of this relation to better understand why earnings quality as a summary indicator of 
financial reporting quality should impact cost of equity capital which is used as a summary 
indicator of capital allocation decision and why managers should strive for disseminating better 
quality information to users of accounting information. 
 Third, the study confirms the existence of a significant cross-sectional association 
between firm-specific return volatility and earnings quality. However, examining and relating the 
time-series behavior of earnings quality with overtime changes in firm-specific return volatility 
can be an important avenue for future research for a deeper understanding of the relation 
between these two variables.  
 Fourth, prior research suggests that high-quality disclosure can affect information 
asymmetry by altering the trading pattern of uninformed investors or by discouraging costly 
private information search activities. While the findings of this study suggest an inverse relation 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry, this study does not uncover the exact 
channel through which earnings quality is linked with information asymmetry. Therefore, future 
research may consider exploring the underlying mechanism through which poor earnings quality 
leads to higher information asymmetry with a view to enriching our understanding of the relation 
between earnings quality and information asymmetry. 
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables from Chapter Four 
Variable Definition 
Implied Cost of Equity Measures 
Earning-price ratio EP Annual earnings per share (positive) of firm i divided by the stock price 
three months after fiscal year end t. 
Industry-adjusted 
earnings-price ratio 
IndEP The difference between EP ratio of firm i and the median industry EP 
ratio in year t. 
Easton’s implied 
cost of equity 
CoE Implied cost of equity of firm i in year t estimated based on Easton 
(2004) PEG ratio approach. 
Earnings Quality Variables 
Dechow-Dichev 
Accruals quality 
DDSTD Standard deviation of residuals estimated from a modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model for firm i over years t-4 through t. 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + φ4ΔREVi,t + φ5PPEi,t 
+ νi,t, 
where TCAi,t is the total current accruals (using the balance sheet 
approach), CFOi,t is the cash flow from operations, ΔREVi,t is the 
change in total revenue, PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment, and all variables in the equation are deflated by average 
total assets. I estimate the above model for every industry-year in each 
of the 15 Nikkei two-digit industry groups in which I require at least 10 
firms in year t. 
Innate component InnateEQ InnateEQ is the fitted value from Eq. (4.4) where the dependent variable 
is DDSTD. 
Discretionary 
component 
DiscEQ DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (4.4) where the dependent variable is 
DDSTD. 
Kasznik’s absolute 
abnormal accruals 
KZABS The absolute value of abnormal accruals from Kasznik version of Jones 
(1991) model. 
TAi,t = δ0 + δ1(ΔREVi,t - ΔARi,t) + δ2PPEi,t + δ3ΔCFOi,t + ηi,t , 
where TAi,t is the total accruals (using the balance sheet approach), 
ΔREVi,t is the change in total revenue, ΔARi,t is the change in net 
accounts receivable, PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment, ΔCFOi,t is the change in cash flows from operation, and all 
variables in the equation are deflated by average total assets. I estimate 
the above model for every industry-year in each of the 15 Nikkei two-
digit industry groups in which I require at least 10 firms in year t.  
Innate component InnateEQ InnateEQ is the fitted value from Eq. (4.4) where the dependent variable 
is KZABS. 
Discretionary 
component 
DiscEQ DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (4.4) where the dependent variable is 
KZABS. 
Earnings Quality Measurement Variables 
Total current 
accruals 
TCA Total current accruals = ∆CA – ∆CL – ∆Cash + ∆STDEBT where ∆CA 
is the change in current assets, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, 
∆Cash is the change in cash, ∆STDEBT is the change in short-term debt 
included in current liabilities. 
Total accruals TA Total accruals = TCA – DEP where TCA is the total current accruals 
and DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense. 
Cash flows from 
operation 
CFO Cash flows from operation = NI – TA where NI is the net income and 
TA is the total accruals. 
OR 
Cash flows from operation = NI – TCA + DEP where NI is the net 
income, TCA is the total current accruals and DEP is the depreciation 
and amortization expense 
187 
 
Change in revenue ΔREV Changes in total revenues from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Property, plant and 
equipment 
PPE The gross value of property, plant, and equipment of firm i at year t. 
Change in accounts 
receivable 
ΔAR Changes in net accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Change in cash 
flows from 
operation 
ΔCFO Changes in cash flows from operation from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Earnings Quality Determinants Variables 
Size ASSET Firm size is proxied by the natural log of firm i’s total assets in year t. 
Cash flows 
volatility 
VCFO The standard deviation of firm i’s rolling five-year cash flows from 
operation, scaled by average total assets. 
Sales volatility VSALES The standard deviation of firm i’s rolling five-year sales revenues, 
scaled by average total assets. 
Operating cycle OPCYCLE The natural log of the sum of firm i’s days accounts receivable and days 
inventory in year t.  
Days accounts receivable = 360/(Sales/Average accounts receivable). 
Days inventory = 360/(Cost of goods sold/Average inventory) 
Incidence of 
negative earnings 
NEG Firm i's proportion of losses over the prior five years. 
Intangible intensity INTAN The sum of firm i's reported R&D and advertising expense as a 
proportion of its sales revenues in year t; missing values of R&D and 
advertising expense are set to zero. 
Absence of 
reported intangible 
INTANDUM The absence of reported intangible is captured by an indicator variable, 
INTANDUM, which is equal to 1 for firms with INTAN = 0, and 0, 
otherwise. 
Capital intensity CAPITAL The ratio of firm i’s  net book value of property, plant, and equipment to 
total assets in year t. 
Control Variables 
Systematic risk BETA The market beta for firm i in year t is measured using the market model 
of CAPM, estimated using monthly returns data over a rolling five-year 
windows; I require a firm to have at least 18 monthly returns for this 
estimation. The NPM Topix return is used as the market return. 
Firm size  SIZE Natural logarithm of market capitalization. Market capitalization is 
calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of 
shares outstanding at fiscal year-end. 
Book-to-market 
ratio 
BM Fiscal-year-end book value of equity over fiscal-year-end market value 
of equity. 
Leverage LEV Firm i’s ratio of interest-bearing debt to market value of equity in fiscal 
year t. 
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Appendix B: Definition of Variables from Chapter Five 
Variable Definition 
Firm-specific Return Volatility Variables 
Idiosyncratic 
volatility 
[σe
2], ln[σe
2] Variance of daily excess returns adjusted for the expected returns of the 
market model (CAPM) for firm i in fiscal year t. Specifically, [σe
2] is 
the variance of residuals from a regression of stock return on market 
index return on a daily basis. ln[σe
2] is the natural logarithm of [σe
2]. 
Asynchronicity  Ф ln[(1-R2)/R2] and R2 is estimated from the market model (CAPM) for 
firm i in fiscal year t.  
Beta squared [β2], ln[β2] Beta squared for firm i in fiscal year t. Beta squared is the square of 
market beta estimated from the market model (CAPM) using daily 
returns in a fiscal year. ln[β2] is the natural logarithm of [β2]. 
Earnings Quality Variables 
Accruals quality DDSTD Standard deviation of residuals estimated from a modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model for firm i over years t-4 through t. 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + φ4ΔREVi,t + φ5PPEi,t 
+ νi,t, 
where TCAi,t is the total current accruals (using the balance sheet 
approach), CFOi,t is the cash flow from operations, ΔREVi,t is the 
change in total revenue, PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment, and all variables in the equation are deflated by average 
total assets. I estimate the above model for every industry-year in each 
of the 15 Nikkei two-digit industry groups in which I require at least 10 
firms in year t. 
Innate component InnateEQ InnateEQ is the fitted value from Eq. (5.8) where the dependent variable 
is DDSTD. 
Discretionary 
component 
DiscEQ DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (5.8) where the dependent variable is 
DDSTD. 
Absolute value of 
abnormal accruals 
KZABS The absolute value of abnormal accruals from Kasznik version of 
modified Jones (1991) model. 
TAi,t = δ0 + δ1(ΔREVi,t - ΔARi,t) + δ2PPEi,t + δ3 ΔCFOi,t + ηi,t , 
where TAi,t is the total accruals (using the balance sheet approach), 
ΔREVi,t is the change in total revenue, ΔARi,t is the change in accounts 
receivable, PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant, and equipment, 
ΔCFOi,t is the change in cash flows from operation, and all variables in 
the equation are deflated by average total assets. I estimate the above 
model for every industry-year in each of the 15 Nikkei two-digit 
industry groups in which I require at least 10 firms in year t.  
Innate component InnateEQ InnateEQ is the fitted value from Eq. (5.8) where the dependent variable 
is KZABS. 
Discretionary 
component 
DiscEQ DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (5.8) where the dependent variable is 
KZABS. 
Earnings Quality Measurement Variables 
Total current 
accruals 
TCA Total current accruals = ∆CA – ∆CL – ∆Cash + ∆STDEBT where ∆CA 
is the change in current assets, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, 
∆Cash is the change in cash, ∆STDEBT is the change in short-term debt 
included in current liabilities. 
Total accruals TA Total accruals = TCA – DEP where TCA is the total current accruals 
and DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense. 
Cash flows from 
operation 
CFO Cash flows from operation = NI – TA where NI is the net income and 
TA is the total accruals. 
OR 
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Cash flows from operation = NI – TCA + DEP where NI is the net 
income, TCA is the total current accruals and DEP is the depreciation 
and amortization expense 
Change in revenue ΔREV Changes in total revenues from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Property, plant and 
equipment 
PPE The gross value of property, plant, and equipment of firm i at year t. 
Change in accounts 
receivable 
ΔAR Changes in net accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Change in CFO ΔCFO Changes in cash flows from operation from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Earnings Quality Determinants Variables 
Total assets ASSET Firm size is proxied by the natural log of firm i’s total assets in year t. 
Cash flows 
volatility 
VCFO The standard deviation of firm i’s rolling five-year cash flows from 
operation, scaled by average total assets. 
Sales volatility VSALES The standard deviation of firm i’s rolling five-year sales revenues, 
scaled by average total assets. 
Operating cycle OPCYCLE The natural log of the sum of firm i’s days accounts receivable and days 
inventory in year t.  
Days accounts receivable = 360/(Sales/Average accounts receivable).  
Days inventory = 360/(Cost of goods sold/Average inventory) 
Incidence of 
negative earnings 
NEG Firm i's proportion of losses over the prior five years. 
Intangible intensity INTAN The sum of firm i's reported R&D and advertising expense as a 
proportion of its sales revenues in year t; missing values of R&D and 
advertising expense are set to zero. 
Absence of 
reported intangible 
INTANDUM The absence of reported intangible is captured by an indicator variable, 
INTANDUM, which is equal to 1 for firms with INTAN = 0, and 0, 
otherwise. 
Capital intensity CAPITAL The ratio of firm i’s  net book value of property, plant, and equipment to 
total assets in year t. 
Control Variables 
Earnings related 
value-relevant 
information 
RET2 The squared annual buy and hold return for firm i in fiscal year t. To be 
consistent with the measurement of idiosyncratic volatility, measured as 
the variance of stock return, I use the squared transformation of stock 
returns. 
Informativeness of 
earnings quality for 
future cash flows 
CFO Net income less total accruals scaled by average total assets. Firm i’s 
cash flows from operation for year t+1 is used as a proxy for 
informativeness of earnings quality for future cash flows. 
Operating 
performance 
ROE Return on equity is calculated as net income divided by lagged book 
value of equity. 
Firm size  SIZE Natural logarithm of market capitalization. Market capitalization is 
calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of 
shares outstanding at fiscal year-end. 
Leverage LEV Firm i’s ratio of long-term debt to total assets in fiscal year t. 
Book-to-market 
ratio 
BM Fiscal-year-end book value of equity over fiscal-year-end market value 
of equity. 
Stock return 
performance 
RET Contemporaneous buy and hold returns for firm i in fiscal year t. 
Loss firms LOSS A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm-year reports negative 
earnings or losses and 0, otherwise. 
Return skewness SKEW Skewness of the firm-specific daily return for firm i in fiscal year t. 
Return kurtosis KURT Kurtosis of the firm-specific daily return for firm i in fiscal year t. 
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Information Environment Variables 
Bid-ask spread SPREAD The average of daily bid-ask spread for firm i in fiscal year t. The daily 
spread is calculated as the absolute difference between daily closing 
quoted ask price and closing quoted bid price, deflated by the mid-point 
of ask and bid price. I drop those days for which either ask price or bid 
price is zero from my calculation of spread measure. Finally, I require at 
least 150 days of non-zero ask and bid price for bid-ask spread 
calculation. 
Illiquidity measure ILLIQUID The illiquidity of a stock is measured as the average of daily price 
impact of trade. Following Amihud (2002), I compute the daily price 
impact of trade as |Return×100|/(Price×Volume/1,000), where Return is 
the daily stock return, Price is the daily closing price of the stock and 
Volume is the daily trading volume. 
Liquidity risk ILLIQVOL Annual standard deviation of the daily ILLIQUID measure for firm i in 
fiscal year t. 
Institutional 
ownership  
INSTITUTE The proportion of outstanding shares held by institutional investors for 
firm i in fiscal year t. 
Zero return days ZRDAYS The ratio of total number of days yielding zero returns in a fiscal year t 
to total number of trading days in that fiscal year for firm i. 
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Appendix C: Definition of Variables from Chapter Six 
Variable Definition 
Information Asymmetry Variable 
Bid-ask spread SPREAD The average of daily bid-ask spread for firm i in year t. The daily 
spread is calculated as the difference between daily closing quoted ask 
price and closing quoted bid price, deflated by the mid-point of ask 
and bid price. I drop those days for which either ask price or bid price 
is zero from my calculation of spread measure. Finally, I require at 
least 150 days of non-zero ask and bid price for bid-ask spread 
calculation. I use natural log of spread measure in empirical analysis.  
Earnings Quality Variables 
Accruals quality DDSTD Standard deviation of residuals estimated from a modified Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model for firm i over years t-4 through t. 
TCAi,t = φ0 + φ1CFOi,t-1 + φ2CFOi,t + φ3CFOi,t+1 + φ4ΔREVi,t + 
φ5PPEi,t + νi,t, 
where TCAi,t is the total current accruals (using the balance sheet 
approach), CFOi,t is the cash flow from operations, ΔREVi,t is the 
change in total revenue, PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment, and all variables in the equation are deflated by average 
total assets. I estimate the above model for every industry-year in each 
of the 15 Nikkei two-digit industry groups in which I require at least 
10 firms in year t. 
Innate component InnateEQ InnateEQ is the fitted value from Eq. (6.5) where the dependent 
variable is DDSTD. 
Discretionary 
component 
DiscEQ DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (6.5) where the dependent variable is 
DDSTD. 
Absolute value of 
abnormal accruals 
KZABS The absolute value of abnormal accruals from Kasznik version of 
modified Jones (1991) model. 
TAi,t = δ0 + δ1(ΔREVi,t - ΔARi,t) + δ2PPEi,t + δ3 ΔCFOi,t + ηi,t , 
where TAi,t is the total accruals (using the balance sheet approach), 
ΔREVi,t is the change in total revenue, ΔARi,t is the change in accounts 
receivable, PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant, and equipment, 
ΔCFOi,t is the change in cash flows from operation, and all variables in 
the equation are deflated by average total assets. I estimate the above 
model for every industry-year in each of the 15 Nikkei two-digit 
industry groups in which I require at least 10 firms in year t.  
Innate component InnateEQ InnateEQ is the fitted value from Eq. (6.5) where the dependent 
variable is KZABS. 
Discretionary 
component 
DiscEQ DiscEQ is the residual from Eq. (6.5) where the dependent variable is 
KZABS. 
Earnings Quality Measurement Variables 
Total current 
accruals 
TCA Total current accruals = ∆CA – ∆CL – ∆Cash + ∆STDEBT where 
∆CA is the change in current assets, ∆CL is the change in current 
liabilities, ∆Cash is the change in cash, ∆STDEBT is the change in 
short-term debt included in current liabilities. 
Total accruals TA Total accruals = TCA – DEP where TCA is the total current accruals 
and DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense. 
Cash flows from 
operation 
CFO Cash flows from operation = NI – TA where NI is the net income and 
TA is the total accruals. 
OR 
Cash flows from operation = NI – TCA + DEP where NI is the net 
income, TCA is the total current accruals and DEP is the depreciation 
and amortization expense 
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Change in revenue ΔREV Changes in total revenues from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Property, plant and 
equipment 
PPE The gross value of property, plant, and equipment of firm i at year t. 
Change in accounts 
receivable 
ΔAR Changes in net accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Change in CFO ΔCFO Changes in cash flows from operation from year t-1 to year t for firm i. 
Earnings Quality Determinants Variables 
Total assets ASSET Firm size is proxied by the natural log of firm i’s total assets in year t. 
Cash flows 
volatility 
VCFO The standard deviation of firm i’s rolling five-year cash flows from 
operation, scaled by average total assets. 
Sales volatility VSALES The standard deviation of firm i’s rolling five-year sales revenues, 
scaled by average total assets. 
Operating cycle OPCYCLE The natural log of the sum of firm i’s days accounts receivable and 
days inventory in year t.  
Days accounts receivable = 360/(Sales/Average accounts receivable).  
Days inventory = 360/(Cost of goods sold/Average inventory) 
Incidence of 
negative earnings 
NEG Firm i's proportion of losses over the prior five years. 
Intangible intensity INTAN The sum of firm i's reported R&D and advertising expense as a 
proportion of its sales revenues in year t; missing values of R&D and 
advertising expense are set to zero. 
Absence of 
reported intangible 
INTANDUM The absence of reported intangible is captured by an indicator variable, 
INTANDUM, which is equal to 1 for firms with INTAN = 0, and 0, 
otherwise. 
Capital intensity CAPITAL The ratio of firm i’s  net book value of property, plant, and equipment 
to total assets in year t. 
Control Variables 
Stock price PRICE The mean value of daily closing price for firm i in year t. I require at 
least 150 days of closing price for a firm in a year to compute this 
variable. This variable is log transformed. 
Trading volume VOLUME The mean value of daily trading volume for firm i in year t. The 
calculation requires minimum 150 days of trading volume in shares for 
a firm in a year. I take natural log of this variable. 
Stock return 
volatility 
VOLATILITY The variance of daily stock returns for firm i in year t. I require at least 
150 days of return data to measure return volatility. I log transform this 
variable. 
Firm size  SIZE Natural logarithm of market capitalization. Market capitalization is 
calculated as the year-end closing price times the number of shares 
outstanding at year-end. 
Market-to-book 
ratio 
MB Firm i’s ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity in year 
t. Market value of equity is estimated as the year-end closing price 
times the number of shares outstanding at year-end. I use logarithmic 
transformation of this variable. 
Leverage LEV Firm i’s ratio of interest-bearing debt to market value of equity in year 
t. I use log transformation of this variable. 
Institutional 
ownership  
INSTITUTE The proportion of outstanding shares held by institutional investors for 
firm i in year t. 
Number of analyst 
following 
ANALYST The maximum number of individual analysts providing next year 
earnings forecasts for firm i in year t. 
 
 
 
